International systems change: integration or disintegration? by Ertl, Alan
  
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS CHANGE: INTEGRATION 
OR DISINTEGRATION? 
 
 
Alan Ertl 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
  
1989 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15224  
     
           
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS CHANGE:
INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?
ALAN ERTL
SUBMITTED AS PARTIAL REQUIREMENT FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS
2 JUNE 1986
ProQuest Number: 10170829
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, 
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10170829
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code 
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
0
I, Alan Ertl, hereby certify that this thesis, which is 
approximately 100,000 words in length, has been written by 
me, that it is a record of work carried out by me and that 
it has not been submitted in any previous application for a 
h i ghe r degree.
June 2 , 1988 _____:_____________________________________
Alan Ertl
I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance No. 12 
in Martinmas Term, 1985. and as a candidate for the degree 
of Ph.D. in Martinmas Term, 1986; the higher study for which 
this is a record was carried out in the University of St. 
Andrews between 1985 and 1988.
June 2 . 1988 ____________
Alan Ert1
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the
conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the University of St. 
Andrews and that the candidate is aualified to submit this 
thesis in application for that degree.
June 2, 1988 _______________________________________________
Signature of Supervisor
In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I 
understand that I am giving permission for it to be made 
available for use in accordance with the regulations of the 
University Library for the time being in force, subject to 
any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. 
1 also understand that the title and abstract will be 
published, and that a copy of the work may be made and 
supplied to any bona fide library or research worker.
June 2. 1988
Alan Ertl
ABSTRACT
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS CHANGE;
INTEGRATION OR DISINTEGRATION?
Homo sapiens seek stabilisation and tend toward a state 
of equilibrium in life and. in times of rapid change, 
attempt even more to achieve a relative condition 
approaching a normative status quo. International systems 
tend also to focus on stabilising behaviour in a like manner 
as a quantitative enlargement of the individual phenomenon. 
Within the European context, expansion Cintearation), as an 
attempt to maintain stability. may not be achieving the
hoped for success because of the do_ut de s phenomenon.
Single collectivities attempt a best possible relationship 
based on particularistic motives. Theories have yet to 
focus on tne social dimer.sion of integration and tend to 
selectively single out tne more readily available economic 
and political aspects. Effective, expanded society is the 
product of mutual feelings, often unarticulated, with higher 
degrees of consonance more prone to integrate, given the 
extensive range of compatici11ties. than non-European 
societies exhibiting dissonance- Individuals, fundamentally 
motivated by needs, resotnc to needs in similar fashions.
developing linkages. But now can authority shift if the 
authoritarian state is unwilling to Telinquimh same? The 
opposite to author 1 tar iar. prejudicial subjectiveness is 
objective humanistic liberalism, a product highly correlated
with education and exDOSure. Collectivities arow
organically from within. ough cognition, and during rapid
change, International accommodation may develop most
effectively only on this basis. An adequate assessment and 
projection of European Integration may be possible only by 
determining the causation and degree of the individual
comm i tment.
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Change Is an ineluctable endemic feature of' life and 
evidenced by the very fact that the form of today's life, 
its patterns, modes, and expressions have substantia 1ly 
altered from the form that existed previously.1 Change 
is taking place singularly, on the biographical level as 
well as in the aggregate, collectively, on the societal- 
level.® The latter portion of the twentieth century may - 
be unique in man's historical experience in that the degree 
of change has both accelerated significantly over previous 
historical periods and may now have permeated significantly 
all levels and functions of global society.'-5 The very 
mercurial nature of life places both .man and society in the 
position of having to constantly and continually make 
adjustments for the maintenance of a homeostatic
equilibrium. The quest for an equilibrium status on the 
intra-societa 1 level mandates a degree of rapprochement 
analogous with the conceptualisation of integrated society; 
an obverse state is one of isolation. A significant 
mutational result of change, in the modern epoch, is the 
development of interdependencies, dependencies which fall in 
the material, the security, or the social realm of
consideration. z*
—Materially: economically interdependent society has
become the hallmark of advanced domestic economics.
—Security: interdependencies evidenced by bilateral and
multi-lateral arrangements have become requisite
2features of international life and
—Socially: interdependencies or alignments of previously
autonomous cultures are producing global societal 
mono-characteristics to a degree heretofore unknown.
An attempt to curb the proliferation of these
1 nterdependerxc i e s , an effect 5 ve- retreat to a- state of
isolation, would produce ex consequenti a net reduction in 
the gains these interdependencies have thus far achieved 
with a corresponding retardation of further expansion of 
such linkages. An antipathetic motion, as such, is the all 
consuming nature of change. The causation of change is 
essentially modernity,55 and its effect on collective 
group status is one of- abnegating traditional parameters 
tending toward a state of homogenisation. .Singular 
societies intra-group homogenisation is in this respect 
synonomous with integration. This paper will attempt to 
make a subjective locative assessment of integration 
relating to European societies. Material, security, and
social consi derat ions fall within the realm of economic and
politics, and align themselves with the concepts of man in 
society. It is the argument here that all three 
considerations are essentially amorphic and interrelate, and 
function tri a jurtcta in uno necessitating an analysis of 
European Integration to take an holistic telos,&
The question of European integration, or conversely 
that of European disintegration, is essentially a question 
with ramifications extending to the very consideration of 
the existence of Europe. The cui bono of the question is
more than an adraanum consideration for European society per 
se. Its import has considerable ramifications for world 
society, for although being played out on a European stage, 
the audience Is global. The drama is by no means 
inelaborate; to a great degree the action impends with that 
wor-ld audience, as in many respects the action relates to 
telekinesis drawn from that audience. And It may be. that 
the adf inea of the production will have a- concatenate effect 
on the casual observer. This synoptic depiction Is 
purposely aimed at highlighting the fact that, in the 
transparent world of today, action is interlinked, and, In 
an age of globenascence, suuss cuique action is unimaginable. 
Total communications at the present level of modernity with 
its expansions of knowledge7 has heightened the stakes 
and to a great degree changed the rules in the economic, 
pol it i ca 1 and social game of life. For Europe, the Idea of 
integration has been for the most part a consideration aimed 
at stabilising conduct but may now extend to the
consideration of life itself.®
This century under Germany, the last century under 
France, and In previous centuries under Austria or Spain or 
Holland or Italy, individuals with philosophies and
Ideologies attempted unification. These ideologies were 
more or less designed for, and often amounted to, a 
conceptualisation of the integration of Europe. The Idea of 
an Integrated Europe is the idea of a Utopia.'5’ Six 
hundred years ago, it seemed utopian to wish to liberate the
3
peasants of Switzerland from the power of the Bapsburgs and
unite in a Helvetian Republic. Five hundred years ago, the 
unification of France seemed utopian as did the unification 
of Spain with the expulsion of the Koors from Europe. Four 
hundred years ago, the unification of England and Scotland 
in a Great Britain seemed utopian. Three hundred years ago, 
the liberation of Hungary! from the Turkish domination seemed 
utopian, as did two hundred years ago, the restoration of 
Greece. A century and a half ago, the unification and 
restoration of Poland, Rumania, and Jugoslavia and one 
hundred years ago the unification of Italy seemed utopian, 
as did forty years ago, the unification of the Aryan 
cultures.10 Today the utopian ideal has extended to the
creation of the -Europe a n Co bub un i ties with an 'ever
increasing unity'11 of European Individuals.131 Some
movements have been successful; others have not. In some
respects, theireality of an integrated Europe has already 
flourished; in others, the idea has not yet begun to 
germinate . 1:3
In the first instance, the primary consideration must 
be given to the 'why' of unification. This critical 
consideration is one of peace, specifically peace 
maintenance. Latterly that has been expanded to prosperity, 
the concept of the benefits of peace, being essentially 
economic, political, and social in nature. Such benefits 
are the domestic gains achieved by intercommunal activity 
normalising the intra-societa 1 environment and are so 
extensive that a certain minimum of agreed order in the 
international system appears to be desirable.1"14 If the
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5stakes of the peace game brought about by technological 
advancement have Increased to the point of possible total 
European hydragination, the necessity for integration 
becomes more apparent. It is not only a consideration of 
finding an optimal condition in which to conduct life, it 
may alao be, now, one that extends to the continuance of
life itself.
The focus of this paper is on the INDIVIDUAL,, as it is
ultimately he who Integrates. It will be argued in this 
paper that integration is achieved Individually in only one 
way, the way it has always taken place - through
soc ialisation.
Aristotle's early analysis traced the theoretical 
beginnings of man from singular society to the society that 
he knew at that time, the City-State.5® For him, the 
City-State encpiopas-sed a unit of a few thousand individuals 
- citizens. Today the process of socialisation has brought
the level of human societies to that of nations. Nations
being anything from a few hundred thousand to several tens 
of millions of individuals. The process of socialisation 
allows for integration functioning as a series of movements 
not dissimilar to the workings of a ratchet. Growth is from 
small to large. If socialisation has brought society to the 
level of nations, the next logical, intra a 11 a , movement of 
the ratchet would produce some sort of seta-national 
society. A seta-national society would be the effectual 
outcome of further Integration In Europe.
By far the greatest contribution to the understanding
6of integration has been made as a direct result of the total 
wars which characterised the first half of this century. It 
was motivated by the desire to identify, and control, the 
causality of adverse international relations. International 
relations often “arises out of inequality and adversity 
between-states in terms of resources, development,
ideologies and standards of living.'61*^ Disparities are 
frequently causations! to an attempt to 'normalise', 
relations via the achievement of an international system 
“achieving consensus of a kind.1’17’ The international 
system, a product of international politics, is essentially 
a “ceaseless struggle” tending toward a stabilising 
consensus. States are fundamentally the principal actors in 
the arena of international politics. xer As such, states 
exhibit alongside their Internal regulatory obligations, 
obligations in.jthe external sphere adjunct to their position 
within the internationa1 system. The operational elements 
are those of inequalities, interests, and governments, 
functioning as a tripolitic modus operandl19 ameliorated 
by regimes and systems. The theory hypothetically 
postulates integrated society as an alternative to conflict.
Theories of integration are essentially Ca} reductive 
or Cb} systemic in nature. The Ca} reduct Iona 1ist theories 
generated by the body of economic literature,20 which 
postulated gains in trade, or disadvantages of trade 
diversion, are generally descriptive in nature, and relate 
to theoretical expansion of, for example, a given customs 
union area. These reductive approaches to integration do
7little to encapsulate the operational imperatives of
integration. This is so. as the reduct Iona 11sts
persistently proposed theories, hypotheses, and techniques 
ainiiBallslng the systemic uncertainty, combined within their 
general equilibrium formulations,21 The ChO systemic 
theories are primari-ly the result of political thought,22:2 
descriptive of interrelations within entitles and venture 
modestly into the area of hypothetical generalisations as to 
the 'hows' of integrational development.12'5 Both of these 
schools of thought summarily overgo the individual as 
central to the primary focus of the consideration.
In order to understand the creation of multi-national
society, it' is necessary to understand nations, groups of
individuals, This paper will r-eview the literature with 
regard to the salient elements that comprise the nation. In
the final analysis, what is important and what_f unct ions a s
the operational_imperative for nations is the concept of
COMHUNICATI ON - interaction between individuals on a
frequent, meaningful, and coherent level. This Implies 
identification. Modern society is characterised by a high
degree of centra 11 sat ion. Centralisation has aided the 
nation-building process, and simultaneously may tend in and 
of itself, to discourage the continuation of further 
socialisation leading towards International integrated 
society. Modernisation mandates a high degree of LITERACY,
roughly synonymous with education, which has fallen Into the 
hands, and is essentially the function, of these centralised
governments.
Primitive and non-literate societies tend on an
individual level, to educate the young, the new incumbents 
into society, locally, imbuing them -with local values and 
traditions. As modernity advances, the necessity increases 
for specialised education. Where once the child was 
educated and initiated into society by its i aimed i a-t e family, 
modernity requires the introduction of collective
educational institutions which- implement collective, less 
specific, store generalised, values and traditions.
Modernity has forced a situation in which the kin group has 
lost its primary importance as socialisation has changed its 
motive from specifics to general universal, having been 
taken over by centralised society or at least indirectly 
central governments. This not only means the loss of kin 
identity, but also the creation of a void being filled with 
a community or national ident 1 ty. Modernisation has
been instrumental in the creation of nation and could,
theoretically, on the same grounds, be instrumental in the
creation of multi-nationalities. If individual
identification relates to successful socialisation, the
logical question follows, what sort of education are
Europeans today undergoing? For inherent within the
creation of a collective identity, with standarlsed values 
and ideals, is the opposing notion of otherness, the 
significant detrimental notion of xenophobia.
This question suggests that knowledge of other groups 
is paramount to an essential pre-condition for the 
development of identification and ultimate integration
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9linkages. The amount of education along these lines being 
conducted in Western European countries way be directly 
related to an ultimate integrated European environment.
This analysis_wi11 show that there is little coordination, 
and, with few exceptions, there is fundamentally little 
dedication to the- idea of further integration. i.e.» of 
allowing an optimal condition to evolve by the domestic 
governments that would produce within the young the idea of 
an integrated European.
This paper is not designed to argue the case either for 
or against European integration. It is an attempt to 
analyse the internationa1 system today, in light of change, 
to determine overall movement. . In this respect, it exhibits 
a degree of uniqueness in that it loosens the ties of a 
strictly mono-dimensional approach to the question of 
integration by opening the parameters of the'consideration 
to Incorporate multi-dimensionality, specifically, economic, 
political and social perspectives and thus examines the
process as what it is, multi-dimensional in substance.23
The problem with such a macro approach is that of 
clarity, and specificity, clouding an otherwise complex 
consideration. This will be overcome by focusing centrally
on the individual, as homo politicus, homo_econoaicus, and
homo soc i us. Aspects of the individual who, as the chief 
participant, is the central focus of integration. His 
attitudes_and actions are salient in the final analysis.
Looking further, this paper examines the European 
Economic Community as the primary actor on the international
10
stage promulgating European integration. On a cognitive 
level, the preliminary outcome shows little positive 
integration resulting by Sts activities. If integration is 
ultimately an individual phenomenon, the question would 
suggest an examination of the degree of Community endeavours 
directly affecting individuals. One could summarily 
conclude that the reason why integration in Europe is not 
going forward with a -higher degree of intensity may be
because there is a lack of fundamental commitment to a
European end by the domestic states who comprise and
dominate the community. In order to understand this, it is
essential to understand the State. Classical Theorists
posit man as living in a state of nature- If this is so. 
the individual associates, for security, in a pact with the
State. In return for security, the State is allowed the
opportunity' to exercise sovereignty in exchange for
individual loyalty. This system is legitimised within the 
society, and, in European society, especially since the 
beginning of the last century.^6 The state is viewed by 
nationals as a security provider.
States have become identified, if not frequently 
synonymous, with nations, and each exercises its own 
sovereignty. Each nation state with its own bureaucratic 
system possesses various elements which comprise an overall 
power structure, jealously guarding its own identity.
Perhaps the most notable stumbling block in the wider 
process of socialisation has been the advent of literacy, 
where each nation state is fundamenta 1ly identified with a
11
specific highly developed language with its related thereto 
body of literature, producing formal differences between 
nation-state units. Previously, prior to the advent of 
literacy, language was of little significance. For example, 
in early England, subsequent to the Norman invasion, the 
then spoken Saxon as the lingua franca was the medium by 
which individuals integrated, while the overlay of French 
continued, forming the foundation of modern English.
Indeed, linguistic and other cultural borrowings took, place. 
Since the advent of literacy this degree of flexibility has
been lost. It is the direct result of modernity and may be 
essentially countered by an effective initiation of language 
studies in the domestic States’ school systems. Why it is 
not being done may be the reason why Europe is not
integra11 ng, i.e., it may be an intentional or implied 
action by the State to protect- the State’s sovereign _ -
autonomy.
In a world where internationa1 systems are changing, 
when regimes are constantly at flux with each other, it may 
be becoming more and more difficult for States to justify 
their position within the eyes of their various nations. 
Technological advancement requires further knowledge, often 
necessarily gleaned from external national societies, making 
it increasingly more difficult for States to function 
autonomously. Economically, an example of'this was
deraonst rated very dramatically by the first oil crisis where 
an outside party, indeed a non-European group, significantly 
altered the economic product ion-employment-inflation
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equilibrium of European countries. The States of Europe 
were powerless to avert the ensuing catastrophic 
rawifIcatlons. Politically, an example of this on the 
domestic population may be seen by the effect of third 
parties on the State Itself. In Britain, strategic defence 
necessitates a functional radar system. The failure of the 
home economy to produce a successfully viable NIMROD system 
-necessitated the purchase of an American system. The 
expertise for its own defence Cto the chagrin of the State?) 
could not be found domestically. Further, the 1987 British 
parlianentary elections on dune 11th witnessed repeated 
interference designed at influencing public opinion from 
non-national elites. (American President Reagan frequently
criticised Labour candidate Kinnock’s nuclear defence
posture and effectively endorsed the Conservative Prime
Ministerial candidate.9 -
Looking at systems change, it becomes quite apparent 
that Western European society possesses a great number of 
similarities, perhaps in the final analysis, more
similarities than dissimilarities. The fundus of European 
society is fundamentally Christian, democratic, and 
capitalistic in nature. These all reflect values held in 
common. It may be reasonable to assume that if integration 
were to take place, it would be more probable amongst groups
with higher levels of similarity than between groups with 
lesser or divergent similarities.
The concepts put forward in this paper are essentially
13
consistent with an organic qro w t h bi ode 1, whereby integration 
is dependent upon the individual., a function of 
coMunicatlon and puissantlv pending on literacy. As a 
substantive paradigm, it posits Integration as a sui generis 
function of monad development, as growth fro® the particular
to the universal. This is in counterdistinction to a
structural arrangement of universal to particular growth.
As a result of technological advancement brought about 
by modernity, integration may be not only desirable, but 
absolutely necessary. If the process of socialisation is 
responsible for integration, and if it has always been 
accomplished through ever -increasing degrees of intensive 
communication, then the end result - European integration -
would-be achieved by the logical fo1low-through of that 
socialisation process. In the literate age, it may 
necessitate directlonal education designed at initiating the 
young with a pan-European mentality, or at least directional 
education decreasing the construction of 'otherness' notions 
as evidenced by current educational practices. If the 
reason why that is not being done is domestically political, 
then both the problem and the solution may have been
identi f ied.
Is the nation-state the optimal vehicle for society in 
the twenty-first century? The Functionalists27 postulate 
international society on a need basis. The idea being not
far from the surface, that incremental transference of
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loyalties and sovereignties go from the domestic entity to a
multi-national entity. To manage a series of international
reglme s as f ore seen by Functionalistic theory, a central
agency would require the means to control and protect its
client States. However, experience has demonstrated in the
post-war period that, the greater the potential managerial
powers of a central agency, the stronger the incentives of
states to engage in a struggle to control it. It appears as
if Functionalism will be successful only to the degree that
the domestic units wish it to be. The Implication is that
to overcoming these obstacles may mean address i ng the
fundamental requirement of modernity - education.
The Governments of the advanced industrial 
societies are . . . working, so it seems to roe,
on a wrong set of assumptions. They cannot get 
back to full employment or human social
services or good industrial relations on the 
present basis . . «- the effort_ should be -
directed instead to explaining and educating, 
to presenting honestly to the public how 
circumstances have changed, what the new range 
of choice is, what are the policies that 
governments are capable of carrying out.28
If it is the case, that despite temporary and 
occasional setbacks, the tendency is for society to grow, 
in a series of ratchet movements, it is imprudent to 
assume that man can go back for any appreciable length of 
time. Society can hardly demodernise nor can it reach a 
deliteracy level. With the advent of modernity, literacy 
has become related to the idea of integration by way of 
promoting a greater degree of collective identity, 
essentially the necessary ground work for an effective
socialisation to continue above the nation level.
The why of individua1-collectivitv construction has 
remained constant throughout history.The how is 
unique to each age. If socialisation is to continue, a 
multi-national level of socialisation appears to be the 
next step in the ratchet mechanism. Modernity may be the 
vehicle, as it introduces change. The nation-state of 
today, as the focus of the nation may be the obstacle? 
however, the problem may be two-sided. On the one side,
there is the societies' lack of trust in a multi-national
political arrangement to offer significant levels of 
security mandated by modernity and, on the other side, 
the lack of desire by the state to promote that -
multi-national society. For a multi-national society to 
evolve, a new level of systems change must take place.
The chief actors which would promote that change are the ' 
Individuals in society collectively, which are
responsible for underwriting that course of action. In 
the democratic setting, the onus lies heavily upon the
shoulders of the individual, the ultimate integrator.
If organisations create webs of interdependence and
associations produce new points of identification that 
transcend the territorial nation state, the problem 
facing mankind, if multi-nationalism is to result, is the 
development of an alternative to existing forms of 
territorial integration.30
As integration is fundamentally a one-on-one 
phenomena. It is difficult to empirically access its
15
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state at any given time as individual 'feelings*
constantly vary. Further, because of its aulti-
dimensionality, and because it is fundamentally a process 
through time, any given measurement would soon be 
superceded by new events and new feelings. Consequently, 
and primarily because'of its elusivenessan analytical 
framework must be employed if any meaningful assessment 
is to be made. Such a framework must by necessity be 
open-ended enough to allow for the incorporation of any 
new events which may affect the process of integration, 
but yet such a framework must be realistic enough to 
afford a general paradigm for effective analysis.
The term "integration" as ajaolitical consideration 
has effectively been misemployed to the extent as to have 
created a term with ambiguous connotations.31 The 
word “integration” it.self comes from the Latin verb - 
Integrare meaning literally to bring thack) together or 
to enlarge and enhance. The Latin noun Integra Ils 
Implies a total agreement.32 "Integration" as a term 
has the further suggestive connotation of the act or 
process of unification into a whole or single entity, 
specifically, the bringing together of elements in a 
community.33 The employment of the term "integration" 
in a consideration of the political integration process, 
especially with relation to integration in the European 
sense, necessitates a more precise definition. This is 
fundamenta 1ly the problem with the employment of
integration methodology. Quite simply stated,
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'* 1 ntegra t i on" is 3 aiul t i-d i mens 1 ona 1 ter® and in
political economic literature, it is more often than not 
utilised as a jsono-d 1 mens i ona 1 term. To more adequately 
fixate on the process of integration, a continuum may he 
imagined, ranging from a point of total non-integration 
to a point of total integration.
Non-integration ------------------------------------------------ > Integration
Mono-dimensional postulations of integration set simple 
criteria as a measure of integration, as in the above 
scale, such as age, sex, hair colour, size, weight, 
nationality. or employment, status,' etc. 'These may be 
employed to determine the integrated state of a single 
characteristic.3^ But unfortunately, integration may 
not be measured so~simplistically. Societal integration 
is essentially composed of a fluid set of elements, the 
interplay of which varies in magnitude depending upon 
condition, time, and place, producing a concatenate 
plexure of diverse and sundry characteristics.
In considering the total process of integration 
three distinct delineations of integrational 
characteristics may be isolated Cl) the po1i t i ca 1
delineation C2) the social delineation of mass
community, and C3) the transactional delineation. Each 
of these three groups represents a different delineation 
of activity in which the consideration of aspects of 
integration may be viewed.3®
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Cl) The political delineation may be viewed by, for 
example, the types and decisions made by supra-national 
organisations. Within the European context, the European 
Economic Community, the European Coal and Steel
Community, and Euratom are examples.36 C2) Kass
attitudes toward other politicarl units constitute the 
measure of mass community, and is a social delineation of 
activity. Masses are considered to be Integrated if they 
have a high recording of mutual good opinions about other 
countries,37 Given the populations of Europe and
their various operational assumptions, this paper will 
put forward this social delineation of activity as
fundamental and most s^Lient. C3) The transactional
delineation may be viewed in terms of events - for 
example, Intel—governmental events could be measured by 
agreements? state visits, notes - occurring’ between 
European governments excluding actions taking place
within the framework of an international
organisation.3® Here integration is high when 
inter-governmental cooperation is high, and when mass 
feelings about other people are positive, and when many 
decisions are made by supra-national organisations.39
This is consonant with the literature which
postulates three dimensions by which the phenomena of 
integration may be measured, namely, the economic, the 
political, and the social dimension.^’ The suggestion 
is that economic integration would constitute high 
intra-national trade, social integration would include
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the unification of masses, specific groups or elites, and 
political integration would encompass a wide array of 
phenomena including more decisions on the international 
level.Zt 1 Literature also suggests that the
consideration of integration is not single and simple, 
that, in actuality, it is a complex multi—dimensioral 
activity.^3 The author'of this paper is of like
opinion.
The limitations of mono-dimensional observation and
assessment of integration may be seen in the following 
analysis considering the three dimensional areas of 
integration, those being Cl) the political C2) the 
level of mass counmunity or social level and C3) the
int.ej—transactional level.
CD The Political_Dimension of Integration
-Viewed as an activity between nations, integration
as a political consideration may be subdivided into two 
subsidiary dimensions; Ci) the number and importance of 
decisions undertaken within the political area of
international considerations and Cii) the mode of
decision.^'1 Ci) The more political the decision, and 
the more political the group making those decisions, 
determining the degree of integration is an indication of 
importance of these decisions. Within the terms of the 
European Community, the political decisions concerning 
the community market, for domestic industrial production 
and the Common Agricultural Policy CCAP), for 
agricultural decisions, would suggest a high degree of
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political lntegrat Ion. However, considerations of a
comounlty defence vls-a-vls third parties have more or 
less been taken out of the reala of community
considerations and, hence, would receive a low political 
Integration status. Contrasting the Const1tut1ona1 
change envisioned by the European Parliament dated 16th ‘ 
February 1986, encompassing a wider European Union, 
specifically referencing the free movement of people, 
services, goods, capital and advertising, etc. would, if 
adopted and put into force, achieve a sign1ficantly high 
community wide rating for Important political 
decision-asking. Cii) The mode of decision deals with 
the degree of integration and the type, as in cemaunlty 
decisions. Supra-nstiona1 integration would exist when 
the Community organisation was given autonomous 
competence for action, action that would be equally 
binding on all Community members regardless of domestic 
opinion.Here the degree of Integration would be 
advanced when programmes could be formulated and put into 
force with only a majority vote. However, in a situation 
where each of the members carry a veto ability, the 
Community, in terms of functioning actuality, receives a 
low Integratlonal rating. In the practical sense all 
important decisions and competence lie within the hands 
of the European Heads of State. Leo Tindemans, in The
Report on European Union Brussels 1976 made reference to
L' Europe_a plusleurs_v i_t_e sses , essentially being a
two-tier system of cooperation operational within the
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framework of the European Community which essentially 
postulated a situation where nothing within the Community 
would be totally binding upon all. If the two-tler 
system were an operational reality, this system could be 
considered as evidence of an effective breakdown of the 
European Community as an Integrations] organ operational 
within Europe, or at least as departing from the original 
goal of concerted and unified action. The idea of a 
two-tier system suggests the idea of a Europe a la carte, 
an idea refuted in the Tindemans report, as each country 
was seen as being bound by the agreement of all a3 to the 
final objective to be achieved in common. Only the time 
sequence for each Individual country was allowed to vary 
under the two-tier system. In practice, what has evolved 
is something akin to L'Eurooe a oeometrie variable, 
which essentially allows each participant to take what it 
wants and not to give consideration to the unit as a
who 1e• An example of this would be the Airbus . a
project ostensibly between Britain and France. Br i t a i n
and Fra nee bene fit from a European project, a project
which i s not even subscribed to by, for exampl e, Denmark
or Italy.What has developed, is that within the 
community, there is a convergence of interests on smaller 
levels.'47 Consequently the idea of a developing
supra-nat1ona11ty, with regard to this consideration of 
the political dimension of integration, leaves much to be 
desired with reference to the European Community. Rather
than an effective development of an integrationa1 overall
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unit within the European Community, where unanimous 
decision making is required, there is a reduction of 
Issues to the most common denominator level.**®
C 2 ) Integrat ion_as Cons idered on the Soc1 a 1_Level
This area of consideration of Integration is by far
the most important, if integration is considered
ultimately as a one-on-one relationship. This implies 
that what is important, in the final analysis, is what 
the individual thinks, essentially, his degree of overall 
individual commitment to others. Referring to German 
integration in the 19th century, Schiller made the 
emotive proclamation to the German people, highlighting 
this degree of commitment.: Win woljer seir. ein einzlg
Volk von Brudern In the social sense a politically
integrated group is one in which every member of that 
group thinks in terms of an ~US. US connotes solidari-ty 
and a binding relationship, especially v1s-a-v1s third 
parties. It incorporates a communal identity with 
circumscribed duties and obligations. This dimension 
considers integration not as essentially something that 
takes place on the governmental level or in political
offices or as a function of bureaucracies; it connotes
the notion of integration as a posture taken by the 
individual members of the group collectively - as 
brothers.50 With regard to this term of reference,
the social dimension of integration suggests a change in 
the political conscious knowledge of the Individual in
degrees going toward a normative collective feeling.-1
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The social dimension of integration also has 
subdlmensions, one of which is the Importance attached to 
the term solidarity; essentially who are to be considered 
brothers and who are to be considered strangers? Here 
the emphasis is on loyalty to the group. The group 
outsider is considered after the fashion -of do_ut_des, an 
essentially cost and utility analysis. This
consideration weighs every transaction with third parties
to determine the worth received. This Is evident in
international relations by the degree and proliferation 
of bilateral and mult 1~latera1 agreements. It is more or
less the consideration of what Is received In return when
something is given tc another. In tne case of the
European Community, the implication is that integration 
has not yet reachec the degree envisioned by Schiller's 
brotherhood. Here the "classical principle of trade seems
to be operational. In other words, what are the net 
results received by me when I_ conclude a given action 
with them. This appears to be the operated motive in the
EEC's agricultural political considerations or Indeed the
general utility of membership by EEC members themselves. 
In a truly integrated community, the consideration of 
benefit of one group v1s-a-v1s another group is not of 
major importance, for the consideration of groups implies 
a low degree of social integration.52 However, within 
the community, this is exactly what is being done. The
Europ*____Earometer frequently tests European opinions in
relationship to European membership, as it did in Hay
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1984. ®3, The question was asked, in general terms, if 
it was thought that there was a general profit to be made 
by the domestic country as a result of European
membership. Although from country to country and from 
time to time the answers are essentially different, at 
the point of this sample, forty-six percent of the 
respondents answered in the affirmative. Therein 
Luxembourg registered 73%, Holland 67%, and were amongst
the most favourable returns, i.e., individuals that
thought that their individual country membership was 
profiting their individual country. Britain at 32% and 
Denmark at 39% were amongst the most negative, which
means, in general terms, that they have a higher
parr icu’.ari si group or i err a r i on than thar of an European
or isntation.55
Further considerations of 3 social "community” 
feeling may be extended the idea of a common myth.
Common *yths or autostereotypes are notions or ideas held 
in common which symbolise collective ideology. This 
would symbolise a vision of a collective future,5*' and 
perhaps, a political organisation for the achievement of 
that goal. This would imply that nationalistic symbolism 
found in flags, hymns, holiday costumes, jokes, etc., 
must be ultimately supplanted by collective symbolism. 
Here the problem is the suggestion that to create a 
collective symbolism would imply a degree of 
artificiality. However, if European integration were a 
goal and if it were to be achieved on the level of
25
political community realisation, the end point of
unencumbered solidarity must Justify the means and hence 
be actively so ugh t . !“5<E>
C5) The Inter-Trsnssctional Dimension
The third dimension found within the integration
process is the I nter-transac-t i ona 1 dimension.
Integrat ion on this di mens ion connotes essentially the 
physical, connectiveness of persons found within the 
overall collectivity, where contact implies integration, 
as in the trade in goods and services, credit, 
technology, ideas, banking. Insurance, etc. The number 
of people going over internationa1 borders, tourists, the 
exchange of production workers, as well as the exchange 
of information through letters, telephone, telegraph, 
newspapers, magazines, electronic media, etc. are
determinants of the inter-transactional dimension. The*
criterion here is that the greater the frequency of 
interaction, the greater the degree of integration.37 
This dimension of integration is the easiest to analyse. 
It lends itself to simple measurement and a compilation 
of empirical statistical data on transact ions and 
transactional flows. The development of a ratio between 
transactions within a given group and outside the group 
Ca foreign domestic ratio) allows for accessible 
transactions information. Within any given economy, the 
greater the degree of transactions, the higher the degree 
of interdependence. The implication is that the greater 
the alignment of price levels, salary levels, and credit
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levels, through developing interdependence, the greater 
the degree of similarities.30 Under this
consideration, the European Community would be considered 
highly Integrated. In 1983, the ten members_of the 
European Comunity traded 50.3% of their production with 
EEC partners, but this overall percentage is comprised of 
fluctuations ranging from 40.9% for the UK to 7.2.3% for 
Ireland. However of interest is that If this type of 
consideration were termed an indicator of integration, 
that is, the more one sells to and buys from another 
being a determinant of the degree of integration with 
that other, it would suggest that Germany with its 
exports of_48.1% to- the Community and imports from the 
Community of 49-1% compared with the EFT& country of 
Switzerland who imported 49% of its exports to the 
Community and imported 66% of the imports from the 
Community, is not as highly integrated with the Community
as Switzerland.3^
The ambivalent nature of the possible answers to the 
questions inherent in the political, the social, or the 
inter-transactional dimension suggests that no dimension 
in itself is sufficient to explain the integration 
process nor is any specific dimension alone sufficient to 
be used as an indicator of integration. The integration 
process must be viewed mu 11i~dimensiona1ly. The inherent 
complexities of the consideration necessitate an holistic 
paradigm, incorporating all dimensions, structured
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loosely enough to tolerate ambivalance.
The political dimension suggests that peace vij3 the
vehicle of integration is a process of political
amalgamation. European history has shown that the
Swedish-Norway Union or the Austria-Hungarian Union were 
political arrangements that did not abate international
tension or conflict, a result at odds with the
underlining tenet of the proposition. The transactional 
level, specifically relating to trade in Europe, shows 
that the high degree of trade between Germany and Britain 
(indeed the UK was Germany's strongest single trading 
partner in 1913) did little to avert the effects of 1914, 
again, a result not consistent with the proposition.45*0 _ 
This paper puts forward the suggestion that the most
often overlooked dimension. that dimension which,
potentially at least, offers the most smbivalarrce may be 
the most important dimension. This is the dimension of 
the mass community, the social psychological level of 
integrat ion.
It is salient what one thinks of another, not what
one is told to think of another, nor what one
specifically does with another. To understand
integration, one must understand the forces that aid or 
deter the process. Considering integration in the form 
of an organic growth model, the forces that control or 
restrain society are fundamentally akin to political 
conceptualisations of soc ietal actions. The
relationships viewed as transactions are likewise akin to
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economic conceptualisation of social actions. Both of 
these aref in offset, subsections of social actions. To 
conceptualise upon these, forces, it is consequently 
necessary to develop & theoretical approach to
integration narrowly enough constructed to focus upon and 
project the phenomenon but wide enough to encompass the 
jault i-dimensional aspect of its nature. -
Views of I ntegrat ion
Theories are to be used primarily as an approach 
providing a common language or framework of cosaiun i cat ion 
for those engaged in research.4*1 They are helpful 
because they carry with them the possibility of providing 
minimal standardisation of word meanings, cctneepfcs, 
categories, and patterns of explanation’ among those 
accepting a given intellectual orientation.4*2 Such an 
approach is not simply a singular image of the world but 
an intellectual outlook. It provides descriptions, 
explanations. and often predictions about the empirical 
world with reference to which it is constantly being 
refined and reformulated. Karl Popper has suggested
"theories are nets cast to catch what we call ’the world’
to rationalise, to explain, and to master it. We
endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer.‘,&z*
Ho we v e r, the attempt_to refine a theory must not exclude
the possi bility of exo ge n ous __ f a c tor s h e r et q f or e_un know n 
and perhaps unquantiftable which may play an influential 
role in the results. Developing a paradigm for
integration must by necessity be expansive rather than
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restrictive. It must not be restricted to solid
dimensions, confined to specific sorts of activities. It 
roust go further to use those dimensions as an aid to 
highlighting the individual's specific contribution.
Several formidable theories regarding Integration In 
the internal 1 ons 1 system do exist, but, it is argued 
here, these theories are restrictive inasmuch as they do 
not develop a centrality around the cognitive formation 
of individual's feelings.'2’3 The three most prominent 
are those of Cl} Federalism, (2} Functionalism, and C3}
Neo-Functionalism.
Cl} Federal Theory, frequently accorded 
prominence,6”2" in practice developed through the _
American experience,67 posits group activities toward 
common goals preferable to singular endeavours ,&i3 
However, based on a plurality of control centers, it 
itself is not integrational,®’9 as integration would 
suggest a migration toward one common center. The theory 
does not address the creation of a developed collectivity 
feeling sufficient enough to supplant
particularisms.70 Whatever else say be its merits or 
demerits, a federal system is a structure which clearly 
multiplies the opportunity for more administration, 
extending not only the practical participation in 
politics, but diminishing the central pole fixation 
necessary for integrated society.71 C2} Func tlonal 
Theory7'2, is a growth model based on social interaction 
approximating historical reality with the notion of
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spill-over effects, where relations are based and
lnstenslfled on past successes. It postulates a process 
of Integration being accomplished apart and outside the 
realm of domestic political units,73 wherein lies Its 
weakness. Doing such, it Is an optimistic formulation 
of the Integration process based, appropriately enough. “ 
on a collective abatement of common problems.71* It. 
omits, essentially, the reality of the political world • 
outside, assigning 'high' and 'low’ political status7® 
to issues indicating the control maintained over those
issues by domestic units.76, C3D Neo-Functionalism ex 
hypothes1 Functionalism attempts to address the political 
cef-iclencies77 by suggesting tha.t the impulse for
integration stems from regional interests slowly
developing community attachments. The problem with this 
theory is that the "regional units often hold domestic 
pr iorities hi gher than the Neo-Functionalist theory 
implies.7'®
Modern Develocments
The need to combine the various theories on
integration within one framework was underlined by the
work of Karl Deutsch and stated in his Social Causal
I ntegrationa1 Model.7® Deutsch postulated a model of 
integration based on all three dimensions Intermingling 
to the extent of creating a common net of ever-increasing
transactions which actuates within the individual the
sense of commonality. This knowledge unleashes a social 
psychological education process assimilating diverse
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individuals into a singular unit. The development of
coffinunities, he ssweo as the result of needs which are
ultimately institutionalised affording protection and 
assurance to the individual, culminating in ultimate 
unified political organisation. He postulated political 
union as a Functional result of integration, commencing
in the transactional dimension carrying over into the 
social dimension and terminating in the political 
(institutional} dimension. Deutsch’s analysis couples 
all three dimensions into a growth model. Its weakness 
is in the failure to explain the social psychological 
education process which leads toward integration and the 
propagating of its advancement. Despite* this weakness, ■ 
be did isolate the importance of the poli s or central 
focusing point for the consideration of integration to 
develop. One of the variables that he implied as being" 
salient may be agglomerated as an elite theory 
(leadership} which crystallises and conceptualises the 
idea of integration and sets it in motion. In the 
European experience, an example of leadership of this 
sort is shown by the endeavours of Churchill or 
Schuman®1 which added the crystallisation necessary 
for the ultimate establishment of the European 
Coausunity. ®2 A further variable is encapsulated 
within the idea of the considerat ion of a disturbing
influence or a domestic unit that reaches threat
potential. Again within the European Community 
experience, the potential of the further development of a
32
situation in which any given European country threatened 
to dominate the rest of Europe was a fundamental 
underlining ideal in the creation of the European 
Community Cheeping France and Genosny apart).ec3 This, 
and the threat of non-European intervention in Western 
Europe, is theoretically postulated as grounds for 
keeping intra-European dialogue going in the face of 
apparently insurmountable obstacles.®*4
In reviewing the various theories on 
integration,es what is apparent is that the trend 
towards the idealistic world arrangement, the utopia 
which first postulated, in real terms, a united Europe,
was the direct result of internat1ona1 conflict. This
Idealism devolved slowly into a more rational and
pragmatic methodology the further removed in time from 
World War II. For perhaps -a period of ten years roost 
definitely commencing with the first oil crisis of the 
early 1970's, integration theory within the Western 
European context has been at a standstill. This may be 
directly related to the perceived degree of integration 
and the lack of progress thereof, by the individuals of 
Europe themselves. Indeed the new theoretical impetus, 
termed Neorea I i sin relates highly to the old pre-world war 
concept of international society organised in a balance 
of power framework along pluralistic lines.94"
Political theory plays an important part in the 
reality of political relations.97 States' actions are
guided by assumptions and expectations which relate to a
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concept of cause and result. Such assumptions, as
hypotheses, offer the framework for action between
States. Behind the often highly technical problems of 
European integration, political thought undergone by 
European domestic governments, is in the last analysis, 
an operational framework or hypothesis. Often 
assumptions are applied by States as rules, and are 
frequently promulgated by leaders as reality, and applied
as laws. But as international relations are
fundamentally social relations, they must be viewed as 
being within the social framework, that is, not as hard 
and fast laws, but more as philosophies or models or
frameworks for inter-relations. If a stare's action is
motivated by anything; other than an altruistic group 
motive, it is hardly surprising that meaningful steps 
towards a greater degree of integration are not achieved. 
The premise which functions as a modus operand! for a 
given domestic government has a direct bearing on the 
outcome of interaction. The apparent loss of momentum 
within the European community toward significant 
increases in European integration within the current 
period may be the result of the lack of a comprehensive 
holistic multi-dimensional hypothesis governing action. 
Integration is now on the mu 111~nationa1 level. Any 
hypothesis which operates as a foundation for action must 
be based on a multi-dimensional analysis founded within 
the social dimension. It is in the social dimension, if
a stable international environment is to be maintained,
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where integration must be achieved.
The politics! dimension relates directly to the 
social dimension either by the concept of an elite push
or & population_pull. Elites are a product of a given
population.®® They may reflect an underlying mood or 
ideology of the population or they rosy advance individual 
ideas but eventually for acceptance those ideas must be
seeded within that given population. The transactSona1
dimension of integration relates to the social because it 
is here that free Interchange develops fluidity only to 
the extent of acceptance within the multiples of 
individuals. As Deutsch has pointed out, all three 
dimensions relate and the common denominator hinges 
around the development of community, which is, in the 
final analysis, the product of an individual endeavour.
The thrust of this paper is to look, at the problem 
of integration and to assess the progress or the lack of 
progress within the current epoch within the Western 
European context. The homeostasis is afforded by a focus
on the individual as the most common and salient
denominator in the integration equation. Integration 
will be viewed as a process through not only time but 
place. Given the apparent prevailing state of 
mis-education leading the inherent bias of democracy 
against the cosmopolitan expansion of thought and 
culture, public opinion is left with the intellectually 
inferior role of responding with tidal waves of emotion 
to gross caricatures of political reality, the sad
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consequences of which®'®’ are all too apparent in a
historical review of European history. As the general, 
opinions of large numbers of persons are almost certainly 
a vague and confusing medley, action cannot be taken 
which effectively solves European problems until basic 
individual opinions have been factored down, essentially 
made to develop a degree of conformity. The making of 
one general will out of the multitude of general wishes 
is an art well known to the political elites and
political steering committees. To a degree, it consists 
essentially in the use of symbols and verbiage which 
assembles emotions which frequently are detached from 
ideas because feelings are much less specific than jdess 
and very much more poignant, the steering of same allows 
for the creation of a homogeneous will out of a 
heterogeneous mass of desire.'5*0 This may-amount to 
social engineering.
The principal concern of mankind may be simply 
stated, hostility abatement — peace. Johan GaItung, has 
defined integration as "the process whereby two or more 
actors form a new actor. When the process is completed, 
the actors are said to be integrated,’”5*1 Such
integration reduces hostility from inter-societv to the 
more manageable intra-society level. The form of such 
action, the essential structure, is essentially of 
secondary importance.
In a period of history in which the Darwinean luxury 
of evolution may not be any longer operational, the idea
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of integration in Europe must be germinated either
positively or negatively within the social dimension in 
order to achieve flourishing in time to avert 
international conflagration. If war is endemic, every 
new and succeeding member of society must be converted to 
the idea of 'peace. It can only-he conducted on the 
individual level. This paper analyses the problem of 
conceptiona1ising integration along the lines of the 
Deutschian analysis.92 It attempts to go further to 
explain or at least to isolate the conditions essential 
for a mult i-~d i mens i ona 1 integration framework, of analysis 
comprehensive enough to afford a general paradigm. It 
attempts to avoid the pjtfalls of being confined to 
specific theory and instead it will attempt to isolate 
the conditions necessary for integration to take place.
In order to. do this, it will first focus on'the process 
of socia 1isation in chapter two, examining the idea of 
community and its development via that process. In 
chapter three, it will go on to identify theoretically 
and noiBinatively the individual need structures and 
define the core entity, the first consideration of 
nationality. In chapter four, it examines theoretically 
and historically the development of the nation and 
ultimately the nation state in Western Europe as an 
answer to the needs of society. The hypothesis is 
suggested that man and society have specific needs and 
man's specific national identity was developed through 
his handling of those needs collectively. Chapter five
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posits the continuation of the process to create a
European society, In light of modernisation and over-all 
globulised systems change, the possibility of a 
continuation of the factors which created the nation may 
ultimately lead to some sort of supra-national unity. 
Chapter- six will focus separately on the economic, _ 
political, and the social nature of the individual in 
society. The individual is the missing variable in the 
overall consideration of holistic integration. Chapter 
seven will examine the German model of integration and 
apply it when possible to the modern movement.
This paper, refering frequently to the Genian model, 
uses Germany, as an example of an Integrated- society 
which owing to its comparatively late development, offers 
well documented evidence of the interplay of multi­
dimensional variables and their .effects on the
individual. Its reference may highlight parallel or 
missing current European developments. Remembering that 
socialisation allows for integration and that societies 
develop from small to large, the German model as an 
example of integration to the level of nation, may be 
instrumental in yielding insight to the interplay of 
variables potentially yielding meta-nationality. Chapter 
Eight highlights the building of consensus of opinion 
through knowledge and Chapter Nine summarises and focuses 
on the process of Education.
Why must the focus and the very thrust of
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Integration be aimed at social cons ijerat Ions?"’'3 The
answer is apparent; the political dimension alone does
not fully encapsulate the process and the transactiona1 S
dimension only describes that which is readily 
empirically testiflable. Only an overall consideration 
coupled with the social dimension, despite its inherent «
validity problem, can ba emoloyed to explain what 
f unda merit a 1 ly is the social process of intearation.
The most prominent integrational actor in Europe 
today is the European Community. The Community prides 
itself on the lowering of restrictive barriers to 
±nter-community trace. Effectively the free-trade area 
created by the community today is very comparable to the 
free trade area that existed in Europe during 1870's and 
the-1880's. The European' Economic Community has as ef its 
goalg free travel for Community citizens without the 
necessity of passports. Again the condition is similar 
to the Europe prior to World War One, when private travel 
did not mandate document ation. The progress forward made 
by the Community in the field of integration in many 
respects takes on the characteristic of a large step 
backwards. The reason for this as put forward by this 
paper is the fact that the EEC's actions are politically 
state-based and as such, are formal integration attempts 
to achieve specific ends. In this instance, the 
achievement of resat i v e integrational advantages - the
undoing of what states themselves have done is not
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PQJL.tt LY®. j nt •? or at iona 1 - the assist a nee of individuals to 
socially integrate. Political actions of this nature are 
not necessarily directly causal to the triggering of the 
free social, responses aaongst populations required to 
create an effective "we" feeling or a feeling as Scheller
termed, of Brotherhood .
CHAPTER ONE NOTES
’-For an excellent analytical discussion, see Warren 
llchman and Norman Uphoff, The Political, Economy in Change. 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1971).
::£Change is discussed at length throughout the 
literature. For an introduction to the phenomena, reference 
is made to p, 9ff, “The Principle of Growth," etc., in 
Bertrand Russell, Pr in.c i pie-s of Socia 1 Reconstruct ion . 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1916).: Edward H. Spicer,
Husaan Problems in Technological_Change. (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1952). especially p. ,L3ff.: "Change in the 
Modern World”; the introduction and case studies in Martin 
Ko 1 i n sky, Continuity and Change in European Society.
CLondon; Croom Helm, 1974); and,'for an introduction as to 
changes’ effect on the individual, see Gienn Pearce and 
Patrick Maynard, ed., Conceptual Change. . (Dordrecht, 
Holland: H. Reidel, 1973) on conceptualisation, p. 31ff.,
linguistic importance, p. Iff.; conceptual change, p. 127ff; 
and Gene Summ e r s , Att i tude Measurement . (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1970. Summers attempts an analytical assessment of 
attitudes and their evaluation Cp. 127ff.), behavioural 
predictions (p. 468ff.) which are affected by the impact of
change.
:3See K. Waltz, "National Independence," in Ray 
Maghoori. and Bennett Rsmber, ed. , Globalism versus Realism: 
International Relations Third Debate. (Boulder, .CoI a r ado: 
Westview Press, 1982), p. 81. ~ -
^Social relations have to do with dependencies and 
interdependencies. See the seminal work, Ward Hunt 
Goodenough, Cooperation in Change. (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1963 (1976 edition), .Forward (p. 7ff,),- ~
cooperation in-change (p. 35ff.), and ident Ity‘(related to 
attitude) change (p. 215ff.), and the difficult concept of 
1 Change and Social Control' (p. 346ff.). The questions of
dependence (see especially 'call for order' by Kurt 
Waldheim, p. 9, 1975) is treated in J, Tinbergen, et.al.,
Reshaping the International Order:__ A Report to_the Club of
Rome. (London: Hutchinson of London, 1977), and a study on 
"Public and Private Learning in a Changing Society," in 
Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State. (London: Temple 
Smith, 1971), especially chapter 7, p. 201ff.
^Modernity is essentially the name given to change 
taking place in the current historical period. For an 
interesting dicussion on both its singular and collective 
effects on individuals, see especially chapter 3, p. 62ff., 
and chapter 5, p. 89ff. in C.S. Badcock, Madness and 
Modernity. (Oxford: Basil .Blackwell, 1983). For its 
effects on society, politics, and religion, see Peter L. 
Berger, Facing Up to Modernity. (New York: Basic Books, 
1977), especially chapter 6, Critique, p. 70ff.; and see 
also Modernity's general effects in the excellent work, S.N. 
Eisenstadt, Trad it ion ?__Cha n ge and Modernity. (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, 1973).
&For a discussion on the need to synthesise 
disciplines, see David Easton, A _Framswork for Political 
Analys i s. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962);
41
Goyernme ht. (Glencoe, Illinois 
Almond, "A Functional Approach to 
in G.A« Almond and J.S. Coleman, The 
Areas. (Princeton, New Jersey:
K. W. Deutsch? The Nerves of 
Free Press, 1963); G.A« 
Comparative Politics/’ 
Politics of Developing 
Princeton University Press,
'’"Shirley Williams attr 
cumulative knowledge, 
Penguin Books, 1981), 
e<Although dated, 
argumentat i on,
Jonathan Cape,
CLondon; W-illiam
i960), pp.
5butes this 
Politics _ I_ s for 
p. 172.
for an excellent
see Clarence K. Stre it,
1939); In What Are We_to
He inesann
3 -66 . 
to what 
People.
she calls 
(London:
backup
Union Now. (London: 
Do with Our Lives?
Ltd, 1931), H.G. Wells call« 
this an open conspiracy (Chapter II, p. 10) and defines the 
danger of traditional forms of government and economics' ss a 
nightmare, the conspiracy being the awakening of mankind 
from such a nightmare of struggle for existence and the 
inevitability of war (pp. 147-48)-.
’^"The desire for the creation of a united European 
power is not new. As early as 1305, Pierre DuBois, a lawyer 
from Normandy called for a European state. Throughout the 
centuries that followed, DuBois had many followers . . .
and, of course, a number of rulers tried to create a unified 
Europe and nearly succeeded." Etienne-Sadi Kirschen,
Financial Integration in Western Europe. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1969>, p. 1. For efforts before 
the Treaty of Rome, see E.S. Kirschen, et.al., Eeonoa1c 
Policy in Our Tjjrne« (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing 
Co., 1974)7 '
iOSee the consideration of Count Couden Hove-Kaiergi 
entitled "Europe Must Unite," originally printed 1939-40 in 
George Catlin, One Anglo-American Union. (London: Andrew 
Decers, Ltd., 1941), d. 29. _ '
isThe idea of a united Europe is an age—old idea 
which had inspired men as diverse as William Penn and Sully. 
See Alan Watson, Europe at Risk. (London: George C. Harrop 
and Co., 1972), p. 182; Etienne—Sadi Kirschen, F i nanc ial 
Integration in Western Europe. op. cit. p. 1; and, for 
effects before World War II, Kirschen, et.al., Economic 
Policy. op. cit.
^Through a harmonious development of economic 
activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
rise in standards of 
Cha 1 lenqe _g_f _ th®. „ .5.9..® m on 
D. Pra ig, "The 
Market: The
1962) and 
The Common 
Anthony Blond
increased stability, an accelerated 
living, etc., see U. Kitzinger, The 
Market. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
Treaty of Rome," in J. Calatan, ed.,
Trea t yo f Rome Expla ined. (London:
Publishing, 1967).
x‘sToday's utopian idea is best summarised by L.
Barzini. "Europe clearly evolved one common will, speak 
(sic) with one calm majestic voice, have a clear idea of its 
identity and goals, cultivate and defend its economic 
prosperity, and pursue a single foreign policy in its own 
interest (and the world's). It should therefore forget its 
trivial disputes and rivalries, put its own house in order, 
set up authoritarian common democratic institutions, arrange 
its financial affairs according to more or less uniform
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criteria, adopt ons currency, and set up one redoubtable 
defence establishment." The Impossible Europeans. (London: 
Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1983), p. 23.
1ZtThis has been developed by H. Bull in The Anar chai 
Soc iety« (London: Macai i1lan, 1977).
-sArishotle, Pol 111cs. (London: J.M. Dent and
Sons, 1942).
xfoJ.D.B . Miller, The World of States. (London
Croom-Helm, 1981), p. 9.
i-zLoc. c i t. p. 10.
3 ®Loc. c i t. p. 16.
iV'Loc. c i t. p . 31. -
^General reference is made to Parts II and III of 
A.K. Cairncross, Factors in Economic Development. (London: 
George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1962). For a review and
bibliography, see E r 11, European_Economic Inteqrat_ipn•
Unpublished Master's thesis, Univsrsity "of Exeter, Devon, 
1979. Of more modern vintage, reference is made to Werner 
Hildenbrand, ed., Advances in Economic Theory. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, Econometeric Society Monographs, 
1985), especially chapter 9, pp. 235-52 and en passant Part 
VII on the industrial organisation.
aiTo bring in a degree of stabilisation, an 
effective 'subjective' focus is the subject well treated in 
Jack Wiseman, e d. , Beyond Positive Eco no m i c s ? (London: ' 
Macmillan, 1983), especially chapter 6, p. 87ff. N.B_, -the
Philips Curve theory, and its noticeable disfunction as a 
result of the second oil crisis, (1978-81) in western 
European economies when both inflation and unemployment 
increased, is an example.
_'aagee Gordon K. Douglass, -ed., The New * ~
Interdependence. (Lexington, Kessachusetts: ' Lexington 
Books, 1979), chapter 1: “National Interests and 
International Order." For an example, see Richard Bailey, 
The European Connection. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1983), 
“Britain Shunning the EMS," p. 91ff.
sr3See as a general overview, H.K. Junckersto f f, ed., 
International Manual on the European Community. (St. Louis, 
Missouri: St. Louis University Press, 1963), especially
chapter VI, p. 145ff.; and Henry G. Aubrey and F.A. Praeher, 
Atlantic Economic Cooperation. (New York: Praeger, 1967, 
first edition), p. 35ff.
^^This is social genetics. For a good discussion 
about social genetics, see Ernest Gallner, Nations and 
Nationalism. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), p. 29ff.
:a;:5It would probably be accurate to develop an 
approach to the study of international behaviour on the 
basis of social-psychological concepts incorporating all 
dimensions as argued by H.C. Kelman, “Social-Psychological 
Approaches of Internalional Relations," in International 
Behaviour, a Soc1a 1-PsychoIogica1 Analysis. (New York:
Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1965), section one, pp. 14ff.
2&Thls is primarily the reasoning of the eighteenth 
century school, although foundations go much before that 
date. See, for a comprehensive overview in summarisation 
form, John Bowie, Western Political Thought. (London:
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Jonathan Cape, 1968}, especially book three onwards.
^Functional 1 s» will be discussed later in this 
paper. Here an apercu nay be gleaned from D. Mltrany, first
noted in The_Progress of International Governaent. (New
Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1933}.
*eWl 11 iaas, Politics Is for People.. op. cit. p.
172.
a’*For further material on the concept ua 1 i sat iona 1 
changes in the consideration of society, see John Rex, ed.,
Approaches to Sociology:___ An__Introduction to Major Trends
Br1t1sh Soc1ology. (London: Routledge and Keaan Paul,
1974}, especially p. 187.
3°For a oood review, see
i n
James Dougherty and Robert 
Contsndlno Theories of Internat lonalPfal tzgra f f , Jr __ ____ ___ . _ ____ ____ ___
Relations. (New York: Harper and Row. Publishers. 198i},
p. 2 8 2. • .
31 Ex a moles of the various usages of the term 
"Integration" are given in Henry Teune, “Integration," In 
Giovanni Sartorl. ed., Social Science Concepts. (Beverly 
Hills: Sage Publications, 198*+}, pp. 235-64.
"'"See Duden, Worterbuch der deutshen Soracke . 
(Mannheim:
3iE. M 
Diet 1o n a r v.
■3 x-t 'T* h
Bibliographisches Institut, 1921}.
Kirkpatrick, ed., Chambers Twentieth Century 
(Edinburgh: Chambers, 1983}, p. 654.
example is given by Daniel Frei in 
"Intsgrationsprozesse." in -werr.er w'eidenfeld, Die Identitat
Euro era s . _ (Darmstadt: Carl nanser Verisg, 1985}, p. 113ff. 
--Anioncsr others, see Barry Hughes and John E.
Schwarz, “Dimensions of Political Integration and the 
Experience of the European Community,” in International 
Studies: Quarterly. 16(Sept. 1972}:263-94.
- "^Political a ma Igamation levels are measured and 
recorded in W.E. Fischer. “An Analysis of the Deutsch 
Soclo-Causal Paradigm of Political Integra11 on,” in 
International Organizations. 23(Spr i ng 1969}:254-90.
37See Michael P. Sullivan. I nternationa1 Relations
Theories and Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
pp. 214-15.
Dimensions of Political
. cit. p. 285. 
not to imply that 1 ntergovernmenta 1 
synonymous with Integration. It does mean 
ation may be more prone to a postliminary
Prentice-Ha 11, 1976},
3SHughes and Schwarz,
Integration.” op 
3'3’Th i s is
coopera t ion is 
however, coops .
integration than not. Hcwev 
supra-r.a t i ona 1 organisations binding on the domestic entity, 
a d-
w n e n o e» s 1 o n s are se a ?v
ee of integration has been achieved. see. tor a
historical analysis of the modern period, F.H. Hinsley. 
National ism and the International Svstam. (London : dodder
and Stoughton. 1973}, chapter eight, especially pp.
'£’u'See Leon Lindberg, “Political Integration as 
Multi-Di mensiona1 Phenomenon Requiring Multivariate
i n I n t e r r,3 t_ ional Orga n i z a t i_c_n s_. 2 4 ( A u t u m n
and Joseph Nye. “Comparative Regional 
Concept and Measurement,” in International 
22(Autumn 1$68}:855-30.
4 .113
a
Me a sure sent , ” 
1970}:6*9-732 
I nt egra t ion: 
Organizations .
1Sullivan, I nternationa1 Relations Theories and
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Evidence. op. clt. p. 215.
*2For a useful three dimensional conceptualisation 
of Integration, see Leon Hurwltz. ’’Contemporary Perspectives 
on EC Integration: Attitudes. Non-Government a 1 Behaviour
and Collective Decision Making," In Contemporary
Perspectives on European Integration. CLondon: Aldwych,
1980), pp. 3-23. A major problem Is that empirical evidence 
readily available, frequently economic In nature, because of 
its accessabl11ty, could potentially assume an importance 
grade In excess of non-ver1f1 able 1nforma11 on, often
political motives, and hence effectively bias-the outcome of 
cons1dera11 on . ~
'"-Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Schelnaold,
Europe ’ s _Vou Id-be _ Pg_l i_ty: _.._Patterns_pf^ Change. l.n_ the 
European Community. CEnglewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prent1ce-Ha 11, 1970), pp. 69-7^: 'and Ernest B. Haas, The
Obsolescence of_ ReaLong 1_Integration Theory. CBerkelev:
The University of California Press, 1975); and Llewellyn D. 
Howell, "The Dimensionality of Regional Integration," in 
International Organizations. 29CAutumn 1975):997-1020.
^^The primacy of politics In the EEC was made clear 
by their first President, Walter Hallstein: "We are not In
business at all - we are In politics." See "EEC Comission 
Press Release," CBruxelle: 22 May 1961).
£,’?Yao-Su Hu, Europe under Stress:__ .Cpnye rgejyce a no
Divergence in the European Community. CLondon:
But-er^orths. 1981), p. 109ff.
""For an up-to-date review of the ’success’ of tfie 
project and Its industrial ramifications, see Keith Hayward, 
"Airbus: Twenty Years of European Co11abora11 on." in
International Affairs. - 64CWinter, 1937-88):11-26. See also 
a report by Leo Tlndemans to the .European Council. entitled 
"European Union." (Luxembourg: Commission of the European 
Communities, Supplement 1/76. 1976).
^7Yao-Su Hu, Europe under Stress. op. clt. and Ray
Rambera, ed. Globa 11sm versus Rea 1i_§.m • 
Power Politics,"Transnational 1 sm ,
Present System."
et.al., Die Identitat Eurooas.
Maghoorl and Bennett 
op. clt. p. 195 f f. : 
the Realities of the
A*Peter Bender. _____________________________
CStuttgart: Carl Hansen Veriag. 1985), p. 116.
*’Loc. clt. See the general text, Die Icent 11a t 
Europa s. "We want to be one single brotherhood."
soThi s
and
s basically a non-iocicai attitude, 
what Mac’niavelli meant when he said, "I conclude, 
that when a prince has the goodwill of the people 
not worry about consoiracies: but when the people
TnIs is 
therefore, 
he should 
are
hostile and regard him with hatred he should go in fear to 
everything and everyone." The Prince. (Hsuoncsworth: 
Penguin. 1514. 1961), p. 105. Note also what Merritt and
Pucha1a said: "An under stand 1ng . . . requIres not only
knowledge of how government officials and foreign policy 
elites perceive and react, but also and to an increasing 
extent information about hew the ’man in the street' thinks 
about, feels about, and responds." R.L. Merritt and E.J.
r u c r. ala , 
Affairs.
ec. , western 
CNsw York:
.^yCQtiean _Per spec t j ve s in Intern a t fora 1 
Praeger, 1963), p. vll. Concerted
Ao
responding is action of 'brothers’.
'-,1Ths normative sociological dimension is dicussed
in Elisabeth Noe 1le-Neuaann, “Phantom Europe: Thirty Years 
of Survey Research on German Attitudes toward European 
Integration,” in L. Hurwitz, ed., Contemporary Perspectives 
on European Integration. opr cit. pp. 53-74 and Am. its i 
Etzioni, '‘Social Psychological Aspects of International 
Relations," in Lindsey Gardner and Elliot Aronson, ed., The 
Handbook of Social Psychology. Volume 5. C Re a d 1 n g, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp . 538-601.
s:aThere are always groups In society but when group 
status begins to dominate over collective status, the 
collectivity is sacrificed to the particularistic interest 
and is analogous to disintegration. The idea of groups 
within a whole is best appreciated by the idea of cells in a 
body, and is associated with William dames. See Ralph 
Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William dames. 
CLondon: Humphrey Milford, 1935), especially part III, vol.
1. Also Josiah Royce, William dames and Other Essays. CNew 
York: Macmillan, 1911), "Introduction," p. 19ff.
S3Europa Barometer. (^Brussels: EEC, May 1984, no.
21), table 17.’"
5z'In other words, that their collective group is not 
receiving sufficient benefit from association. It Is a
question of orientation. See Josephine Klein, The_Study of
Groups. CLondon: -Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1956>, 
chapter 1, p. Iff., chapter 5. p. 57ff., p. 108ff. and 
chapter 12, p. 158ff. Also, see the consideration of group 
orientation applicable to larger collectivities in A. Paul 
Hare, Handbook of Small Group Research. CGlencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1962), part two.
ssBased on a concept inherited from the past. See,
for the development, Lewis Spence, An_Introduction to
Mythology. CLondon: George G. Harap, 1921), p. llff.
"5,&The emotional feelings nations have towards others 
are related to the corollary phenomena of national 
character; is it possible to say such exists or indeed is 
justifiably valid? The answer may be yes, for like 
individuals undergoing the same sort of socialisation, being 
exposed to similar stimuli, do produce similar patterns 
which may be objectively characterised of societies as a 
whole, but not as a subjective rule. See, amongst others,
Lloyd Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policies. CEnglewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: PrentIce-Ha11, 1982), chapter 2: “The
Human Dimension of Foreign Policy and National Character" in 
section 3: "Societal Determinants"; and Maurice A. East,
"National Attributes and Foreign Policy," in M.A. East, S.A.
Salsore, and C.F. Hermann. Why Nations Act:___Theoret i ca1
Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies.
CBeverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1978), 
chapter six.
“'^Wilfried Preno, "Trade, I interdependence and 
European Integration," In L. Hurwitz, Contemporary 
Perspectives on European Integration. op. cit. pp. 77-94;
Karl Deutsch, “International Communications," in Public 
Opinion Quarterly. 20C1956):143-60; and Robert Rosecrance,
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et.al., “Whither Independence?" in International 
Organ 1za tIons. 31(1977):425-71 and Donald J. Puchala,
"Internatlonal Transactions," in Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart
Schelngold, ed., Regional Integration,__Theory and Research.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971), 
pp. 128-59.
’^This 
The classic 
(New York.:
Is a primary tenet of basic trade theory, 
work Is Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1950); empirically set out in Jaroslav Vanek, Genera 1 
Equilibrium of InternatIona 1 Di scr im1na 11 on. (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, '1965); called for,
amongst others, early on, by Lord Avebury, in Free Trade.
Macmillan. 1905); defined by. amongst others, 
Johnson. New Trade Strategy for the World Economy. 
George Allen and Unwin. 1969); and G.D.N.
The Free Trade Proposals. (Oxford: Basil
I960); requiring internat1ona1 structures,
notably GATT, see Gerard Curzon, Multilateral Commercial 
Diplomacy. (London: Michael Joseph, 1965); which may be
needing reorganisation, see John Evans, The Kennedy Round in
American Trade Po11cy:__ The Twilight of the GATT.
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1971),
especially chater 16, p. 299ff; leading toward cost, price, 
Herbert Giersch, ed. , Qn__t_he 
(Tubingen: Institut fur
Kiel. J.C.B. Monr, 1976),
(London 
Harry G 
(London: 
Wor sw i ck,
Blackwel1,
and other standardisation. Se< 
Economics of -1n t ra -1h d u st rv Trade 
*e-1 twirtschaft an cer Univsrsitat 
especially pp• 3-10.
intei esting comparative 
Die I d e nt it at Eurooas.
reference is
s’For an
Peter Bender, _________
for-statist leal data.
OECD publications.
^’Evidenced by historical statistics first noted in 
literature by Jacob Viner in reviewing general UK, German 
1913/14 trade in The Customs Union Issue. op. cit.
felSee, for a conceptual framework’s importance, 
constituting “a beginning and a promise for the future," the 
of the Pr 1 ncLples 
19ff. See also 
in M .
discussion, see 
 op. cit. p. 119: and
made to the soorooriata
"will" in G. Catlin. ___________
__________ (London: MacMillan, 1930), p
David Easton. "The Point of View of the Author,"
Black, ed. , The Soc i a 1_Theorles of Talcott Parsons.
196 i
discussion of 
o f Po 1 i 11 c s .
A Studv
(Engle wood 
311-63.
«0. R 
(Englewood 
' *3K.R 
(London:
Cliffs. Ne ! e r s e v enct ice-Ha 11 . pc
See a jl so
Si
op
Young. 
Clif f s ,
Popper, 
Hu tch i r.son
E . N a o e 1 . T
Sv st e as_s jof_Po 1_i t l_9_a ,-L Gc i e nee .
New Jersey: Prentice-Ha 11. 1968), p.
The Logic of Sc ie_n_t i f_ic_ Dcy<erjy. 
1968), especially chapters 3 and 4
ure of Sc i en New York:
11
Mart in's Press 
-^K.P. Popper, Tne_
cit. p . .59 . 
fc~'See a discussion
1961). chaoters 2,
.oqic of Sclentiii c Di scc verv
oI tne social s c i e n c e s 
O
in David 
’h i ca oo :Easton, A Framework f or Pc 1 it. l_c a I An a 1 y s i s .
University of Cnicagc Press, 1962), p. 13ff.
^Regi r.a Id J. Harrison, Eurooe .in^ua st l_qn .
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1974), oo. 42-74: and Paul
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Taylor and A.J.R. Grooa, ed., "A Conceptual Typology of 
International Organization," In International Organization, 
CLondon: F. Pinter, 1978), pp. 118-36; as well as
"Federalism: The Conceptual Setting," C1978), pp. 326-44;
and Carole Webb, "Theories of International Cooperation and 
Integration," in James Barber, et.al., ed., PolJLt les _betwe_en
States:__Conflict and Cooperation. CMllton Keynes: Open
University, 1975). See also Bernard Burrows, et.al., ed.,
Federa 1_Solutions to European Issues. CLondon: Macmillan,
1977),- especially Conclusion and p. 224ff.
s7Prlitar 1 ly by the The Federalist Papers, originally 
a series of eighty-flve essays published In the New York 
press from October 1737 until August 1788 under the 
signature, ’Publius,' written by Hamilton C51), Madison C26) 
and John Jay C5) CHamilton and Madison collaborated on 
three), is the classic statement of the political principle 
of Federalism. See Alan Pendleton Grimes. American 
Political Thought. CNew York: Henry Holt and Co., 1955),
p. 119ff., and Louis Hartz. The Liberal Tradition in 
America. CNew York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1955), p.
67ff.
&eFor a good discussion of Federalism, see Charles 
Pent land, International Theories and European Integra t i on. 
CNew York: Macmillan, 1973), especially part one, chapter 
two-.
^No.t withstanding the potentiality for growth, as 
in the United States, toward a greater integrated Ccentrally 
controlled) collectivity.
7OPeter Bender, Die Identitat Eurocas. op. cit. p.
122.
- 7,1 See J. Roland Pennock, Democratic Political '
Theory. (Frinceton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1979), p. 503: and its possibility by growth through
centra 11sat1 on, Frederic Jesup Stimson, The_Western Way.
CNew York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 62. The 
Inherent implications of growth are a theoretical 
outcropping of formalised structural relativity outside the 
realm of this paper.
72For Functional ism detail, see David Mltrany, The 
Funct1ona11st Theory of Politics. CLondon: Robertson (for
the London School of Economics and Political Science),
1975): P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, ed., "Functionalism. the 
Theory of David Mitrany," in Paul Taylor, et.al.. eds., 
International CrqanlzatIon, op. cit. pp. 236-52; Paul
Taylor, The Limits of European Integration. CLondon: Croom
Helm, 1983); and Mark Imber, "Re-reading Mitrany: A
Pragmatic Assessment of Sovereignty," in Review of
I nt erna 11 ona 1 Studies. 1QC1934) : 103-23 .
73Honnet himself said that "The history of European 
unification shows that when people become convinced a change 
is taking place . . . they act before that situation is
established." A. Sampson. The_New_gurooeans. CLondon:
Hodder and Stoughton. 1968), p. 82.
7See Peter Bender. Pi e J.dent i ta_t Euro_oa s_. op. cit.
p. 123, for an elaboration of the argument.
7‘5Haas Introduced the 'high' and 'low' concepts in
48
E.B. Haas, f,>The Uniting of Europe' and the Uniting of Latin 
America,*' in Journa 1_ „of__Cowmgn_ Ha rke:t _Styd i e s . 5C1967):315. 
327—28.
~'‘&As evidenced in the Federalist discussion of 
pluralistic society, Functionalism too MAY lead to social 
and ultimately political integration. However, this is an 
implied residual and not central tenet of the primary 
theory. The theory itself has two main streams. Ci) 
struetura1-functionalism, a fra mework oriented toward a 
general theory of society based in anthropological and
social thought. See E. Durkheim, The Rules_of Sociological
Method. (Glencoer Illinois: The Free Press, 1938), pp.
89-97; A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in 
Primitive Society'. CLondon: Cohen and West, 1979: M.J. 
Levy, Jr., The Structure of Society. C P ri n c e t o n, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952); and G.A. Almond
and J.S. Coleman, ed., The Politics of Developing Areas. 
CPrinceton: Princeton University Press, 1960),
"Introduction.") And C.2) a more flexible empirical approach 
suggesting functions as being achieved when needs are met by 
activity in the system. See B. Malinowski, "Functionalism 
in Anthropology,” in L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg, ed., 
Sociological Theory. CLondon: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul,
1964), pp. 637-50; R.K. Merton, Cent inuities_in Structural
I nou 1 rv. CLondon: Sage, 1981): and R. Firth, ed., Man__anc
Cu Iture:_-An Eva lust i on. o f „_the. _ Wqrk__o f Bronislaw Maliriowskl .
CLondon: Routledge and Kegan Paul, -1957).
^See, amongst others, Gerhard Mallv, The European 
Communi ty in PerspecU ve . C L e x i ri a t o n : University of 
Kentucky Press, 1973), pp. 29-33: and Phillippe C.
Schmitter, "A Revised Theory of Re-gional Integration," in 
"L.N. Lindberg, S.A. Schei-ngold, ed. , Regional Integration, 
Theory and Research. op. cit. pp. 232-64: and Ernest B.
Haas, Beyond the Nation-State:___Functionalism and
Interna11onal Organization. CStanford, California:
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CHAPTER TWO
Social!sa t ion: ....The Process
Socialisation and integration are complementary but not 
synonymous terms. Whereas integration is the bringing 
together of parts into a contiguous whole, creating an 
orderly arrangement of elemental components integrated into 
a harmonious grouping or pattern,1 socialisation is the
process undergone either singularly or collectively which 
provides the environment necessary for the bringing together 
of diverse entities-in an i integrated'state . Socialisation 
relates to individual concoperated coalescence to form 
groups and the concoporated coalescence of groups to form 
larger groups. In many respects, the individual is
nationalised through the process of socialisation. These 
characteristics may be viewed in terms of gains, economic, 
socio-cultural, and political, which are benefits derived
t-hrouah integration. The process of socialisation tends'to
create similar and ultimately identifying characteristics
relating to the plexure of' individuals in the socia 1isation
proce s s.
The economic ga i ns of socialisation may be 
preliminarily summarised as gains in the material standard 
of living. Socio-cultural gains may be summarised as an 
expansion in intellectual horizon achieved through knowledge 
or participation in others' experiences derived through the 
synergies of interaction. The political gains may likewise 
by summarised, as gains in security, either economic or 
phys i ca1.
Sociological developments started in organic groups2-
with a series of individuals which, in a general way. felt
solidarity. This is accomplished in either a cognitive or 
non-coanit 5 ve fashion.3 Essentially, life presents an 
ongoing series of tensions or conflicts which cause a 
constant need for new re—evaluation, re,justification, and 
new assertions or actions, tending toward equilibrium.'. 
Individuals or groups treat each other as auxilliary (or 
adversary! until a general pattern of solidarity develops 
which moderates the need for much individual or group 
competition. This is achieved by way of role identification 
and a general development of tolerance with the whole, 
resulting in a division of labour with its implied or 
apparent benefits. Slowlv. patterns evolve,-"” mutual 
reactions and expectations which find themselves very 
comfortable. Patterns develop through repetition and are 
coded into habi_ts, leading by way of reinforcement, into 
rules of expectations and conduct. There is a certain 
sorting of rights and duties, established by usage and which 
become almost obligatory action which tends to create a 
transmission pattern in which the past eventually becomes
the future.5 This is the slow work of consolidation.
afforded by the interactions inherent within socialisation, 
which forms a network of links that, little by little, weave 
themselves into a permanent organic solidarity. Equilbrium 
can be maintained by a rigourously defined elimination of 
competition through.a clearly defined division of
labour.
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The size of the embryonic group existent at the
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beginning of the socialisation process is important. The 
size or quantitative determinants, results in the 
compatibility of responses to the exposure of stimuli in the 
socialisation process and ultimately the eventual 
integration of elements.
These responses may be either positive or negative. 
Smaller«groups may react to stimulus differently than do 
larger groups and yijpe_ye_r sa~. Reactions coded into patterns
of behaviour are fundamental to, and a determinant of. basic
political, socio-cultural, and economic gains. Primarily 
such gains, the very reason why individuals function in 
society, are gains made possible through the quantitative 
expansion in the size of groups. These gains are the product 
of cumulative knowledge and divisions of labour. Given a 
condition of freedom, the single individual could possibly 
exist, as an individual apart frojm sociological
considerations without labour divisions or politically 
defined authority. Kis cultural and economic attainments 
would be of his own achievement, and given the limitations 
of man, these are discreetly restricted to his personal 
capabilities.
A combination of two individuals creating a basic 
diodal unit can capitalise on the quantitatively expanded 
unit by extending capabilities. A combination of three, a 
trlodal unit, when exercising divisions of labour, achieve 
economic socio-cultural and political gains from
interactiona1 increases.7 At the diodal level, distinct
economic behavioural patterns are observable. At the
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triodal level, both economic and political patterns are 
visible. Thus the quantitative determinants at this level 
of socialisation appear positive. Positive because there are 
achievement gains made directly related to group size.
Given a scarcity of primary resources, and the necessity to 
share, size may also however, produce negat_lye_advantaaes 
with group quantitative exoansion.
The triodal unity tends to create a group which could 
be termed primary.^ a group characterised by intimate 
face to face association and cooperation/'' Because of
the interactive nature of the triodal unit, all levels of
human interchange are apparent. Because of the basic »ur>®»ive 
primacy of tne triodal unit, tne individual forms his 
fundamental social nature, ineordorating common ideals ano
concepts of purpose.
Psychologically, the result of fntiinate association is
that of a certain fusion of individualities into a common
whole. This wholeness may be termed a "we-ness.11 whereby 
sympathy and mutual identification are best expressed 
naturally by the term ’’we.*’ It is not to be supposed that 
the unity of tne primary group is one of constant harmony.
It Is often competitive and self-asserting, however, this is 
socialised by sympathy with allegiance to a basic 
conceptualisation of the unit's commonality. Primary groups 
are primary in that they give the individual his earliest 
and most complete experience of social unity and form the 
foundation of expanded socialisation.1'"’ This primary 
relationship forms the first phase of society and is
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achieved amongst individuals through the medium of
communication. The individual’s freedom takes on the form
of role playing which is a patterned control by which an
individual is able to exercise his own response to given
sociological situations within accepted parameters.
Socialisation is the bringing of any given social act. or of 
the total' social process in which that act is a constituent, 
directly, and as an organised whole, into the experience of 
each of the individual organisms implicated in that act.
This achieves the reference to which the individual may 
consequently be regulated and governed in his own individual 
conduct. The reference constitutes the peculiar value and
significance of self-consciousness in the individual 
organism, which derives as a result in the social context.
through the fulfillment of a role.11
A role is important. It is a position that, can be 
filled by an individual and is something that has certain 
distinctive behavioural requirements and expectations
attached to it.32 The distinctive behaviour, termed
'norms’ . determine action within given groups. Norms CO 
are a basic mechanism of social control and supply group 
structure; CiO they encourage specialisation by increasing 
efficiency of the group members’ efforts, as no one can do 
everything equally well; Ciii) Norms tend to increase 
interdependence amongst group members and carry the net 
effect of strengthening the group; and Civ) Norms tend to be 
a mechanism by which the culture is sustained and
transmitted. "Individuals are mortal, roles are not."1
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Patterned roles develop n o re i natlv e_act Ion. The y pr e s cribe
the limits of acceptable individual and societal behaviour. 
Norms develop from triadic society, that is, from a society 
which has grown quantitatively enough to allow for the 
divisions of labour and the resultant dependency-
interdependency to develop which necessitates the creation 
of such. Socialisation extending beyond the triads to 
groups, tends to.expand the interaction complexities.5^
The elements present in the triad are entwined by each new 
additional quantitative advance. The resulting patterns,
roles, and behaviours as well as labour diversifications are
dependent upon the interplay of the existing elements and 
conditions relating to the social grouping and are 
discretely unique to each indigenous grouping. Repetitive 
action within the group congeals into ritual, so that any 
collective alienation from the existing social structure 
contains - potentially, at any rate - the seeds of new 
organ i sa t i on . 1 s
Alienation from the accepted social order could find 
new expression in a new, elementary form of organisation. 
Fluid forms of interaction become routinised and fugitive 
patterns are "crystallised" into cohesive units with a sense
of solidarity and with more or less definite structure. The 
resulting collectivity constitutes what has been termed a 
sectarian association: "sectarian" signifies that such an
association exists as a secondary phenomenon which developed 
as a result of cleavage from an already existing social
order. Conflict or hostility frequently provides the
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provocation for microcosm development from the previously 
existing association/17 and frequently provides the means 
which afford the opportunity for structural social change.
The new associations interact with older associations.
exchanging, mixing, producing a constant organisation
reshuffle with constant new definitions o-f roles and -
relations, and are not dissimilar to molecular movement
inside the smallest particles of matter.1*4
Alternative As s.oc ia p j_o ns
There are also groupings which do not exhibit
significant cohesive structure. Such an organised grouping
is termed a crowd,19 and commences the resemblance of an
organised group when its component members become possessed
by the same clearly defined purpose whether articulated or
not and when the purpose becomes transformed into a
collective will, where such is based on a collective group 
idea. This is often on a tangent to collective or group 
dynamics and underscores the idea of social organisation
based on social interaction and collective idealism. The
break-off association, and the spin-off grouping process, 
develop a nucleus which spells the beginnings of permanent 
association. It is important to note that the sectarian
nuclei reflect a group-coded response to specific and 
particular needs. The concept of marginality suggests that 
resulting from the cleavage, spin-offs of individuals 
develop with lack of Just acceptance to the new or the old 
association and form mutated subgroups, as heretofore
merit ioried .
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Through this process of constant aligning and 
re-aligning within the socialisation process is developed 
evolut i o n ary c hanqe, whereby evolutionary change is a 
process of cumulative changes by which a succession of new 
phenomena develop more or less gradually and over an 
extended period of time, out of phenomena that already 
exist. Evolutionary change is cumulative change based 
fundamentally on systems of encoded_informat ion. “li 1
Cultural forms or habits are generally freely transmitted by 
accepted patterns of action. Vast quantities of cultural 
information combine to form a cultural heritage indigenous 
to the group which is carried from generation to generation 
embellished and enriched by further interactions.
Incorporated into this general body of cultural heritage 
transmission are the results of individual learning and 
experience. An important concept of encoded information is 
that, within any given society, and indigenous to that 
society, the cultural evolutionary heritage which is being 
transmitted is highly unique. The overall socio-cultural, 
economic, and political evolution is the result of a process 
of change and development in human societies which stem from 
cumulative change in their stores of cultural
inf ormat ion.
The encoding and transmission process, through a series 
of innovations and selections, continues from the individual 
through to the world system of societies, the consequences
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being different for each human participant. Societal 
groupings, quantitatively larger than the group level, as a 
common focus of identity, are a phenomenon of relatively 
modern vintage and directly related to the process of 
modernisation. Throughout history, quantitatively most 
societies have consisted of only a few hundred members and - 
as late as two or three hundred years ago the majority of 
societies still fit this description.22 Because of the 
quantitative magnitude of society’s complexities, the 
encoding and transmission, especially in light of the 
modernisation process, has been propelling sociological 
development to a larger unit other than that of the primary 
base with an ever increasing speed. All units possess an
expanded store of information about, how to utilise the
resources of their environments for basic need satisfaction
in common, however, the qualitative exparrsion of society 
redefines, in light of new experience, that information. 
Evolutionary change is the result of socialisation and is 
fundamentally the interactional process whereby an
individual’s behaviour is modified to conform to
expectations held by members of the group to which he 
belongs . *2
Evolution itself has to do with the explanation of the 
life-forms with which nature and history present the 
individual in society,2'-' especially in light of Ci) the 
new environments of society and Cii) the changing 
life-questions brought on by both the new member and the
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cha nae ("modern i sat i onl which has taken place.*’*
What Is found existent in small group structure is, in 
effect, that which is also of importance to large group 
structures. The quantitative determinants of the group are 
a dimension of progressive intensity which refers to an • 
increased frequency and mixity of that which is found in the
small node. The greater the number of Individuals
participating in the process, the more opportunities for 
interaction. The greater the number of challenges and 
responses to challenges, the greater the general change, 
creating a more dynamic and complex socialisation process.
A dyad is.less complex than a triad, which itself is 
infinitely less complex than a larger grouping of any given 
number of members. The growth is an intensification and 
formalisation of the structures of society, affording a - 
clarification and recognition of expectations and 
performance of participating individuals within the group 
sett ing.
Conf1 let
Conflict, as a means of eliminating tension, frequently 
provides the process by which socialisation takes place. 
Conflict is the confrontation of different positions, ideas,
notions, etc., which are in essence the stimulus for social
evolution. Conflict is when one individual perceives that 
the other has frustrated or is about to frustrate some 
right.It may be singular, taking on the highly
personal characteristic of disequilibrium forcing a question
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and answer process, or it may be transmitted to a group with 
the more overt characteristics tending toward hostility.
Hostile conflict, once achieved, must be vented either Ci')
through the satisfaction of one's requirements often at the 
expense of another; Cii? through a cooperative; or (iii? 
compromising; or Civ? collaboration-action; or Cv? avoidance 
with most generally the result of the mutation of the 
original singular or inter-group sociological
structure.
Conflict is a major stimulus for the achievement of 
evolutional change, introducing the individual or 
collectivity to changes in positions throughout life 
encountering new role relationships to be learned, new
economic and political structures to be mastered, or as
prec ipitator or participator in overall social-environment 
changes. It is evident at all levels of society,- at the 
Individual level in those heretofore treated quantitatively 
limited organisations, the elementary groups, and in more 
complex groupings."-'’* As differences in the size of a
grouping entail differences in the nature of their social
relationships, direct human contacts and mediated
relationships are fundamentally different.30 Small
communities, which take on essentially a personal character, 
exhibit conflict and conflict abatement taking place on the 
plane of direct interactiona1 contact. As small communities 
tend to have less formal political organisations than do 
larger groupings, relationships are defined in terms of 
alliance among individuals and in terms of personal
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affinities- In larger communities, conflict is as much 
collective as individual and is characterised by greater 
complexity, conducted on simultaneous levels between 
contending groups and within groups. In a very real sense, 
inter-group conflict is similar to small group conflict, 
with the, larger group exhibiting complexities of
amplification having conflict simultaneously taking place on
both macro and micro levels. Conflict is essential as the
primary stimulus which changes structural forms, however, it 
is by no means the only impetus to a process of change. 
Others may perfectly well originate in the development of a 
cultural configuration such as the development of science or 
of religion, ideas, genetic considerations of population or
a shift in the physical environment such as the exhaustion 
of a strategic resource.33 Structural change in society 
may also be generated by- nothing more than the general 
advancement of the learning curve. The degree of change 
Indicates the dynamics of society; a society with little 
change tends toward stagnancy. Socialisation, as the 
interactional process of the individual in society, affects 
and is affected by, individual change in the overall social 
change, and situational changes brought about by the advance 
of modernity.
Dur i ng the proce s s of socialisation, the sociological
small node, as a result of constant confrontation and
equa1isational alignments, crystallises with an identifiable 
set of character patterns, roles, economic, or political
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patterns, unique to that grouping. The centre of this, 
called a p.g_l^i_s_, generates in almost gravitational 
consistency the Impetus for the propagation of patterns of 
behaviours. The small nodal gravitational E’2A-,Ts provides 
the natio and correlates highly with ethnie.32 The 
ethnie is an aggregate of kinship units, the members of 
which trace their origin in terms of common descent from a 
common ancestor or common ancestors who belong to the same-
categorised ethnic group and form a matrix re 1 a tedne s s .
The consideration of the polls of a given societal grouping 
as natio. as the point of birth of a given society and hence 
related to that society's ethnie, is a correct
consideration, as socialisation is a network of ordered -
relations in which individuals are organised in many
different ways and have their behaviours, attitudes and 
-characters determined by numerous established patterns in 
the form of institutions, customs, and ultimately in highly 
organised society law.3’*’
Non-Be ha v i oura 1_Characteristics _of „a _Com m u n i_t_v
The community members’ attitudes are as important as
their behaviours and the former are often responsible for 
the latter. The nature of the community is codifed in a set 
of “value impregnated beliefs."^"”' The beliefs give
structure and form to society and allow for explanation and 
justification of conditions through customs, institutions
and practice. This is the area of cultural identification 
stemming from the nat io, the collective images and ideas of
a community, which are in a way its spiritual and
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psychological elements.34" Culture is the unique-
to-the-community frame around which all elements which 
comprise a social group combine, i.e., collective images, 
beliefs, ideologies, institutions, technology, and even 
geographical and demographical factors.
Societies have value impregnated beliefs or myths which 
are propositions that are either true or false or
propositions that are partly true and partly false.737'
Myths and traditional ways of thinking about things, are 
logically related systems of ideas which are often called 
ideologies, or they may be single and unsubstantiated 
propositions. Myths often re-st on taboos of primitive .
societies;36’ ideologies are often generally complex
rationa1isations of a highly articulated set of beliefs; 
institutions are patterns of rationalised and systematised 
organisations which, generally speaking, reflect beliefs. 
Belief systems are not necessarily consistent and frequently 
embody contradictory propositions of an ambivalent nature.
It is important to note that beliefs may either be the 
deliberate creation of leaders (elites) or may have 
historical origins,3'5'
Be1iefs take_on two dimensions:___ the myth and the
ideoloaical, both form collective ideas based not
necessarily on an objective knowledge of facts, but more on 
subjective opinions or a way of thinking, and results from 
the process of socialisation by way of growth.**0
What is important is that beliefs, myths, and
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ideologies define systems of value and value systems evolve 
by way of socialisation and lend identifiable 
characteristics to those involved in that evolutionary 
process. Every society is based on definitions of good and 
evil, right and wrong, proper and improper, which together
constitute the salient system of values and patterns for
normative interaction and thus are identifiable constituents
of overall group 'identification’. - •
Beliefs function as a set of rules of behavioural
expectations defining nominative interaction and as such 
form a set of values/45 The acceptance or adherence of a 
society to a set of beliefs is a question of legitimacy of 
the beliefs within the group. The more deep-seated the 
belief, regardless of nature, the greater the degree of 
functioning legitimacy within that community. The developed 
sociological grouping with its own developed cultural 
patterns is esentially formed by history and then reinforced
through acculturation. Acculturation is a result of
socialisation, the inculcating of traditional social
behaviour into the new members of society. Uniqueness 
results from particular events which have occurred in the 
experience of a given society, each producing its own 
certain effect which influences the sociological development 
of that specific community, regardless of similarities with 
events in the inter-group environment and their respective
ultimate in-group development. It is significant to note
that the appearance of different_factors. i^n _socl a 1
evo1ut ion__vary from country to country and from
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civilisation to civilisat ion.2'1’ Inter-cultural.
inter-societal compleraentarlness exercising distinct
diseoualated results force and form future and further
evolution. Most elements occur through conscious phenomenon 
such as beliefs, images, and attitudes and are thus 
transmitted from generation to generation by a process of- 
education. Education here dees not solely mean formal
education, as in modern schools. It has the expanded
connotation of cultural transference. perhaps vi_a schools, 
but more with regards to interpersonal relations.
Education, whatever method, instills both skills for life in
the new generation and an analytical review of past events 
which is summarised in c u11 u r a 1 transmission. In_ modern
societies, tnis process, primarily due to the sopnist1catec 
level of skills required and the comclexlty of the general 
body of knowledge, is reinforced, indeed dominated, by 
formal structural institutional programmes controlled, and 
dictated primarily, by the majority structure and beliefs. 
Hence, in today's cultural evolutionary process,
transmission has been Identified, typed and codified and is 
transmitted by an ad perpetuus process.
Thus some of the elements which compromise and go to 
make up the sociological grouping are determined by the 
grouping's treatment of past elements, out of which
collective patterns are established and those found
desirable used to form the structure of the new society.
This is an ongoing process, an unending chain of events, 
often motivated by conflict and learning, starting with the
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self, on to the dyad and triad level, to the group, to the 
expanded large group, through to the developing natlo and on 
to a nation, that being, the largest sociological human 
grouping yet developed by and known to man. The process of 
socialisation occurs at two essential speeds, either rapidly 
by Transformation or slowly be. Accretion. Transformation 
mav be direct, as a result of a coanizant objective by 
elites or. Indirect. as in the result of events or defined 
action as in the event of public campaigns, war, or the 
formalised educational process. Accretion is by less 
defined and less structured more gradualistic processes, as
changes in diet, speech, or patterns of behaviour over
time."'- _
The socialisation process is one in wn • c n t n e 
individual learns basic social behaviour and acconwedates 
himself to the dynamics of collective life. Social _
behaviour is learned through fundamentally cultural 
influences such as early contacts and environmental 
influences''^ in the process of soc i a 1 i sa t i on . It may 
also be learned by desoc1 a 1isation as in "re-learning" 
habits of behaviour as in transformational efforts by Health 
Authorities to discourage the practice of smoking or as in 
"new learning" such as habits of acceptable behaviour 
required in new group memberships. The process of 
socialisation produces on the _Individual level a
modification of behavi our __r ecu i_r ed by the or cup and
characterised by the group as normative parameters of the 
group. It is essentially a learning process,"4-' and is
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derived from the individual desire, either cognitive or 
non-cognitive, to satisfy needs, stemming from concepts of 
self and especially self concepts relating to the group.
The seif_cgncegt arises in conduct, when the individual 
becomes a social object in experience to himself. This 
takes place when the individual assumes the attitudes, or
uses the gesture which another individual would use in 
response to himself or tends to so respond/** -This is 
the direct result of socialisation. Self is orientated by 
the process in terms of reference, evaluation, realisation, 
or actualisat ion, status or self conceptua1isation through 
arousal, cognitive or latent exposure to the group. 
Socialisation is the continuing process which, by creating 
normative patterns, creates out-groupings, a differentiation 
or gradation of individuals.
Development- of Collective Identity
The na t i o developed through socialisation produces a 
* we' of major importance in that along with the development 
of the 'we', is the simultaneous, although often entirely 
unrealised, development of the ’they'. What becomes that 
which becomes unique to 'us', is 'us', anything else is 
foreign or 'theirs'. The development of 'our' identity, the 
crystallisation of 'our' characteristic, crystallises and 
motivates the ’’other than us” or foreign characterisitics. 
The further the process of evolution takes either the 
individual or the group or a whole society, the greater the 
degree of polarisation of the foreign or non-complementary 
elements and thus, the growth of the potential chances of
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inter-group conflict. A major effect of t he _pr gee ss__gf 
socialisation, is the means whereby the foregone society 
acculturates and defines the future society and forms the 
idea of ’cultural baggage'. The differentiation of that 
’cultural baggage' forms the distinct parametorial 
boundaries of given societies/"7 For the society at 
large, it produces attitudes and patterned responses to 
change.. The .impetus for societal change is
moderni sati on.
The bringing together of small groups into
ever-increasing larger grouos through greater interactional 
awareness is i nt eora t i on afforded by the ratchet effect of
socialisation. The process of socialisation incorporates 
the ides of integration, the bringing together of unique 
sub-groups to form a new encompassing larger group and “is 
the process of social learning/*9 The theoretical 
approaches to the understanding of how integration occurs 
outlined in chapter one, are set out in political economics 
in the three previously described theories. These theories 
attempt to define integration with only an implied and not a 
specific focus on the process of socialisation. Specific 
focus would centre on an unencumbered interplay of need - 
action response situations and the developed patterns of 
expectations and performance.
The Federal Theory is suggestive of a high degree of 
self-sustaining autonomy,-’0 essentially maintaining-’3 
relations in a state of balanced equilibrium as a f 1 xum
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formalising recognition of others~'2’ and otherness. As 
the nation-state arrangement is both the central fact of 
modern political life and central to political
analysis,5' it is a theory recognizing the elements of, 
and not the explanations of, integration.5’*
Theoretica11y, it could potentially allow marginal 
interaction, leading toward expanded society."” but only 
on a highly remote and ancillary plan as it does not 
directly address the incorporation of the concept of
socialisation. In and of itself, isolation does not lead
toward integration.'54' Functionalism, on the other hand, 
does substantively embrace_notions of socialisation by 
suggesting incremental spill-over puroosec through .
functional need abatement. e 1 t ne r systems-requisite or 
’individual’ request. Such action would form interplavs, 
eithe-r inter-group or intrapersonal.-,fc’ The former are 
based on a general theory of society, microscopic in nature 
The latter are based on individual demands, necessitating 
systems activity which are macroscopic in nature."’"* 
Functionalism does not oer se lead to development beyond 
sub-governmental cooperation^0 and is limited by its 
mono-dimensionality. It postulates the developed 
relationships causal to the ultimate dissolution of the
current nation-state structure of society, organising the 
world not by what divides it. but by what unites it.el 
The nation-state is discounted as a way of organising man's 
social and political life and, as a result, this reality
presents the major liability of the theory.^'2 In real
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terms, the state does, itself, attempt to satisfy domestic
needs and not as suggested by the theory. That is, need 
satisfaction is achieved through inter-group relations,'-’-'
Neo-Funct i ona1ism addresses the political omission of 
Functionalism, by positing integration as the process 
whereby political actors, in the several distinct national 
settings are persuaded to shift loyalty toward a new 
collective centre away from the domestic,*’0 achieving 
ultimately a supra-national status. Its novum is the 
implied postulation that domestic units agree to integrate, 
and as such integration is seen more as a contractual 
political arrangement rather than a sociological 
evolutionary event.*-’ This is basically a legitimate 
system in which conflict is resolved via authoritarian 
decisions.** This is systems change imagined as a result
-of a succession of 'low' political cons fderat i ons4-'7 _
dependent upon commitment to a new centre of obeisance by a 
domestic willingness.*’0
To various degrees, these theories overlook the 
uniqueness of individual commitment to integration or the 
political implications of such action. Integration affects 
the individual and, as such, must be accomplished on the 
biographical level.*’’5’ The portion of these theories that 
relate to the biographical level, refer to the individual 
commitment to integration, however, in general terms, they 
reflect a group political action and not an individual 
action. To adequately assess integration in the present
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epoch of European development, the effects of integration on
the Individual and the individual attitudes towards such
must be assessed, and to do this the process of
socialisation must be taken into full consideration. In
previous societal arrangements, integrational development 
most frequently took place in an environment characterised 
by less rigidity. This development alleged unencumbered 
horizontal linkages to evolve.
Modern, increased institutionalisation, hampered by 
physical parameters sui generis holds nations as clients of 
their respective states. The essentially unencumbered 
individual involvement and.commitment to the process of
integrati or. is r. e c e s s a r y : or „ nt rst•:net effect of
developme nr a 1 . see i c1 oc: ca _ o r cwtn. with hignlv stru c t u r e d
society, developme nt a 1 arc w t n . integration, may only be
a erh i e v e c by incorpora ting t_he concept of growth into the
societal structure i t self and bv emDlovino society as the
vehicle for the individual conversion to the idea of
integrat ion.
Pluralistic community is a community based on the 
recognition of domestic spheres of sovereignty, and as such, 
is a theory primarily devoted to the political dimension of 
social endeavours. The Func t i_gna_l _t neorv. envisioning a 
community based on the concept of specific-1 nterest-
communities, achieves credibility in that functional
Integration is defined by transactions and hence lends 
itself to empirical validation • It is chiefly concerned
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with the transactional dimension of social endeavours. The
Neo-Functionalist_theor ymore formal in its scope, is
suggestive of communities of like interest evolving, in 
various domestic settings bridging both the political and 
the transactiona1 dimension. These three approaches to 
integration emphasise horizontal linkages forming -­
horizontally structured communities. Socialisation in 
structured societies implies vertical linkages, interests 
running from top to bottom in given areas forming 
fundamentally a vertically structured community. A 
vertically structured community is fundamentally based on 
the concept of mutual identification."70 Mutual
identification incorporates both the politic_al dimension and 
the transactional dimension as adjunct to the social 
cultural dimension and 5s analogous with integrated society.
Soc £al i_s at f on :___ De ve lop inq Common _Ide nt i_f icat ion
What is it that draws people together? Human beings,
as animals, require some culture or group and along with the
idea of group goes the idea of identification.71 
Identification is a state of mind creating a feeling of 
loyalty to the group, a people with a sense of collective 
destiny sharing through a common past and a vision of a
common future.72 Identification has to do with the
notion of “my group and your group.'1 What causes Group
Identification?
Group identification is fundamentally the product of
group differences and the inherent individual ability, given
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a variety of options, to choose to formulate and identify 
with, or to subsume individual Identity under that of a 
chosen larger entity.
The major characteristic of the Nation-States in Europe 
today Is that they hold a belief that each has the right to 
have its own way.''-' From the b e g i r. i ri g of recorded
history, to the present day. roan has been at war, indeed,
one could postulate that war is endemic. War is rooted in 
the idea that man has the right to have his own way. and is 
based on the concept of individual differences. Organised
at the state level with nationalism at its core. States
foster the timeless nan i f estat i on of their owr.
individuality. A 11; • - g ?. Z u r o d e may be enjoying tne benefits
of unorececenied oeace for a orotracted oeriod, the
supposition that the basic nature of man has changed is not 
founded. Individuality has always been evident; 
individuality is still present. This is apparent in the 
block, system which surrounds Europe. This is apparent in 
the diplomatic inter-state activity found within 
Europe.7^ Individuals themselves belong to nations, and 
either identify, or do not identify, with, those nations.
To focus on the causational points of identity a fundamental
distinction must be first made.
A State is a legal and political organisation, with 
power to request obedience and loyalty from its citizens. A
nation is a cororcunitv of dgodIg where members are bound
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together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a 
national'™' consciousness. Socialisation, although 
peripherally related to State, is fundamentally the actions 
of people, and directly causal to, the Nation.
A Nation exists when a group or- otherwise a 
"significant number of people in a community cons i der 
themselves to form a nation or behave as if they formed 
one,"76, In Western Europe, "nation" is a concept which 
was derived from the eighteenth century notion of popular 
sovereignty. One group united in will. The common will is 
a product of a common image and is the result of vertical 
identification.77 Images are. strengthened by. "facts’* 
which constitute "knowledge" c-f nation-ism. Nation-ism in 
the modern Nation-State is perpetuated by a formal series of 
institutional apparatus designed to foster -Natioh-ism. In 
essence, then, although the state originally developed its 
unique posture vis a vis others, although characteristics 
attributed it by its Nation or Nations, its hermetic action, 
in effect, intensifies those National characteristics by Cl) 
acting as a buffer between the Nation and outside parties 
and C2) constantly refeeding those characteristics back into 
the domestic system.
Uniqueness as WE-ness vs._FORE IGN-nes s
The process and the product of socialisation provides
both the means and the ends of both individual and
collective identification. Individually, it is coupled with
emotional and impulsive reactions which develop into a
complex of feelings due partly to the valuations and
interpretations of own ideas and partly by primitive
instincts and the acquired association of emotion with
emotion.7® Individually, men are normally not aware of 
the process by which their idea of group identity and their 
nationa1-ness, with its accompanying emotions, are produced. 
‘The layering creation of such ideas and emotions is
constantly on the increase by the organisationa1 network 
found within the Nation-State of today. Identity is a 
mental picture fairly typical of the mass. The soc i ological 
process found within the group formalises the development of 
the embodied identity in that it produces like human beings 
in distinction to a_group of un-lire human beings. Although 
there are individual differences within groups there is an 
over-riding group individuality that differentiates it from 
other groups. ' _ -
It has been suggested that most of current European 
tension today resulting in a ’fundamental political and 
social malaise’7'5' may be attributed to a general loss of 
community, which is in effect, the loss of or blurring of 
traditional identification. The loss of community may have 
been brought about by modernisation and its associated 
developments, but most certainly is exacerbated by 
'overspecialisation and uniformity'.®0 The general loss 
of natural communities which afforded traditional 
identification resulted. If this is the case, contributing 
toward the Disintegration of existing European Systems, then
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the general notion of ident ity as forming a group of
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national awareness is a real portion of a common ’WE'
feeling. Indeed, a Nation may appropriately be termed a 
“self-aware ethnic group."®’ In other words, at the 
level of Nation, it is self-defining. It is the development 
through time of “a collectivity within a larger society 
having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a
shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more
symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their
peoplehood1'82 which produces some consciousness of kind 
among members of the groups.
This suggests that identity is triggered by either 
given or achieved differences.
1dent i ty:__ given and achieved di f f erenc e s. t he product of
man in both his physical and social_environment.
Commonalities relating toward similarities and differences 
relating toward xenophobia are either achieved or given. 
Reactions to given stimuli and conditions taken collectively 
as a result of the socialisation process congeal into 
patterns of similarities, which produce a means of 
identification. Ethnos relates to cultural (perhaps more so 
than biological®75 kinship for it is a similarity of 
cultural attributes in a group that attracts both the term
“Ethnos'“3Z4 and the idea of common identification.
The ai ven_e2e®ents which contribute toward a common
identity are first and foremost indicative of the biological
characteristics of the individual, such as race and its
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identifications! characteristics such as colouration.
etc.®”’ Above that, the location of the collectivity is 
salient. There is an apparent natural tendency - a tendency 
having been produced bv_social circumstances (socialisation) 
from time practically immemorial - for the individual "to 
love his birthplace or the place of his childhood sojourn.
its s u r rc u nd i n a s. its climate, the co nr o ur s of hills and
valleys, of rivers and trees."®'- Man. as a subject c-f 
immense habitude, exhibits the tendency to revert back to 
what is known, especially in times of rapid change, as these
are the substance and stuff of identification. And inasmuch
as these physical identifications are held in common with
similar individuals. identification extends to the common
core group. As Voltaire nas. suggested. "11 est impossible 
a ' a i mer_t endr em. ent_une ramill e_trop_nombreuse_au}pri_cpnn_a i_t
S’* __ __ _
= Identification at this level comes about
through common exposure and response to ai_ven circumstances. 
The exposure is given by natural, physical, or biological 
conditions responded upon collectively through the 
socialisation process of interaction,
The achieved elements which lead toward common
identification relate to the fact that, to a great extent, 
man arranges his own environment. "Different aspects of the 
multifarious character of man respond to different calls
from without, so that the same individuals and much more the
same race, may behave very differently at different
epochs."6’® The cathexus of human thought is dominated by
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ego-consciousness as much as It is by group-consciousness. 
Both ‘'are complex states of mind at which we arrive through 
experiences of differentiation and opposition, of the ego 
and the surrounding world, of the we-group and those outside 
the group."®'5’
- The differentiation tending toward xenophobia, the 
opposition tending toward conflict, is a product of social 
interaction in the process of socialisation. •
The achieved identificat ional characteristics held in
common by the homo erectus is suggestive of the concept of 
homo mult jplex. Man, as individual and unique, is a member 
of a myriad of groups and alliances, constructs of the 
socialisation process and may fall broadly into three 
salient, categories:
Homo multiplex =
homo economicus 
homo politicus 
homo socius'5’0
Life for homo multiplex is played out in terms of three 
levels or aspects: his economic, his political, and his
social activities contribute toward his overall definition
of self_as a societal being and hence contribute toward
identity as achieved determinants.'5’1 Socialisation 
attributed toward societal growth incorporates group 
consciousness. And with group consciousness comes group 
loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people involved 
in the process, exposed to similar stimuli, responding in 
similar manner.92 The concept Eadem sed_a 1 iter suggests
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the feature of repetitive collective interaction, achieving 
patterns of similarity and in terms of pat.terns of 
similarity resulting in a lo.G.P§. of identification.'”'"'
Group exposure through socialisation produces 
togetherness and collectivity crystallises a common overall 
Ideology^ which itself develops into a philosophy -which 
functions as a cognitive method of analysis and in turn 
generates a Political, Economic- and.Social system as
patterned common responses to stimuli.'5"-' These achieved
points of common identification are often very deep-seated 
as they provide reference for self-life definition.'”6'
The group feeling is an effective sentiment or sympathy 
brought about through meaningful interaction which binds a 
group together through common institutions, and culture, and 
given that group unity.'”7''
_ The dynamic aspect of 'achieved identification is
composed of essentially all the cultural activities and 
stimulants of a given collectivity, where culture extends 
broadly to encapsulate all embraced characteristics of the 
group. The static aspect of achieved identification 
represents the existing group system Juxtaposed others 
as'?e point of reference.
The concept of homo multiplex, affording identification 
through socialisation, incorporates the creation of strong 
group feelings, a definite solidarity or embryonic kin 
foundation through like peoples, responding to like stimuli, 
with like needs and experiencing like results Cor a
combination of like and dislike, etc.). It is a common
82
reference to group life experiences.'5"5'
The homo economicus aspect of the mult l_£.l.ex is,
extended to, for example, the desire to expand territory, to 
acquire economic self-sufficiency, to promote business 
interests, etc. It provides identification chiefly through 
a felt e m g^i p_n, These are emotional appeals motivated by/ a 
desire for group advantage over third parties. So also is 
the homo politlcus aspect of multiplex, the wishes of. a 
group to foster their will, to function socially independent 
and unencumbered to promote interests with a minimum of
enforced outside directional definition. This is a desire
for an environment in which to play out developed
ideologies.100 The homo__sogi_us_a_s_pect of mu 11 i_pl_ex_i_s 
extended that of intercommunication and exchange on all 
levels. Homo politicus, ecqnomfcus, and socius are three 
distinct’ identities of- man. developed, expanded, and refined 
by the socialisation process. These aspects of homo 
mult 1 pi ex directly relate to man's achieved uniqueness and 
the relatedness of these achieved uniqueness toward others. 
These three aspects of man’s nature reflect the dimensions 
of life, and their interplay, the complexity of life.
I n Sum
In a societal sense, structure comes from values.503
A system, social, political, or economic, has structure or 
form, because of the need to harmonise components. What 
allows for the functioning of components in a system is some 
sort of common underwritten norm. The degree of
independence or conformity is axiological to the group of
S3
which the eon s i dera t, i on has reference. Tne ph eno mono n of
rapid social change brings about mutations, frequently 
i input a t i ona 1 , through catalyst and Inhibitor reactions to 
stimuli with an impact on participant inter-relations, 
kinship, and environment.107
There are two fundamental-theories relating to man’s 
identification toward group. Firstly, the. Social-Exchange 
Theory, namely that man Joins society because the group is 
means to an end. It posits the individual’s goals or needs 
as only fully met through a f f i 1 i a t i on . 3 O7:' Secondly, the 
Re i n f orcement Theory posits group membership as the end in
and of itself, that is. that needs such as those for
development of-an identity can be met only by other
people,30'' Both these views highlight the functional 
relationship defining interaction as ascribed roles, and 
answers the question long ago asked by Georg Simmel, "How i 
society possible?"105
Role, or Social role,10* is concerned with the
emphasized individual personality in relation to functional 
normative constraints dictating deviance or conformity to 
the group.107 It is the individuals' prescribed reaction 
to his setting, Political, Economic, or Social, each level 
of life being distinct but affording interrelational 
overlays. Individuals exist in society by_naiture and by 
nurture for implied biological reasons and for sustenance
and actuation.10* Individuals’ existence is
paramaterised by roles, the fulfillment of which gives the 
development of internalised identification. Identification
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is a respo n se to either given or achieved stimuli, netting a
self-actua1ised desire to be associated. Identification
develops, associated with compliance, whereby the individual 
behaves in a particular way, not because such behaviour i_s 
intrinsically satisfying, but by adopting a particular 
bebaviour because it nets a satisfying se 1 f-de f i-n i ng
relationship with the group The most deeply rooted
response to socia 15sation is the internalisation of a value
or belief, a role or an identification with (or against-) the 
group. Internalised, it is a part of the individual 
participants’ own system becoming independent of source and 
becoming extremely resistant to change.130 It becomes 
constituent to the individuals- own being.333
The oeginning point for this analysis of the process 
and state of Integration in Europe is that of the individual 
in society-. Sociological and psychological literature 
afford the basis for tracing both the development of the 
individual in, and the ever changing characteristic of, 
society. A significant portion of what man is. feels, does, 
and thinks, is the product of, and reflected by
participation in the social environment. To a great degree, 
personal characteristics of self contribute largely to that 
development, both singularly and to society at large. The 
quantitative size of that society determines largely the 
degree and type of interplay. With quantitative expansion.
first-hand association diminishes and the active contact
between individual and society centres and concentrates in 
the realm of the core group. The core group, while
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functioning itself as a constituent actor in the overall 
entity, plays a significant part in defining personality by 
way of an inter-group counter-positioning of the individual. 
Equilibration is sought which defines the taken individual 
stand. With the advent of modernisation, literacy and 
centra] i sat ionx the large group i_n_lo.?^l._Dare_ntL§. effectively 
assumed the position of permanent posture in participant 
acculturisation. The formality of the modern system has 
promoted a perforce engagement of a material character, not 
withstanding the degree of flexibility taken by the
i nd i v i dua1.
The nature of man in society is one best characterised 
by tne multiplex concept. Society, formed through 
socialisation entails activities economic, fundamentally the 
abatement of psychological needs, occasionally physical and 
social, but mostly the fulfillment of spiritual112 needs. 
Educed from the concatenate interplay of society is the 
individual’s being, conjoined with associates enshrouded 
with identities both individual and collective unique to 
participants. Significant is that the process of
socialisation affords the conditions for the definition of
self, allowing self to merge collectively through a plexure 
of relations into society. The process causes independent 
accomodation between self and society, and society and self.
If the individual both contributes to the formation of, 
and in return is formed by, society, the next consideration 
of interest is that which takes place at the merging of
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societies. or integration.
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CHAPTER THREE
Integrat ion?___ The Functioning
Functional theory implies the development of 
integration through cross-societal linkages, based on needs. 
Kenneth Waltz suggests1 that even though such linkages 
may, in practical terms, be beneficial to those
participating parties, they are often prohibited or at least 
hindered by governmental intervention. Linkages are the 
substance of integration. Why then this apparent blockage 
of a natural process? To understand this, one must 
understand the nature of integration itself.
Organised society constitutes an establishment or 
regime. Linkages with the out-groups encourage in effect a 
disestablishment of the present fixed regime, in the wake of 
the new linkages, an essential antidisestablishmentarianism 
demonstrates the living organism of government. Although 
composed of constituent elements-, governments as a unit, 
are frequently interested in their own self-maintenance and
exi stence.
To clarify this phenomenon, this chapter will introduce 
the notion of nation and nationality and focus on the 
relationships which, over time, produce a tight social unit 
defined by specific roles and lubricated by communicationa1 
interchange characteristic of, and incorporated within, the 
twentieth century nation. By so doing, it will develop 
Integration as a construct forming in the crucible of the 
socialisation process.
Needs
Society is organised into a social cultural system with
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a definite structure. The structure is composed essentially 
of a network, of relationships among the members of a 
society, ordered through time, relating to the various 
elements found to exist Indigenously around the developed 
society forming its environment. These relationships make 
it- possible for the members to satisfy their own individual- 
needs as well as the system needs of the society.2 
Through this process, the individual achieves personal 
definition and society, ultimate definition. There is 
exhibited a high degree of conformity to the group by the 
individual in society; conformity which creates linkages of 
major significance.3 The types of linkages found in 
human societies are, to a great extent, biologically 
determined. Needs and wants are developed and expanded 
through societal interchange, and their arousal, found in 
complex sets of interacting physiological -events, and are
the net result of the individual's social behaviour. Of
crucial importance is that the society and the Individual's 
position in same, act_a_s_an extensions _o f ..each _ot_ h e r o r
both need definition and need fulfillment.^
Social relationships in all mammalian societies tend to
be organised to take account of age and sex differences. 
Human societies generally speaking develop greater elaborate 
kinship networks and other complex social arrangements that
reflect cultural Influences. The social structures in
developed societies are an organisationa1 and behavioural 
product of the interaction of culture and, to some extent, 
are both biological and genetic.*-' Social structures are
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composed of two elements composing the basic building blocks 
of society CO the human element and CiO the roles that the
human element fulfill.
The human element, the individual person, has a genetic 
heritage that is particularly distinctive and partially 
shared and eajsh individual has a cultural heritage that is.' 
likewise partly distinctive and partly shared. The shared 
portion of both produce the common element found wi-thin the 
social structure. The shared blood produces the kinship 
community, shared economic functions produce the community 
feeling of productive relations. The basic group structure 
itself produces a need for significance and produces a 
community feeling of cohesion. The interaction of the human 
element within the society is accomplished according to role 
patterns.
Role ’ _ -
A role is a position that can be filled by an
individual and has certain distinctive behavioural
requirements and expectations attached to it.*' At least 
five different ways of classifying individuals seem to be 
commonly involved in giving organisation and structure to 
society, Cl} age-sex groupings7 (2} family or kinship 
groupings C3} occupational groupings CA} interest groupings 
C5} status groupings. Within each grouping are a number of 
different categories or positions which may be either given 
or assumed. Each individual in society not only takes or is 
assigned a position in these groupings, but is further 
assigned or assumes positions in sub-groupings almost ad
Z 7'
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i nf 1 n1turn. Many of the positions, thus ascribed or assumed, 
change as the individual in society matures, some do not.
The contribution that a position makes to the objects and 
purposes of the community represent essentially the function 
of the position. The beliefs shared by individuals of the 
society regarding the functions of the various positions 
represent one part of the ideology held in common. The 
common ideology i’s circumambient to behaviour of the 
function filled by the individual, svhich is essentially a 
personified role.® Within a given society people are 
expected to act in certain ways according to the roles in 
question. Failure to live up to expected normative 
behaviour will be criticised by the group, censored or led 
to ostraci sation. Normative behaviour within society may be 
formal, as in legal .considerations, or informal, as in one's 
anticipation'of another's action. A number of different 
norms combine to shape the parameter requirements of a role, 
as individuals in society have many roles to fulfill. They 
are exposed to a myriad of societal parameters in the form 
of expectations of normative behaviour which are largely 
learned responses and expectation patterns acquired through 
the process of individual socialisation into the group.
The primary or basic function of roles are an important 
mechanism of social control. They harness the individual's 
energies to those tasks that must be accomplished if the
system is to survive and the needs of the members are to be 
met, and as such, take on a political connotation. The
second function of roles is to encourage specialisation.
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Specialisation increases the efficiency of members’ efforts 
within the collectivity of the group and assume an economic
connotation. The third function of the role is the resultant
specialisation which increases the level of i nt e_r -dependence 
among the members of the given group. Interdependence 
increases the strength of the group and-have a social
connotation. Further, roles are a mechanism for cultural
transmission. They are used for the passing of tradition 
from one generation to the next and. as such, assume an
overall cultural connotation.’5’
Basic roles are usually ascribed to the individual at 
birth by fixea.criteria- which are independent of the
individual merit such as the criteria of sex. descent, or
seniority of age. These criteria are e xha u st i ve in that 
they can be mutually and universally applied. They are also 
exclu s i ve in as much as every indvidual in a society belongs 
to either one or another, i.e.. male or female, juvenile or
adult, or a selected combination of same. Second to basic 
roles are those of function roles. These are fundamentally 
more differentiated, but, as basic roles, they also have 
extensive implications for the other roles open to their 
incumbents and for Interpersonal relations. These general 
roles may take the form of occupational roles. They are 
generally filled indiscriminately and frequently have much 
wider significance than mere occupation itself. General 
roles are accorded frequently to those that prove themselves 
through society as being capable of occupying some economic
considerations and are f urica went a 11 v those that add the
stimulus to society for the formation of further roles.3'1''
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Whilst primitive societies are fra_gile and tightly 
Integrated around a common core of shared values, industrial 
societies tend toward more loo-se texturingr They contain 
within themselves all sorts of conflicts and divergent 
philosophies. Integration, as such, is not necessarily 
related to a single centre, but to a variety of regional, 
ethnic, class, and minority loyalties. This is why
industrial societies tend to absorb changes, whether planned
or not, more quickly and easily than fragile societies.13
But for the cohesiveness of the society to be maintained, 
common notions regarding roles and role expectations must be 
shared.1"1 They are shared when the societal grouping 
rests on fundamentally compatible mora1 elements.
Specialisation and differentiation are two aspects of
the same sort of change; the one would not occur without the 
other, but specialisation is largely the question of the 
technique of work, whereas ideas about who may appropriately 
perform a task are suffused with the societies' moral 
belief. In general terms, the moral structure of European
society has been, through a period of mutation and growth,
handed down in what has been known as the Christian
tradition.1"2, Ideas of aood and evil are inseparable from
social experience, and, as social experience relates to 
economic development, these ideas relate too. The rules
that people have adopted to normalise behaviour are
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fundamentally, originally, morally based rules. Rules that 
define roles constitute the customs regulating face to face 
relations. iZ( Within the process of socialisation, these 
rules are interna1ised, becoming a constituent part, if not 
the fundus of non-logical behaviour. Social interaction may 
be described _'as the compromise between the input from the 
individual's biological nature and personality on the one
hand, -and r.ole, culture, and environment on the other.
Individual biological nature relates to individuals in small 
groups. The interaction of the individual in small groups 
is associated with the concept of role where role is the 
product of the societal culture either small groups, family, 
peers or large groups, the extended community, or society at 
large, composing an environment.1®
Out of the requirements of needs, patterned socfety. in 
the forming of roles, develops. Roles, as the key to 
community, are primarily established through tradition by 
political, socio-cultura1, or economic traditions, and, are 
formed within the Western European context, with an overlay 
of Christianity providing the moral tone. They CO provide 
social control; CiO they are fundamentally interdependent 
and; Ciii) they are transmittable.
Needs ,__Roles and Interaction
The social control function is accomplished through the 
need for fulfillment. Sociological literature attempts 
typologies of individual need hierarchies,16 based on
expectations and posited on an inherent instinctoid basis.
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In decreasing order of strength, these are Cl} physiological 
needs essential to the biological continuation of the system 
C2} safety needs as freedom from pain and discomfort, and 
threatening circumstances C3} love and belonging needs 
including sex. love., desire for children and the desire for 
acceptance C'l} esteem needs such as prest-ige, fame,
recognition and C5} the need for self-actualisation as in 
self expression, self-fulfillment and the sense of growing 
or becoming something.17 To this list of basic needs may 
be added the meta-needs of C6} the desire to know and
understand and C7} the desire for aesthetic fulfillment.
Relating to the sociological nature of a needs scale, the 
constituent members,- or i ndeed the arrangement, are not 
determined by a natural scientific law.. Any one need may 
take precedence over those below it and lower ones tend to 
be filled only after the higher ones have been relevantly 
satiated, for inherited motifs cannot easily be separated 
from learned motifs, and basic urges as for food and sex can 
be greatly strengthened or weakened by training and 
experience.1® Further, the meeting of one need can be 
instrumental to the accomplishment or meeting of another, 
and as such, may be bound up by prestige, ingroup outgroup 
status or Importance, which may be over or under emphasised. 
The relationship between primary and secondary needs, i.e., 
fundamental or meta needs depends on circumstance, but the 
presentation of needs as above, provides a basic, universal, 
albeit general, guide to human nature.17 Of crucial
importance is that charted horizontally across psychological
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development, the number of wants, variety and related
saliency of same increases from the physiological to the 
safety, from the safety to the belonging, from belonging to
esteem, and from esteem to self-actualisation.210 In
other words, the intensity of wants, varieties, and salience
of actual!sation needs are much more intense and -
psychologically developed. The conclusion is that they are 
determined by the relation of the individual to. and in, 
society. They are products of abstract goals, their roots 
are in Cl} biological capacity C2} cultural norms and values 
C3} personal experience and C4} individual accessibility. 
What is important is the differentiation between needs and
wants, or needs and motifs.
A primary need is something the absence of which, if
persistent, will terminate the life or health of the
organism. The most obvious need-of this sort is food.-’21 
Needs, In this regard, are seen as taking on the 
significance of life and death. The more one migrates from 
the area of viewing the need as a life and death 
consideration, the less urgent the need and the less 
primary. Secondary needs or manipulative needs are the 
product of learning and correlate highly with wants. These 
are not necessarily biologically induced but are more 
socially induced. They are derived from the value system of 
the given society where a value is considered as a 
conception distinctive of an individual or character Istic of 
a group. Such a value, either explicit or implicit, defines 
the desirability wh ich influences the selection from
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available modes, means, and ends of action.22 As such.
value is defined as that aspect of motivation which is 
referrable to standards, personal or cultural, that do not 
arise solely out of immediate tensions or immediate 
situations.23 The significance of values, inasmuch as 
they relate to the priority setting by the_individua1 to 
non-biological needs, have direct bearing-on the setting or 
society in which the individual is found, and the moral 
structure of that society. The moral structure of society 
takes on the formalised aspects of a moral code in the 
cosmology of a society, some moral values may be stated as
universal .
Morals, are frequently idolised values as in ’ thou she It
love thy neighbour as thyself; thou shalt even love thine 
enemy, and respect him that persecutes you.' The 
individual may be conside-red as being at ’the centre of -a 
series of social circles which are generally of increasing 
size and possibly overlapping with each other. They may 
form, for example, a nuclear family, a wider group of 
relatives, or extended family, a clan, a tribe, his 
acquaintances or social groups, the people of a village, 
town or city, or a region. Each series of circles tends to 
define an activity or implied relationship with other 
people. Once a boundary of equal regard is past, the degree
of subordination of the treatment of others relates to
groups' accessibility, the consideration changing the 
further removed by distance from the primary group. The 
obligation imposed by a value becomes more and more tenuous,
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white shades into deeper and deeper grey, and grey into 
black. In so doing, values tend to relate to meta-needs 
and, as such, are competent constituents regulating directly 
the relationship of the individual to the group. The 
ambivalence of secondary or meta-needs depends on the 
-setting. This is the primary distinction between secondar-y 
and primary needs. Primary needs are universally real. ' 
Secondary needs are, in essence, products of the
socialisation process.2® Fulfillment of both is either 
attempted or achieved by societal intercourse defined by 
sets of parameters of action synonymous with roles.
Discussion
For the purposes of this paper, needs will be 
simplified into the primary and secondary category. The 
salient primary needs are fundamenta1ly biological, and 
being related to life and life support, may be broken down 
into the concept of security: either physical or economic.
There is another element closely related to the biological 
but more a neurological need, that is the security necessary 
for sanity or that of intelligence security. Physical, 
economic, or intellectual security is achieved, if at all, 
through patterned societal relations defined in terms of 
roles. Secondary or raeta-needs are themselves created in 
society and are achieved, if at all, by individuals 
exercising roles in that society and are, hence, principally 
culturally structured. For example, whereas the need of 
economic security is biologically induced, when considered 
as a primary need, mandating whether or not food would be
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eaten to sustain an organism's life, on the meta-need level, 
this same economic need could become a want, in other words, 
the type of food eaten, i.e., strawberries, beef, or
potatoes, become important, not necessarily for the
ultilitarian nutritional value of eating itself. But, 
inasmuch as the individual is found to exist in society, and
there exercises his endeavour to conform with a set of
parametorial role requirements for the fulfillment of basic 
need satisfaction, he is a constituent portion both as giver 
and receiver of society and a constituent actor in the
societal socialisation process.
European society is frequently viewed as being divided
into a series of nations. Nations, as distinct and more or
less autonomous sociological units, in which individuals are 
undergoing the sociological process. They are amalgamat-ed 
societies, constructs of smaller sociological groupings 
integrated into a definable unit through time. Each step 
along the process of nation development incorporated 
quantitative expansion, which redefined the core identity 
and remodeled roles and interplay within the group to 
accomodate the newly integrated. The process of connected 
understanding26, produces an evolutional change to the
group, differences merge into similarities and the unit 
experiences an expansion incorporating the intermingled old. 
What develops is an interdependence both physical and 
psychological between the macrostructure and its
substructures .31 Social integration rests on personal
The particularistic values ofbonds of social attraction.
the larger entity diffuse into the face-to-face groups which 
are both incorporated within it and shape the social 
relations and patterns of conduct via roles and expectations
of their members. The result is that the dally social
relations in varigus' di vers e_s ubgroups reinforce the
particularist1c values and bonds of solidarity developed in
the community at large.
Penetration of primary groups gives larger 
groups the capacity to socialise loyalty to 
themselves into deeper levels of the 
personality. Rewards of primary group life and 
loyalties to other members of primary groups 
become resources at the disposal of the larger 
group.
Standards of achievement and success in the larger 
groups become universal particularistic attachments
imposed by particular orientations and tend to isolate 
the subculture.""5 _ - _ -
Integration brings about an awareness of, and an 
expanded particularistic opportunity to coalesce with, 
the larger group. The larger or universalistic group 
provides the setting for mediated goals, both set and 
achieved, through social exchange reflecting any 
behavioural orientation.30 Integrated society brings 
about compliance with the universalistic, identification
with same, and Internalisation of collective values.31
One of the most basic needs, necessary for the functional
interaction and ultimate success of a nation as such, as
well as the facilitation of and regulation of individual 
needs, Is the need to communicate: the interchange of
r- ........ ■ T" ' * ......
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abstract Ideas with transmission and reception more or 
less on the same grounds to assure fluid and meaningful 
understanding. The operational social system is an 
organisation since. “Communication is the cement that 
makes organisations. Communications alone enable a group 
to tin-ink together, to see together, and to act - 
together. The organisation is essentially "a
larger group of persons linked by . . . complementary
habits and facilities of communication."33 Such
communication organisat ions, or societies, are “clusters
of population, united by grids of communication flows and 
transport systems, and separated by thinly settled or 
nearly empty territories."3* “Peoples are groups of 
persons united by an ability to communicate on many kinds 
of topics; they have complementary habits of
communicatiojis.,,:5® Communications develop a social 
system in which persons develop expectations about each
others' behaviour.36
Individuals are socialised into a society and. in 
turn, the society is conforming to the notions of the 
individuals who form constituent members of that society. 
Fundamentally a society fills the needs of the individual 
people. Man joins the voluntary organisation of society 
for the fulfillment of the needs both primary and 
secondary which he possesses. Theoretica1ly, if the 
society is not capable of fulfilling those needs or at 
least not to the expectation of individual members, the
\ r*
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society may be changed to so conform to the expectation
of the individual need for fulfillment, or the individual
may opt for membership in an auxiliary society.
The Consideration of Language
Societal interchange mandates communication, the
major element of which is language. Language is a human 
phenomenon which directly affects the characteristic 
development of a given group. In traditional societies 
language developed its group uniqueness through isolation 
and hence, is highly correlated with group
identification. Language Is frequently cited as a
determinant for nationality and ultimately a determinant 
of the nation,. as “Literacy, education in greater- depth, 
and the vernacular tongue created splits between . . .
groups."3"7 -
- ~ In Europe, linguistic communities have evolved to a
si2e apparently suitable for modern nations.3® Lines 
of ethnic loyalty were drawn along the frontiers of 
linguistic unity. "Language therefore is to a modern 
society what money is to its economy; a universal 
currency of exchange."3'5' Communication developed with 
the modernisation of society, through the necessity of 
military and simple services which required the common 
denominator of mutually understood language. Emerging 
dominant languages, either single languages or one of a 
closely related group of languages, became incorporated 
within the idea of ethnic identity. An increase in the
level of modernisation necessitated an ever increasing
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well-defined language to afford the exactness required by 
communication. The advent of public education further 
highlighted the demands for a specific given linguistic 
media within a given territory amongst a given integrated 
people. Modernisation, which was causal to the 
development of centralised societies, provided the 
vehicle for development. As nationality evolved, 
creating a fundamental social bond, European thought
became re-orientated around domestic identities. What
developed into localised cultural movements was aided by 
the creation of standardised domestic literary 
language . The governments which emerged essentially
in the form of states.within Europe as a result of the
national movements, consolidated their central control
over the society and reinforced the sense of national 
identity.'41 Linguistic uniqueness of smaller 
sociological units, such as tribes or clans, through 
time, developed a pattern of general linguistic 
homogeneity or a highly compatible interface/'*2
Language situations are rarely static and their 
development, moreover, are closely related to other 
social, political and economic, as well as technical 
changes. Frequently, in societal development, there have 
been class structures where a ruling elite spoke a 
different language than that of the masses.
In early England, and generally throughout the
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Continent, French was the universal language of the 
elites, having supplanted Latin in its universality.
With the development of a literature tradition amongst 
the masses, due to the process of modernisation and its_
associated mobilisation and associated with the elites’
desire for developing an autonomy vis-a-vis Rome,
domestic languages proliferated through the various .
echelons of emerging national society. * In Western
Europe, with the emergence of political nations, ruled by 
absolute monarchs, domestic linguistic characteristics 
developed vertically permeating the developing nation and 
adding identifiable uniqueness to same. The
nation-forming process was mainly linked with the ruling 
class and educated section of society CCIVES LITTERATI) 
and the concept of uniform ideological uniqueness 
(especially CUdUS REGIO ECUS RELIGION continued within a 
developing common language.''*3 Synergies of unification 
aided greatly these achieved differences between national
ent it ies .
One school of thought labels language as providing a 
salient identification for nations:
Those factors which contributed powerfully, in 
almost all cases to the formation of a sense of 
nationality; Cared common descent Cthat is, the 
idea of belonging to a distinct 'people'), the 
occupation of a definite territory, a common 
language, and more broadly, a common
culture.*3 •
Another school, most notably led by Arnold Toynbee,
negates the idea of language being a criterion for
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nationality. Indeed, he condemns those who seek "the 
criteria of Nationality in the shibboleth of 
Language".*1''' He viewed language purely as a means of
communication and not as an end to identification. The
argument here is between the concept of language as a 
factor of identification of the nation and the concept of 
language fulfilling a function in the nation.'It" may be
_ both. ’ .
Referring to the Greek-city states, H.G. Wells wrote
that patriotism Cas it relates to nationalism):
took an intense and narrow form. . . . The new
geographical limits of.these Greek states added
■ bo the -intensity of their feeling. A man’s
love’for his country was reinforced by his love 
for his native town, his religion, and his 
home: for these were all one. . . . But in the
mai-n, patriotism in the Greek home was a
. personal passion of an inspiring . . .
intensity.-
The intimacy of Well’s Greek city-states is achieved 
through the inter-communication of language. "A modern 
emotional fusion and exaggeration of two very old 
phenomena — nationality and patriotism,"*”3 emphasizes 
the fact that, "nationalism is plural rather than 
singular,"^'* and as, "nationalism is first and
foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness."50
it requires interpersona1 communication for as much as 
possible the expunction of human needs through integrated 
society. It requires language. In his study on
Nationalism and the Social Communication, Karl W.
Deutsch51 suggests that a community of language is a
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community of information vehicles. Most words of the 
language, those frequently used, will be recognised and 
spoken by most members of the group with identical or 
closely similar denotations; the consideration being two 
sided, speaking and comprehension. The effects of the 
community language may be modified by the effects on the 
community of culture. Speech patterns- according to 
Deutsch, may form speech ‘communities and relate to, not 
only communities as in the form of nations, but
sub-sections of that community. Sub-sections of the
speech community are denoted by dialects and social 
divisions of linguistic specifications. Each, he 
suggests, has its own language centres and leading groups 
which set the standard for that linguistic pattern.®2 
The answer to the conundrum: Is language an .
identification factor or -Just a functional tool? It 
appears to be both.
Quoting Bloomfield, Deutsch relates the following:
The main types of speech in a complex
speech-community can be roughly classed as
follows: 1. literary standard . . . ; 2.
colloquial standard, the speech of the
privileged class . . . 3. provincial standard
. . . spoken by the 'middle' class; 4.
sub-standard, spoken . . . by the 'lower
middle' class... without intense local 
difference . . . ; 5. local dialect, spoken by
the least privileged class; . . . and the
varieties . . . often incomprehensible to each
other and to speakers of 2/3/4.
Each type of speech delineates relationships, roles
expectations, standards, and values. Each type of speech
further denotes shared commonalities amongst uses.®*
Characteristica1ly, dialects are fundamentally 
spoken. Written dialects, other than colloquial 
literature are practically non-existent ,5S'
Modernisation and subsequent centralised
institutionalisation created the dynamic of national 
language. Within the general sphere of national'language 
is the allowed use of incorporated dialects. Heterogenic 
deviations from the norm are conceptualised falling 
within the whole of the national entity, all of which are 
constellations within an orbit of formalised language
associated with a nation. Its utilisation further
differentiates its constituent uses. _
- Quantitative enlargements of society require greater
communicative formalities, standardisations to achieve
universality. Integrated societies require a given -
community understood media for communicative exchange if 
the benefits of quantitatively enlarged community are to 
be achieved; those being the satisfaction of human needs 
via interaction in the socialisation process within
groups.
There is no dearth of reference alluding to the 
linguistic criteria not only affording references for 
individual identity, but with reference for the 
demarcation of nations. The language known as Standard 
English is spoken by diverse elements of the British 
na t ions; g!ifc‘ the standard language French by the French
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nations; and so on throughout the Nation States of
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Europe. The how of this phenomena relates to the
development of the nation over time. The why of this 
phenomena relates to the function of communication, 
facilitating interdependence within society. Language 
facilitates the roll-over effect of history. Language 
permits history to be interpreted and projected to form a 
common future. -People, as a group of individuals within 
a collectivity, have some objective characteristics in
common.
Fundamentally, but not exclusively, is the 
connection with territory as a place of residence. This 
objective characteristic is projected via the vehicle of 
language and forms a collective memory affording -
interpretations of past events which define present 
location and provides the fundus for future projections. 
Physically, people live in a state of their own. By this 
is meant that the personnel of states consist largely of
individuals who share main characteristics in common.
Through the collectivity of these people is ascribed the 
term nationality, the people bound to the territory of 
the nation. This project ion is not without difficulties 
for these nations are frequently segments of a single, or 
compositions of many, different groups of people.
Linguist1ca1ly, for example, the British people may speak. 
Engl 1 sh, :-rz Welsh, Gaelic, or Scots. Or specific given 
language may also be divided amongst several territories 
as German between German CEast and West}, Switzerland,
Austria, Luxembourg, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Deutsch
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said,
No person can he horn at more than one spot on 
the map. The actual place of his birth has the 
size of a bed or a room, not the size of a 
country. If he finds himself in a '‘country” or 
wbthin a set of borders, then no number of 
births can have created these borders or any 
unity of the country within it.7-"3
This is learned. It is a process of 
accultural1 sat ion, facilitated by language, leaning upon 
communalitv achieved through interpretation of past and 
present circumstances. A common heritage is an achieved 
notion. A community of consciousness or community of 
character is learned.3'5' This degree of learning
produces common imagery and is frequently bound up with 
perceptions fostered through the communication media of a 
given language. Language, then, relates to similar 
perception and similar perceptions to similar
characters.60 Similarity of character is a deeper
conception of community character;
This no longer means . . . that the individuals
of the same nation are similar to each other, 
but that the same force . . . acted on the
character of each individual - no matter how 
different the other forces may be which are 
effective beside it . . . While . . .
similarity of character can only be observed in 
the majority of the members of the nation, the 
community of character, the fact that they all 
are the products of one and the same effective 
force, is common to all of them without 
exception. This effective force, that which is 
historical in us, is that which is national to 
us. It is this which wheels us into a
nat ion.&1
The community concept, either that of community of 
culture or community of fate, represents, in effect, a
community of values, that is, "an assemblage of
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reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as 
to the objects of their love."6,2 As the community 
concept is psychological, it incorporates the sense which 
people are bound together and marked off from others by 
common sympathies. Quincey Wright defines the community 
concept as:
. One which manifests cultural uniformity,
spiritual union, institutional unity, and 
material unification in the highest possible 
degree, and subjectively one with which the 
members consciously identify themselves.63 
This high degree of abstraction brought about by
various integrating elements necessitates a high degree 
of conceptua1isat ion articulated by language. The 
patterns of life which accompanied modernisation have
produced the institutional framework for the transmission 
of national interpretation of the ethnic identity. This 
is due to the increased tempo of the modern period with- 
regard to the instance of change, whereby change in and 
of itself is accepted as a fact of life, indeed
revolutionary.6'* The modern nation underscores the
need to scrutinise the extent to which socialisation
intermixes all aspects of society. In a condition of 
rapid change, one can no longer assume that the 
knowledge, or practices that served adequately in the 
past, are sufficent for either the present or the future. 
Hence, there must be a significant rethink in the process 
of transmission, in general terms, undertaken through the 
nation; in specific terms, undertaken by the vehicle of
language to produce the modern definition of cultural
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heritage.*™' However, language, while being ultimately 
utilised to define a given society, does very much to 
facilitate the workings of society. Through language is 
passed the basic character of a culture. The roots of 
culturetefr found within European nations stem generally
from the Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman traditions of
the Mediterranean, regionalised and modified through
time.
In Europe, societal structure has developed a 
corporate form, which, again through time, has evolved 
from the nuclear family*6"’-’ to the nation, a process 
through time in which patterns, prejudices, likes,
similarities, values, cultureetc, evolved.
Quantitative expansion brougnt about by integration 
through socialisation compounds the process. The 
transmission of these past pnenomena constitutes a' 
pattern of identity transmitted by language but also adds 
in defining in-group, out-group status.
Dissimilarities
One of the achieved dissimilarities between nations
is that of their system of beliefs. At a stage of early 
development during the period of national awakening, the 
corpus of religious Christian tradition became mutated to
accomodate domestic aims. This is a result of the
process, through time, intricately intertwined with the
development of domestic literature and elite motivation, 
which afforded nationals a reference point for 
consciousness, differentiating themselves from others.
Religion, as a belief in, recognition of, or an awakening 
sense of, a higher, unseen, controlling power or powers, 
with the emotion and morality connected therewith,^'-* 
produced not only formal institutionalised churches
identified with nations, as in the 'Kirk' of Scotland,
the Church of England, etc. but also correlates with the 
moral attitudes of national populations. Morality, the 
quality of being moral, that which renders an action
right or wrong, relating to character or conduct
considered as good or evil6'"1' may relate to a national 
stereotype. Although in recent experience, European 
institutional religious attendance may be on the decline, 
vestiges of the moral-component of re 1 i g i ous_ t bought 
still may afford delineation between nations.70
Religion, as such, tends to define tne environment of the
nation and is a major consideration i"n that a nation
needs "a well-defined environment."71
A well defined, if not delineated, environment
achieves a degree of characteristic crystallisation of 
ideals permeating the group via linguistic transmission 
homogenising to a degree the diverse positions of the 
integrated elements and backed up with aspirations of 
pressing to acquire a measure of control over the
behaviour of its members.
A We 11 Deffned Environment
If their nationalistic members are successful 
and a new or old state organisation is put into 
their service, then at last the nation has 
become sovereign and a nat ion-state has come 
into being.'7'2-
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The basis for this is cultural autonomy. Advanced 
society, frequently irrational, has an unsurpassed 
capacity to manipulate human beings by virtue of its 
uni-dimensiona1itv which permits the permanent 
suppression of free social-developmental progress.7"
Nat'ions tend to"-desire autonomous identity and form 
states, and states tend to further define the development
of the nation. Nations areelastic and malleable.
States being institutionalised exhibit the tendency of
rigidity; the institutions of state are but another
dimension of achieved differences delineating European
nations. Referring to Weber. Ralph Dahrendorf. in his
ilngevf i s she i t-, - lessen sc ha ft u n-d _peaokrai i c noted; -
There are preconditions that restrict the range 
of knowledge and action and others that enlarge 
it, depending on whether the principle of 
certainty or the principle of uncertainty is .
* dom inant.7* “
The principles of certainty or uncertainty are 
positional principles affecting states’ actions. The
control that the state exercises over the nation is
real.7'"-' The state attempts to determine the posture 
taken by itself with regard to other nation-states. This 
may be a reflective, or protective response. Certainty 
or uncertainty dominating as a operendi mot us for states, 
refers to the argument in question and the position 
assumed by the state in defense or counter to that
argument. Control is salient as is also an element of 
dominance which directly relates to positions of power.
The destiny of man is accomplished, and his
freedom realised by absorption within the 
state, because only through the state does he 
obtain coherence and acquire reality.7*'
Nationalism which frequently attempts to achieve
nationhood often desires self-determination. which is
accomplished by the formation of state. The political
state then becomes an identifiable feature of the social
nation which sought and, potentially at least, achieved 
it. Although the general tendency in Europe has been 
tbat-of social nations questing autonomy and developing 
political domestic states, it is not to infer that other
nations are not content, or at least not sufficiently 
motivated, for such a political development to occur and 
may"choose to live subordinate1y as accomodating nations 
within larger nation-states. It is the tendency to 
merge, which is synonymous with the concept of
_'integration. Generally: _ - ~
A nation is a body of people to whom a 
government is responsible through their 
legislature when governments derive their 
sovereignty from the nation.77
It is difficult to say who exercises more influence 
upon whom: the state upon the nation or the nation upon
the state, but it is not difficult to see the restrictive
parameters placed upon the nation by the state, 
restricting the nation's further free evolution - nations 
tend to become hostage to the political regime.78
States become the custodians of the national good,
because of their historical perspectlve and fa 1.1 back_gn
to both religion and language to promote their ends . 7
Only one language is firmly implanted in an
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individual. Only to one does he belong 
entirely, no matter how many he learns 
subsequently . . . for every language is a
particular mode of thought and what is 
cogitated in one language can never be repeated 
in the same way in another , . . Language,
then, just like the church ... is an 
expression of a peculiar life which contains it 
and develops through it, a common body.®0 
As states, in the modern epoch, afford the po1i s
around which institutionalised education is developed,
the attitude of the state is then re-fed through the
schools and again fed back'into the nation. The state's
position may be so stated:
It is in our public schools that the majority of 
our children are being formed. These schools 
must be the guardians par excellence of our 
national character.81
This a-ititude intimates that the State, although it 
may be a nation's construct, assuming national 
characteristics, once in place, significantly 
resocialises the integrated- nation Cor nations).132
National Culture
The concept of culture as a configuration of 
subjective attitudes, impressions, and a general cathexis 
of the population of the nation projected towards, and 
emanating from its ethnie, is its ethnic polls.
This is unique to the given collectivity. The 
cultural components which comprise the nation are found 
through that grouping to be unique in themselves. For 
example, the institutions of government formed within a
nation for- the eventual control of that nation and the 
regulation of international relations, frequently their 
State, is discreetly unique to those populations over
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which it exercises sovereignty. This uniqueness and the 
collective identification and realisation of the entity 
ss being singular, may release the sentiment of loyalty 
amongst the masses or nationals of that__state, coupled 
with an objective evaluation or perception of
performance. Forms, functions- patterns, and character
are deemed by the nation as having worth, and patterns of 
behaviour, satisfying needs are, through transmission, f
normalised. They evolve from and comply with the
collective values providing norms of behaviour. The
concern with the whole, in which each cultural item is
viewed in the context of its meaning and relation to the 
other parts, provides'an essential perspective to an 
understanding of the process of socialisation which is
undergone by the individual members of the nation. The
diversity of those members, their particularisations
merging into a universa1istic reference system relates to 
integrat ion.
In the European tradition which, in the current 
epoch, links significant learning with institutionalised
education, is the fact that the demands of modernisation
are met by the centralisation of the school system which 
is responsible for public instruction. Here, if the 
Nation stamps its character on the State. it would be
this generalised character that is re-introduced into the
system through the schools. Is it the state that is
responsible for perpetuating the national character or is 
it the nation?'3" It has been suggested that states
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tend to function, albeit within the mandates of the
nation, more or less autonomously from same.
Bureaucratic omnipotence tends naturally to 
convert the holders of key positions in the 
vast administrative regime into a new variety -
of notables and nobles which often act more or 
less of their own accord.®*4
However, it may be that the nation and state
interact in a pattern of mutual agreeable consciousness-.
In the modern over-populated, mechanised' world 
of cities, no government, even though in 
control of the machinery of state, could 
maintain itself very long without some measure 
of active consent and cooperation in the masses 
. . . We live so close together, in such a
network of social relations, that each 
individual is continually taking an active part 
in social activities prescribed or controlled 
by the government. The whole system would 
break - down ^unless- the vast majority of people 
gave a considerable measure of consent to the 
system generally used and the government's 
activities in particular.*®
In the Neo-Functionalist tradition, Schroitter
defined integration as:
the process of transferring exclusive 
expectations of benefits from the nation-state 
to some large entity. It encompasses the 
process by virtue of which national actors of 
all sorts (government officials, interest group 
spokesmen, politicians, as well as ordinary 
people} cease to identify themselves and their 
future welfare entirely with their own national 
governments and its policies.**
This concept relating to internationa1 integration 
may likewise be applied to national integration as indeed 
it may be equally appropriate for integration taking 
place throughout the entire length of the Socia 1isation 
Continuum. It encapsulates benefits, expect at ions of 
membership being transferred to a larger collectivity via
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Identification. Functional shifts in identification are
essentially "based on changing demands and expectations, 
a process "which originates in one functional context 
initially separated froro other . . . concerns, and then
expands . "®‘z
This is descriptive of the Integrationa1 aspect of 
merging collectivities brought about by free and 
unencumbered resocialisation. A national shifting of 
Interests from the particularistic to the universalistic. 
An expansion by growth of the prejudicial position to one 
of a preference position.
In Sum
In essence, the governing principle, the driving 
force of man’s strength is the individual’s own interest. 
"Social life is a bundle of interests rooted in the very
-nature of man."®® •
It is out of this bundle of interests that man's
needs are attempted to be satisfied. Interests, as the
expressions of needs, require the awareness of their
necessity. Needs are innate and, hence, instructive. To 
become needs, they must be recognised or perceived by 
human minds and understood to be necessary. The needs of 
the nation become instrumental as the mandate for the
state and collectively the state exercises that mandate. 
The state works either directly or indirectly through 
governing bodies, regulatory institutions or
instructional establishments within the parameters of 
established patterns which become the unique custom and
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inheritance of the nation. Originally it. steas from an
expression of integrated group ideas:
Since group cohesion is so important in the 
evolutionary process, the group-making factor 
must he established.3'5*
The group-making factor was the common thread woven 
throughout the fabric of the integrated nation dictating 
identity characteristics individually unique to that 
collectivity. The establishment of the group-making 
factor is ”the cake of custom” or the tendency of 
descendants to resemble their progenitors not only 
biologically but also mentally, it is enhanced by the 
institution of state. This cultural pattern may be 
maintained90 CiJ by religion, through fear endowed 
with sanctions; C i i') by a persecuting tendency - a 
propensity for punishment, deviations from establised 
order; and Ciii> by man’s proclivity to imitate what is
before him.
As man is a complex of experiences, there are many 
experiences in each individual. Society as a complex of 
groups includes also many social minds. The craving the 
individual has for union is satisfied by group life, 
groups ever widening, ever unifying, but always groups. 
Groups afford an interaction of minds, therefore they 
form the social, individual man. Collective thought, 
collective feeling, common will, concerted activity, the 
group process, collective ideas, are all harmonised, 
either for better or worse, in the political patterns
which evolved singularly and uniquely to the nation.31
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Follett makes the observation that collectivity does not 
necessarily construe homogeneity. Indeed, he argued for 
het erogen i ty:
To say that the social process is that merely 
of the spread of similarities is to ignore the 
real nature of collective thought, the
collect I ve will.
The core of the social process is not likeness, 
but the harmonisation of differences through 
Inter-penetration.
Inter-penetration is the process of -
compenetration.’5’3 It is a process of inter-knitting.
In a society, there are given similarities and achieved 
similarities. Given similarities are suggestive of
imitation. Achieved similarities are the result of *
evolution, socialisation or co-adaptation. This degree 
of interplay within an integrated unit is either enhanced 
or hindered by the rigidity of the formalised institution 
of its government. What people think and the society of 
those people are virtually synonymous. Ideology cannot 
be separated from the social cultural order.
Ideas play their causal dynamic goal in the
Individual personality as in social structure.
They may promote the change or they may serve 
to maintain the status quo.'?=
The advancement of art, science, invention and 
discovery in Western civilisation was made 
possible by changes in the total system, 
acceptance of changes in one cultural aspect 
having certain affects . . . [on] . . . other
aspects.‘5,fc
Collectivity cooperation achieves motivational 
synergies, consideration of others, an effective division 
of labour termed 'complementary’, and greater and more
1 ” - ■ K
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sensitive communication. The more a collectivity
interacts with itself along these lines, the greater the 
degree of self-awareness or collectivitv-hood. The 
greater the internal interaction, the greater xenophobia 
projected toward the out-group.
Division’s in soc i ety create active healthy tensions
when confined to param-eters sufficiently enough
constr'a ined • to prevent unhealthy or divisional
fractioning. The necessary constraint to tensions are
frequently provided by elites.
The highly attentive publics, a comparatively 
small sector of the whole, need to develop an 
understandi ng of their spec ial way and the 
workings of the system. Other kinds of- 
understandings and outlooks, which may be 
associated with considerably less in the way of 
over-participation,-must permeate most of the 
population. A basic prerequisite is that the 
population be pervaded by Cgroupj loyalty or,
. perhaps,' more accurately, that that population _ 
not consist of segments each with its own sense 
of separateness.'57
The condition is best illustrated by society 
consisting of blocks with their own history, language, 
culture and memories of, if not aspirations for, a 
separate Identity. The observance of public opinion 
points out the incompatibility of these circumstances 
with democratic processes. This incompatibility comes 
not so much from the psychological characteristics of the 
mass of the people as from the fact that those
characteristics invite exploitation by elements of
leadership. Exploitation or reckless leadership may 
disrupt the process of government by diversionary appeals
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that weaken or destroy the foundations of group
unity.'*’® Where a collectivity functions as a whole 
within a government, some degree of conflict is 
necessary, however; loyalties must transcend and be 
dominated by a general feeling for the whole over 
specific localise-d loyalties. This is a pattern of 
culture exhibited in the Western nation-states developed 
through a long period of society coalescence. The limits 
of coalescence are a process of achieved differences 
between national groupings and unique to each national 
entity. Essentially, society forms what may be termed a
'contract’.
Society is indeed a contract . . . but the _
state ought not to be considered as nothing 
better than a partnership agreement . . . It is
a partnership in all science; a partnership in 
all arts; a partnership in all virtue and all
- perfection. ks the ends of such a partnership 
cannot be obtained in many generations lit
- becomes a partnership not only between those 
who are living, but between those who are 
living, those who are dead, and those who are 
to be born.'5’9
Membership in such a collectivity forming a 
community of interests;
produces a very remarkable change in man, by 
subst ituting justice for injustice in his 
conduct, and giving his actions the mora 1ity 
which they have formerly lacked.100 
It is this continuity that transmits traditions,
ideologies, myths and acceptable methods of solving 
problems brought about by the existence of needs. It Is 
this continuity that also perpetuates stereo-types 
characterising out-groups.
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Generally, the literature concludes that:
A nation is an historically evolved stable 
community of people, formed on the basis of a 
common language, territory, economic life and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common
_ culture ... It must be emphasised that none 
of the above characteristics is by itself 
sufficient to define a nation.101
It' is also possible that "on the other hand, it‘'is 
sufficient for a single one of these characteristIcs to
be absent and the nation ceases to exist."102
It is only when the necessary characteristics are, 
to some degree, present that we have a nation. What 
determines what is necessary is fundamentally when a 
significant portion of these elements are present. 
Exactly what that may be is not possible to definitely
pinpo i-nt.
The spirit of the people, its history, its 
religion, its degree of political freedom .
cannot be considered in isolation by their 
separated characteristics. They are woven 
together in an indissoluble fusion.103
The process of weaving the various comprehensive 
elements requisite to form the construction of nationhood 
into the finished production nation is unique to each 
collectivity. It is the process through socialisation of 
individuals integrated into groups and groups into larger 
collectivity10** eventually forming characteristic 
patterns which both pervade and lend identification to 
the collectivity and the development of that collectivity 
further - to the sociological unit known as nation: it
Is a process necessitating intellectual exchange through 
communication. It is a process necessitating a language,
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the more complex the process, the greater the degree of 
idea transmission, the higher the requ 1 remerits of the 
formality of language. In this respect, it is possible 
to conclude both, that language is but a form of 
communication, and, communicationa1 forms are appropriate 
for defining national parameters. It is also to note 
that language communication is the key to the
psychological feeling of unity. The development of 
specific national unity through the movement of 
nationalism is the subject of the next section, chapter
four .
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CHAPTER FOUR
Nation,_A„St age _ _In__The_ In t ear at ion _Pngce s s
To understand the sociological concept of the nation is
to encompass an understanding of the term "integration,'1 for 
the blending of elements which produced the national units 
was accomplished through diverse elements integrated into a 
collectivity. _
The concept of collectivity itself is linked to the 
concept of community in the senses of a Geme 1n scha f t, an 
integrated unit exhibiting degrees of homeogeneity. This
notion is distinct from that of Ge se11scha f t, which as a
form of Gestalt society may lead to a Geme i nscha f t.1 The 
notion of Ge sellschaft is connotationa1 of a process,
Geme inschaft with a condition.2
T-he process of socialisation, the process whereby 
individuals seek an extension of themselves through ever 
increasing action with ever increasing groups of society, is 
integration.3 It is a process that produces a situation 
in which cultural traits and beliefs permeate the whole 
system/'1 creating an indigenous uniqueness. This process 
employs the finding of common denominators in the expanded 
system which necessitates a mutation of the individual unit
to accomodate itself with the whole. The overall
process creates a degree of regional unification and a 
degree of cooperation.But what are these units - 
nat ions? - and do they exist?
N t i_o na Ifsm ,__the Movement ,__the .Process of I nt eg r a tlon
The definition of integration is a major problem in the
literature/7 Different authors defining integration
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differently had to develop their own set of indicators based 
on their own respective theories.fe" Generally they are 
assessments of the level of Integration.'51' Deutsch 
settles on a convenient measure of integration by defining
selected transactions, as in mailflows, etc., to indicate
the degree of international integration and national -
autonomy in terms of interchange and transactions.10 He 
generally defines the concept13 as a sense of. community 
and of Institutions and practices strong enough and 
widespread enough to assure for a long time, dependable 
expectations of peaceful exchange among its population. 
Community is used to mean a belief on the part of 
individuals in a group, that they have- come to agreement on 
at least one point, that is, that common social problems . 
must and can be resolved by the process of peaceful 
exchange^ -
Pentland defines integration as a "process whereby a 
group of people organised initially in two or more 
independent nation-states," come to institute a "whole which 
can in some sense be described as a community."1^
Pentland departmentalises integration into political or
economic considerations.
Demereth and Peterson simply suggest that the process 
of integration13 consists chiefly of the tangible, 
noticeable, testifiable, direct dependence, mutual or 
one-sided, relationships of variables upon one another and 
upon the whole system.1^ This is the concept of cultural 
synthe sis, accomplished when, on one hand, the elimination
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of one important element perceptibly influences the rest of 
the synthesis and when, on the other hand, the separate 
elements being transposed to a quite different combination, 
either cannot exist in it, or have to undergo a profound 
modification to become part of it. In other words, 
significant enough influences are exerted upon others within 
the integrating const-e 11-a t i on .
Northedge1 tends to define integration in terms of
interests shaping each other in an ever continuing process 
of “expansion and contraction" amongst participants. He 
views interest groups as being the definitive criteria of
c o m ro u n i t ies.
Blau1'' sees integration through social eyes, as the
development of 'personal bonds of social attraction'. with
the particularistic values of a larger community defusing 
into the face to face group and shaping' the social* relations 
and patterns of conduct of members.
The literature does not present a coherent meaningful
and united concept of the process; rather, it particularises 
and highlights specifics relating to direct enquiries. This
is indicative of the fact that integration is highly complex
and may be viewed in a variety of ways. The word
'integration', itself as a verb, denotes a condition and not 
a state. The substantive usage of the term 'integration' as 
it applies to, for example, the French nation, denotes the 
degree of interaction implied within the integrating body. 
The term 'integration' implies many things to many people 
and more often than not, refers to specific isolated
14 4
movements as end-results, which may be but portions of the 
overall movement. A ’state’ of integration denotes only the 
degree of an ongoing process at a given time. This is 
emphasised by Anthony Smith1’7' in the case of France,
referring to the separatist movements ongoing within a
nation-state environment.-
Integration focused on Europe refers fundamentally to 
the process of multi-national integration. A supra- 
nationality emerging out of a collective grouping of 
nations, fundamentally resulting in a European commonality 
or a collective European we-ness. ie<
The present’task is to define the nation, the largest 
form of socialisation manifested by i nt egrated society known 
today. Nationhood, the identifiable collectivity, is the 
end result of a process called nationalism. Nationalism is 
the result of integration through socialisation. The core 
concept of nationalism is group-consc iousness, the love of 
the community, great or small, to which one belongs. For 
most of the evolutionary history of European society, love
of the unit has been an instinctive emotion, not a doctrine.
As a doctrine, nationalism is an operative principle and an 
articulated creed which made its appearance among the more 
intellectual processes of the modern world, as opposed to 
the concept of patriotism, which is apparently as old as
human association itself.3*'
The modern growth of the idea of nationalism and the
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concept of integration may be traced by way of the vehicle 
of political theory which, during the Middle Ages, was 
fundamentally associated with theology. The Christian 
Commonwealth with its ru-ler, the Pope, and the Holy Roman 
Emperor, had as its fundus the laws of Christendom, with 
authority anchored in God, whereby obedience to those laws 
was, therefore, a universal duty enjoined by God. This 
harmonious system conceived by the theologians of the Middle 
Ages, gave way to the realities of Medieval Europe when the 
kings of Western Europe began to consolidate their power and 
emancipate themselves from papal supremacy.20 Requiring 
theoretical justification for their new-found authority, the 
kings found themselves central to new theories pertaining to 
royal absolutism which took either a secular or a religious
f orm . 2■1 .
The secular theory was a product of Renaissance’ 
thought, initiated by Machiavell i . It was essentially
a theory based on the right of the strongest, frequently 
justified by tradition and law.23. The religious theory 
was the theory of the divine right of kings, relating to 
fourteenth century writings in France and England.'^-'"4 It 
reached its climax in sixteenth century France as a counter 
to anti-rova1ist theories of religious sects and became the 
official doctrine of the Stuarts while in England.
With the emergence of domestic authority came the 
concept of sovereignty as defined by Bodin in De 
Republic. Sovereignty was tied to national unity and
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resulted in State. The concept of national authority
introduced by Thomas Hobbes in Lev iathan26, was based upon 
the secular theory of the right of the strongest. The
modern State was seen as the antithesis to sectionalism and
older forms of traditionalism which were the surviving 
remnants of the Middle Ages and tied* the concentration of 
political, religious and economic powers in the hand of one 
ruler or sovereign authority. The theoretical framework of 
State, that of an original contract, was based on the
concept of a rational self-interest, and the desire of all
men to escape the disadvantages of the state of nature, as 
highlighted meaningfully by Locke in Civil Government.27
The fine tuning of the concept of nationalism which 
rendered it functional at the end of the eighteenth century 
was introduced by T:he Swiss philosopher Rousseau’ in Contrat 
Soc ial. '"-*■' This changed the focus of the State from crude 
self-interest to one of moral unity. The concept of the 
moral unity rendered nationalism rational. What gave moral 
significance to an association of individuals was the
pursuit of a common aim, and the common aim of the
association known as the State was the common good of all 
its members. It was the General Will of the free community 
directed towards its own common good. The common bond was 
based on common loyalty, v i s-a-v1s a community in which men 
were bound to each other by fear. Such a community based on 
a volonte general, in contra-distinction to self-interest or
volonte de_ tous, theoretically would come into existence
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when sufficient inheres t s _ in _ cgmmgn_be t wee n__ i_t s _ me mbe r s _were 
found to exist, and in which the law of that community 
emanated from the will of the people themselves in their
capa.city as members of the sovereign body.
The fundamental root of the emerging political
philosophy of nationalism was based on the idea that the 
essence of true community was moral liberty, and the 
condition of moral liberty was that the laws which men 
obeyed should be self-imposed. Obedience to the will of 
another, whether he be despot or foreigner, could be based 
only on fear and constituted, theoretically, slavery. The 
civil religion advocated in Contra t Social as -a substitute
for Christianity, on which Robespierre modelled his “Cult of 
Rea son", was the concept of the moral relationship 
between the individual and the community based on 
self-determination and common interest. This concept is 
called patriotism. This concept entailed emotions and 
loyalties which men had hitherto directed toward their 
family surroundings and customs and which were now 
transferred to a more abstract entity, the political 
community.
Briefly, this was the fundamental beginning of the 
concept of nationalism, the development of the concept of a 
moral sense of community resting upon a perception of common 
good which bound men together and took precedence over their
immediate interests. It relates to an overall concep-
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tualisation of common consciousness of heritage and destiny 
overriding short-sighted selfishness and was postulated as 
deliberately cultivated both by education and by
institutionalisation of a civil religion based on the public
good.
Moreover, -the theory that sovereignty must reside in
the General Will, implied by Rousseau and Locke, Indicated a 
degree of political democratic equa1itarianism and a -degree 
of the principle of self-determination. Patriotism could 
only become the moral conviction of individuals when those 
individuals also had the obligations of citizenship; with
individuals who were masters of their own destinies. The
eighteenth century and the revolutions with .which it ended,
erophasized the ideals of individual freedom and equality
without which the sentiment_o f _nat ional ism_c ouJ d _n ot__h a_ve
StLg.wn, The theory of -nat iona 1 i sm evolved simultaneously 
with that of sovereignty and is inextricably bound in the 
Western European experience with the State.31
The integration which produced nationalism is fundamentally 
subjective. As such, it is psychological.3^ It is a 
condition of mind, a spiritual possession, a way of feeling, 
thinking, and living.
Nationalism denotes the resolve of a group of 
human beings to share their fortunes and to 
exercise exclusive control over their own 
actions. Where such a conscious determination 
exists, there should be a State and there will 
be no abiding peace until there is a State.
Where there is a soul, there should be a body
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In which it may dwe 11 .:s:A
Nationalism incorporates the psychological desire
and drive for a Nation-State, epitomised by the right of
self-determination as postulated by Woodrow Wilson.’"*
The notion that before the deed is first the idea,
applies to the development of nationalism and ultimately 
the nation and nation-state. It introduces in many 
respects the function of elites in the socialisation 
process. Elites are individuals thax develop and focus 
on concepts or ideas and, via the introduction of those
ideas into the body of society at large, lead.
The inelaborate concept of nationalism focuses ad
rem on the nation. A concise typology of the
concatenation of elements which through time have
coalesced to form the Ge me i n scha f t of the nation-states
as known today is not possible for in the socialisation 
process there is no one single element that could be 
concluded as essentially causal to the outcome. Such is 
the a 11-emcompassing nature of integrated society.
However, some of the elements which tie and bind
individuals may be isolated.
Nationhood, the Unit,__the Result of Integration
The word "Nation" signifies any considerable
aggregate of human beings, living together in one
country, or under one rule. They are generally assumed, 
with more or less accuracy, to be of one race; but other 
bonds are sufficiently powerful to have the same uniting 
effect as those of blood, with the community so held
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together being regarded as a nation, though the people 
may spring from various stocks.3’-' There is no
generally received definition of “nation." Common
descent, common langauge, common history, common
religion, common interests, ideas, hopes and aspiration -
all of these enter, more or less, into- the current’
conception - but any one of them may be wanting or two or 
three of them may be absent altogether and yet the 
community wh ich lacks them may be called a na t i on. 
Important is the concept of a common heritage of memories 
and fee1i ngs and a present desire to continue their
common life.
In general terms, “nat ion"_may be defined as a
com mu n ity who se members are bound ~t_gge t h er _b v _t ies _ s uch 
-as do not exist between them and the_rest of the 
world.For the most part apolitic in and of
themseIves, these ties assume political importance when 
incorporated within the notion of “state." To isolate 
salient ties and, in so doing, to identify the n1dus of 
nationhood, is important, as out of an objective 
conspectus of ties may be created a subjective lo_gus
standi for the nation. Ties aid in the construction of a
core solidarity, ethnic in-groups and social
differentiations.3'7
Core solidarity is found within the core group and 
becomes a fundamental factor of every nation. Societies
are founded by groups whose members share certain
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qualitative distinctive characteristics, traits around
which they structure their solidarity.361 This core
forms an ideological base which assumes in and of itself
the posture of a theory of nationalism.
A nationalist needs a theory and generally it 
may be asserted that any theory will do. What 
is-really important is not an intellectual 
argument, but a physical fact of difference. 
Nationalism is simply the term used to describe 
the situation where a group of people claiming 
to have some physical characteristic in common 
assert their right to independence against 
those who do not have this characteristic.
The essence of nationalism is found in the notion of
d i f ference which sets one group apart from another. The
notion is primarily a condition of mind, and in many
respects, may be the: . -
feeling, or sentiment of a group of people 
living in a well-defined geographical area, 
speaking a common language, possessing a 
literature in which tke aspiration of the 
nations haive been expressed, attached to the 
common traditions and common customs, 
venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, 
having a common religion/'0
In Western Europe the feeling of nationality, which
centres on the concept and actualisational achievement of
nation, is virtually inextricably related to state, for
the nation or nations claims within the parameters of its
own manifest destiny total independence, which often
necessitates. as in the modern political arrangement of
Western Europe, the political structure of states.
The modern state is a territorial society 
divided into governmental subjects claiming 
within its allotted physical area, a supremacy 
over all other insitutions. It is, In fact, 
the final legal depository of the social world.
It sets the prerogrative of all other organ-
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isations. It brings within its power all the 
forms and substances of the myriad human lives 
with whose destinies it is in charge/'*1
The state is a collective organisation, not
necessarily synonymous with the collectivity from which
it is der i ved . •
An organisation is essentially an aggregate 
which acts-in accordance with internal purpose.
And this purpose is something distinct from the 
physical and chemical properties of the
component parts. If the state is an 
organisation, the state possesses such an 
internal purpose distinct from the natural - 
tendencies of the individual citizens.*1*2
The state derives its being from the nation or
nations within its sphere, and generally exhibits
collectively the sum of their individual components and
.takes on the characteristics found within the nation. In
the Western European experience, the states are the
manifestation of their nations. And as the nation seeks
independence, so also the state seeks clear autonomous ~
sovereignty. The state is a modern personified unit
incorporating the national government. It is the
political objective of nationalism.
Everywhere in Western Europe after 1815 states 
were making nations and nations were creating 
states, and both fostered nationalism, which, 
in turn, nursed the nations and their
states . z*
Dignity and happiness, peace and prosperity, and 
power and glory, were sought by peoples through their 
nations and the states built upon them/*'* During the 
last century, if they had not already done so, the 
peoples of Western Europe found their common historical 
culture and common aspirations and worked and sometimes
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revolted and on occasion warred Cas In 1830, 1848, and
1870) to establish a united territory and sovereign 
state.4*5, It is helpful to note the following 
conspectus which presents the approximate dates of 
independence of modern Western European nation-states.
It is not by chance that t.he nineteenth century
witnessed the establishment of several nation states in
Western Europe, as the -same sociological forces were
operable throughout the European world affecting
i nd i v i dua1 units simultaneously.
STATE DATE OF
ESTABLISHMENT
.During the 19th and 20th Centuries
Greece . 1829-32 
Belgium 1830-31 
Italy 1861-70 
-Germany ■ 1867-70 
Luxembourg ; 1867-90 
Norway * 1905 
Finland 1919 
Ireland 1921-22 
Austria (separate states)* 1919
(*peace conference of Versailles divides the 
Habsburg Empire into a series of nation-states)
The ties around which nationalism flourished and
which ultimately produced the nation-states relate to
different elements/’6' These elements are either
given, as in geographical or demographical
considerations; or achieved, as in cultural-social
attainments such as institut ions ;z,y or historical
definitions of events4'® which define present position
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and shape future direction/*'5 These form iden-
tlfication which is translated into independence from 
others and itself forms the goal of separate national or 
et_hnic identity.250
The "we-feeilnq'‘ is the result of a specific ~ 
perception in the entire constellation of images and
patterns of mutual_responsiveness which incorporated to
form a_vert i ca 1_commun i ty. The concept of community is
an important factor to the social psychologica1
consideration of integration. The social psychological 
consideration suggests that any changes or shifts in
attitudes in this dimension have an ultimate- relation to 
political attitudes and behaviour of individuals and may 
be directly causal to the creation of a community of 
states. The latter group of achieved elements are more 
difficult to locate than the given, as they are
essentially non-physical elements. A problem with the 
literature is that the resultant feeling is often 
overshadowed by those phenomena that may or may not cause 
that feeling. By far, the weight of early literature was 
composed of de f i n i t i ve identification of elements which 
were seen as comprising the essence of nationhood. Only 
recently is found the newer trend to focus more centrally 
on the achieved feeling itself.
Literature Review
Mill saw nationality as a phenomenon fundamentally
meaning membership of, the fact or state of belonging to,
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a particular nation.®1
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute 
a Nationality, if they are united among 
themselves by common sympathies, which do not 
exist between them and any others - which make 
them cooperate with each other more willingly 
than with other people, desire to be under the 
same government, and desire that it should be 
government by -themselves or a portion of _ 
themselves exclusively.®2
This feeling of nationality may have been generated 
by various causes. It may be that the strongest of all 
is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a 
national history, and consequent community of recol­
lections. This is collective pri de and humiliation, 
pleasure and regret, connected with some incidentCs) in 
the past. Where the sentiment of nationality exists in 
any force, there may be a prima facie case for uniting 
all the members of the nationality under the same 
government, and a government to themselves apart, which 
is merely saying that the question of government ought to 
be decided by the governed.33
This feeling is essentially a case for national 
self-determination, in the form of national
self-government.
It is in general a necessary condition of free 
institutions, that the boundaries of government 
should coincide in the main with nation­
alities.
In the European experience, the community of 
interests that resulted largely in the establishment of 
free Institutions, and that underline cooperation
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exhibited on the national level, grew to maturity in the 
age of the French Revolution. That experience was the 
first effect!ve movement in the modern period to posit a 
comprehensive ideal of community.15'5 Community is not 
an abstract notion; it is highly personalised and most 
generally achieved through direct camaraderie and through 
its .liturgy and its symbols. Personal interrelationships 
develop meaning through shared goals and emotions. 
Community is as much a mental state as a physical state. 
This is a position subscribed to by Mosse,®*
attributing community to an ideal which exists within
specific groups. He thought it fundamental to the
concept of a shared culture with the myths and.symbols of 
the natlonal past. The community concept of nationalism, 
relating to the ideal which ultimately achieved
fulfillment in state or as Kazzin-i refers to it,
'Country', is based on a community of interests which
have :
the sentiment of love, the sense of fellowship 
which binds together all the sons of that 
territory. So long as a single one of your 
brothers is not represented by his own vote in 
the development of the national life - so long 
as a single one vegetates uneducated among the 
educated - so long as a single one able and 
willing to work, languishes in poverty for want 
of work. - you have not got a Country such as it 
ought to be, the Country of all and for 
all.537
This is nationalism placed firmly in the 
humanitarian sector. Mazzini thought that nationalism 
is a determinant for differentiating people, and:
Probably the criterion most often applied is
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that of language but others may be used: race, 
religion, history. At a minimum it may only be 
urged that a particular nation be enabled to 
enjoy some degree of autonomy within a
supra ~ria t ional State - as, say the Scots do 
within the United Kingdom. But usually it is 
demanded that each nation - and especially a 
particular nation - be identified with the 
State on its own.55®
Self-determination as a criteria for a given part of 
humanity alone places nations firmly within the confines 
of a physical geographically defined state,®” and i s 
i s an extremely potent doctrine. As Kedourie Indicated,
it is a doctrine that:
pretends to supply a criterion for the deter­
mination of the unit of population proper to 
enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the 
legitimate exercise of power in the state, and 
for the right organisation of a society of 
states/"0 . . _ . -
According to Kedourie, the very word 'nation' has
been endowed by the concept of nationalism with a meaning 
which has placed it firmi-y in'the political rhetoric of 
the West and has been exported throughout the whole of
the rest of the world. He stated:
But what now seems natural was unfamiliar, 
needing argument, persuasion, evidences of many 
kinds; that seem simple and transparent. What 
seems simple and transparent is really obscure 
and contrived, the outcome of circumstances not 
forgotten and preoccupations now academic, the 
residue of metaphysical systems sometimes 
incompatible and even contradictory.61
Kedourie's analysis of nationalism states
fundamentally that:
A nation is a body of people to whom a 
government is responsible through their 
legislature; any body of people associating 
together, and deciding on a scheme for their 
own government, form a nation.62
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Self-determination exercises self-will, is a process
focusing on the definition of the self, and revolves
around the concept of the nation.63
THE SELF:___h Constituent Port i^o n of Group Membership
Fundamental to the concept of nation is that of 
togetherness, suggestive of an equa 1 i t y . A
protracted period of social learning, which leads toward
integration, producing a nation of common theoretical
equals, is a process productive of like-minded
individuals, or at least a group of individuals more 
compatibly minded than incompatibly minded.
Nationalism is the extension of a family. The 
object of nationalism is* the nation. The- political - 
manifestation of nation is the State. At the very centre 
of the nation is the ethnie possessive of its own
distinct characteristics.
The creation of a community of interests is
centralised on a po1i s around which the ethnie is
structured.6'”^ Man as a social animal forms more or
less permanent and specific social groups. The ties that 
hold these groups together are those of strong 
sentiments.6,6 The characteristics which produce 
ethnocentrism often are psychologically related to the
individual's needs. Ethnocentrism’s most obvious form is
that of nationalism as the centre of corporate
sentiments. In its extreme, nationalism may, as integral 
nationalism, become integrally repressive as it may be
responsible for overwhelming and subduing internal
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differentiations especially in multi-national
a glomera t ions isolating arid subjugating non-dominant 
ethnic forces. While subjugating non-dominant ethnic 
forces it is an attempt to develop an overriding common
culture.
Weber68 focuses on the concept of history as 
relating to the notion of a community of interests and as 
the key to a real or imagined past. This view of history 
is one which is insistent on keeping 'the future as 
history’ open to human will and resolution,69 and
is causal to a collective feeling of unity. This 
suggests that nationality is a process of slant necessary 
for interpreta-t-ion . Karl Deutsch agrees70, and posits 
nationality as a concept of society which begins with 
society as a group of individuals united by the division
of labour. Out of this basis~is formed social
Institutions and the infrastructure necessary for the 
development of technology as a man learns habits of 
working together, thereby establishing patterns71 
unique to the group. It explains characteristics which 
develop in the grouping, the development of classes, 
occupations or castes, the location of cultural centres 
and civilisations72 based on culturally biased 
criteria relating to a community of communications —
Kult urkre 1 se . It is in the kulturkre i se that the self is
developed. The kuIturkre i se suggests the development of 
speech for purposes of communication73 and ultimately 
a standard language Cor dialect} and the possibility of
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social delineation between segments of population based 
on dialects or linguistic strat i f ica t ions . Further., it 
would sugge st the deve 1 opine nt of wealth, capital 
formation and factor equipment, with the associated 
differential in living standards, with an apparent desire 
or attempt or possibility, for acquisition or class 
permeabi 1 i ty. ~ZZt Deutsch highlights the notion75 of 
memories and preferences, and the development of
communication links for the transfer of habits and the
eventual complementarity of habits.This transfer 
may or may not be related to language, but more 
importantly emphasizes the functions of memory, as those 
being storage and reca 11 of tn-formation. The -historical 
slant Is apparently salient to the development of a 
building block of nat iona 1 i ty . "z'z _
This introduces the concept of social learning7® 
and is related to the speed of assimilation of changes 
which affect the nationality, and emphasizes the 
necessity for experience, especially for the assimilation 
or the differentiation of change Cnew event evaluation). 
The assimiliation of given change is the process 
facilitated by the ability to communicate over a wide 
range of subjects over time. The assimilation is an 
enrichment of culture, perhaps most evident in language, 
and involves the learning of many new habits and the 
unlearning of many old habits. It can achieve
consciousness by attaching secondary symbols, i.e., 
'symbols about symbols' to certain items in its current
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intake of outside information, and to certain items which 
are recalled in memory. Natonal consciousness precedes 
the development of a national will. National will is the 
ability to either inhibit or further future learning, 
either partially or wholly.7"7'
Authors tend to elevate communication to an
identifiable characteristic of the ethnic group, from
which nations evolve. .
Language before the age of nationalism was 
rarely regarded as a fact upon which the 
prestige of the group depended.*3°
But afterwards, language became central to its
identity. Through language and the associated
accumulation of historical traditions .and memories of a
people, the people or nation feel themselves identified, 
partly distinguishing one group of people, or nation.
‘from another.®-1 Thus, language appears to exhibit a 
high degree of importance, but it is not the sine_qua non
of nationality.®^
Weil®"5 agrees, subjugating physical or
territorial motives for nations, and not subtersensuous
phenomena such as language. He views nationality 
politically and states that "the nation, single and 
separate" ... in other words IS the State: "for there
is no other way of defining the word 'nation' than as a 
territorial aggregate whose various parts recognize the 
authority of the same State." Weil aligns himself 
further with Weber by saying "for a long time now, the
single nation has played the part which constitutes the
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supreme mission of society toward the individual human
being, namely maintaining through the present the links
with the past and the future."8* Weil implies that
the nation, in the form of state, has fundamentally taken
over the traditional role of the family as being the
focus for, amongst other things, the cathexis of human
thought and carries with it the notion of obligation,
with the reciprocal conception of rights.
The notion of obligation comes before that of 
rights, which is subordinate and relative to 
the former. A right is not effectual by 
itself, but only in relation to the obligation 
to wh ich it corre sponds, the effective exerci se 
of a right springing not from the individual 
who possesses it, but from other men who 
consider themselves as being under a certain 
obligation toward him.’3!=i
Social interaction implies obligations toward the 
social grouping and is very much related to a group of 
individuals located in a common territory, whereas.at one 
time in man's social development, one had a distinct 
obligation toward family. Nationalism focuses that 
obligation more or less on the group. The obligation 
today centres on State as the political expression of the 
nation. Obligation is felt as a by-product of
ethnocentrism relating toward the group. It is motivated 
by a nationalist ideology which supplies the basis for 
discerning illogically and eclectically one's place in 
the group. It is related to the feeling of identity and 
again relates in some general way to the views of 
nationalism. This highlights the non-logical aspect of 
nation.86 "A major feature of nationalist thought is
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the way in which it latches upon existing ideas about the
nation wherever these are available and useful."697
I_t__is posited herewith that the feeling of nation is
that which is important, not necessarily any specific
element itself.
Elevating one badge oflidentity as the 
touchstone of nationalism often means 
suppressing other badges of equal or greater 
importance. . . No one sort of identity among
. . . [nationals] . .. . can be regarded as
objectively'’ more important than a-nother. . . .
And the success of nationalism cannot be 
explained as a result of its superior 
attractions to the members of the nation by 
comparison with the alternative identities from 
which they might choose. The only constant 
role national identity plays in nationalism is 
the ideological one that nationalists assign to 
41 .
The' Politicisation of Nationhood
The political aspect of nationalism, the political 
arrangement of individuals -engaged in the movement, 
resulting in state is in itself a form of identi­
fication.'3,5' This political criteria of nationalism 
seeks to align nationalist ideology with more general 
political values; however, it is difficult to apply this 
distinction to a homogeneous group and to point to it as 
a ground for nationalism, because it develops from the 
very homogeneity of the grouping. The desire of the 
individuals in the collectivity to be politically 
expressive, Karl Deutsch lays as the foundation of 
nationalism through communications.'5’0 There may be a 
divergence from the psychological feeling of nationality, 
the possessors of which constitute a nation and the
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politicisation of the concept Itself. In the definition 
of nationality,
there exists a significant movement toward 
political, economic or cultural autonomy, that 
is to say, toward a political organisation: or. 
a market area, or an area of literacy or 
cultural exchange, within which the persona and 
characteristics of this people will . -
predominate.'5*1 -
This suggests difficulties with the idea of nation, 
because of objectivity. They relate to objective 
characteristics essential to its unity, that is, its 
language, a common or contiguous territory, a common 
condition or experience, community of character, or
community of values. Deutsch's communications' approach
is a more fundamental defi-nition of nationality. He
states that nationality is: -
an alignment of large numbers of individuals 
from the’middle and lower .classes linked to
-regional centres and leading social groups by 
channels of social communication and economic 
intercourse both indirectly from link to link 
and with the centre.92
Tbis degree of meaningful communications cannot help 
but develop common sympathies which evolve into more 
emotive feelings of collective solidarity. It may be 
fundamentally argued that this aspect of nationality is 
but a basic observational premise of social nature 
itself, and not necessarily causal to the social entity 
of nation. After all, nationality, as a way of thinking, 
is psychological in nature.5*3 The psychological 
approach highlights the need for people to identify with 
some cause or group larger than themselves.
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Essentially., psychologically, nationalism is a 
community ideology, a community myth. The myth of 
nationalism is the refocusing of collectivity upon 
large-scale soc-ieties as opposed to small-scale, If
the process of change and modernity refocuses the role of 
people* in the collective setting, there is a need for
re Identification in terms of individual function and
social relationships with others. Traditionalism is 
sacrificed and focus must be placed upon attributes which 
are 'carried around' with them, such as language,
religion, or race. These elements afford the essential 
stuff of which nations are made. Modernity forces a 
focus upon the collective identity derived from 
subnascent elements, a process which is necessitated by a 
rapidly changing environment.'5'”' .
The concept of rapid change during the move from 
traditional society to modern society underlines the 
psychological implications of nationalism and national 
identity.
The major implication is that rapid change 
precipitates a breakdown of traditional 
identity and the coming of modernity points to 
the shape a new identity can take.57"2’
The change concept of nationality is a very
functionalist approach. It regards change both as a 
breakdown of old and existing patterns of social 
interaction but also as a prelude to a new
stability.'5'7
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Til®.hyth of Nationality
The myth of nationality may be attributed to a 
’’mysterious kind of instinct, consciousness or will that 
leads to a union of hearts.1"’® This union of hearts 
may be related to almost anything perceived to be held 
commonly, as in raced Hertz indicates the close
correlation between race and nation and ascribes it to:
the reason . . . that most people find it
difficult to conceive a close social unity -
wi thout a phys i ca1 bond, and that they cannot 
th i nk of a common mentality without common
blood. Zin intimate solidarity of fraternity 
between members of a nation seems then to imply 
a real relationship between members of a
family. .
If one looks at a race and defines it as "the -
descendants of a common ancestor: especially those who
inherit a common set of characteristics: such as a set
of descendants, now-or then a species; a breed, "
one sees that the term is fundamentally a term relating
to the natural sciences. It has been applied to the
social sciences, and assertions have been made that
racial sentiment is one of the elements that goes to make 
up national sentiment and national pride and helps to 
make a people cohesive.101 Claiming lines of common 
descent may be useful if a nation is to be made a unit in
the best and fullest sense.102 The compatabi1 ity of
nation and race is not wholly mutually exclusive or
mutually Inclusive, however:
What constitutes a nation is not speaking the 
same tongue or belonging to the same ethnic 
group, but having accomplished great things in 
common in the past and the wish to accomplish
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them In the future.10"5
The point is made here that it is the psychological
aspect, derived through historical interpretations, that
are salient, not physical aspects.
By race we should understand a continuity of a 
physical type, expressing affinities of blood, 
representing an essentially natural grouping, 
which can have nothing, and, in general, has 
nothing in common with the people, the
nationality, the language, or the customs 
corresponding to groups that are purely 
artificial, in no way artthropo logi ca 1, and 
arising entirely from history, whose natural - 
products they are.10*
A nation is not the physical fact of one blood, but
the mental fact of one tradition. Race relates to a
physical type; nation relates to a common mental
condition. “One is a natural fact _wh i ch is already given 
at the dawn of history; the other is an articulated 
structure acquired by the thinking, feeling and willing 
of human minds in the course of h i story1025 -
The racist doctrine developed as an ideology in 
Europe almost simultaneously with the doctrine of 
nationalism. It emphasized the difference between 
in-group and out-group, (exacerbated by European 
colonialism and imperialism), fundamentally attri but ing
the colour barrier or other visual criteria of race to
what was no doubt associated with emerging patterns of 
society relating to wealth, which related perhaps more to
the territorial or climactic circumstances . lo6'
Nationalism and racism are frequently correlated and are
often confused, that is, identified as one and the
same . 1 O"Z
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There is a common descent implication both within
the term 'nation' and the term 'race'. The close
correlation between the two terms blurs the distinction
between the social science term 'nation' and the natural
science term 'race'. This is so as the nation is. among
other things,- the collective identity of a socie­
ty,10® and families which are racially indicative,
also form a society. National individual patterns of
behaviour are based on collective individually learned
perceptions which suggest a high degree of intimacy
implied within the nation that grows out of a family and
a race which is synonymous with that family.
Men have always remarked upon their physical - - 
differences, and have often extolled or scorned 
the variety of customs, cultures and physiques 
that divide them into social groups.109
The doctrine of race affords nationals the -
opportunity to differentiate themselves from others with
regard to a set of given characteristics.110 This
degree of ethnocentrism may be defined:
As the belief by its members in the centrality, 
rightness and superiority of their community, 
and a correspending denial of value to other 
commun ities. 111
This degree of ethnocentrism, central to both racism 
and nationalism, serves mainly to reinforce pre-existing 
cultural fears.3,12 The concept of racism based on 
given biological differences amongst groups of peoples 
highlights the intergroup differences and fortifies 
in-group, out-group prejudices.113
Most serious writers have aareed that
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nationality is not biological and has little if 
anything to do with race. They have suggested 
that nationality somehow involves some common 
relationships to parts of men's physical 
environment/their 'country' - and to some 
events in the past, transmitted to the present 
as 'common' history, although they could not 
tell what made a country or a history
*common'.11**
Deutsch suggests that nationality implies a degree 
of similar elements inside the minds of every individual 
participating in the collectivity of the nation such as 
values, thoughts, or feelings, which may or may not be
similar but are complementary due to their compata- 
bility.3-1"5 Interlocking habits and memories in the 
minds of individuals inducing them to play interlocking
roles of helper and helped, or leader and led Ca habitual 
social discipline} is an essential characteristic of a 
social group. Interlocking roles and common attachments 
to symbols imply an interlocking relation- both between 
and intra groups.
The given fact of race contributes significantly
toward, but is not a determinant of, the nation. Crone
observed i
Nations which have long records of independence 
have in their time received Influxes of 
migrants who have become completely integrated. 
Such nations, e.g., Britain, are thus of a 
diverse racial position, with the stronger 
bonds often cultural and intellectual.11*1'
The Latin, 'nation', that is, the concept of
belonging toegther, relate to 'nasci'/'natus', to be
born,117 which, as the root of the English word
'nation', points to the direct closeness of groups of
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people related through blood and the feeling of
nationality. The etymology of the term 'nation' also 
suggests the sociological origins of modern nations which 
evolved out of successive layers of developing societal 
groupings over time. The common sentiment collectively 
shared by the nation is of relative "recent origin. Rome
did not constitute a nation. It was a
civilisation,1and out of that civilisation came
modern European nations. Clear concepts of political 
entities developed in Europe as a direct result of 
hierarchical and conflicting feudal entities deposing the
notion of a universal Christian sacerdotum. 1It is
the product of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and . 
Enlightenment, and the consequent diminution of church 
influences.120 The concept crystallises around the 
development of C17 the growth of the secular state; C2J 
the weakening of the authority of the universal church
and faith as well as that of the local feudal lords; and
C3) the development of a system of communications.
The forces that led to the establishment of 
nations cannot be precisely isolated, 
ennumerated, and evaluated, for they were many, 
intertwined, and variously effective. . . .
They were however related to royal families, 
the dynasties which were, at the beginning the 
major feudal families1-‘:il
which played a significant role in obtaining territory,
wealth, prestige, and power. These elements presented
a cohesive force . . . whether vested in a
person or a group . . . which seems to have
been the reason for intensifying and bringing 
into consciousness the incipient feeling of 
neighbourliness that has been found a universal
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trait of human society. Once established and 
sanctified, the sentiment may well flourish, 
without compulsion, glorified as loyalty to a 
sovereign being or to a national flag.321""
Johannet introduced another attempt at the
politicisation of nationhood. _
The cause of the statue is not the marble, but 
the artist. In the case of nationality, it was
- primarily the dyna sty. -
Implied here_is the concept that any element can be.
elevated to the status_of criteria for a~ nation, such as
that of history. Dynasties acquired land and subjects 
through war, conquest, diplomacy, and marriage, etc.
Their domains were strengthened and their authority 
solidified through royal laws and the levying of taxes 
for the sustenance of themselves and military actions. 
Slowly royal bureacraciss evolved,12^ political and 
royal elites, later academicians especially lawyers, a 
process o-f which reduced the authority of lesser lords 
which constituted the backbone of the European feudal 
society. This process focused identity on "the crown" 
which became synonymous with the possessions of the 
monarch confined to the geographical consideration 
equalling the nation-state and ultimately the nation 
itself. This was not a fluid process. This was a 
process beset by setbacks. It was a process protracted
over time which afforded the essential stuff from which
historical recollection could be drawn and remoulded to 
identify national sentiment. It is essentially the 
historical period which affords the nation in later times 
the ability to look back and to analyse events, and it is
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fundamentally the period which affords the fertile earth 
for the original germination of the collective national
sentiment,
In Shafer's words, a defining criterion for
nationalism is:
a shared beltef in a common history and often 
in a common ethnic origin . . . the common past
. . . may be real or imagined. ... In any
case, to the extent that individuals are 
nationalist, they appear to find shared meaning 
in common past experience, be this actual or -
invented, and to feel unified because of it. 
Consciousness of a common heritage also gives 
the people a feeling of being distinct from 
other peoples, and enables them to have the 
sense of Ident ity. lSiSS
History affords a culture.
When_a_n individual shares this culture, wishes 
to continue to do so, and is, i-n some fashion, 
devoted to it, he is said to be of the nation 
and to belong to the nat iona 1 i ty . 1 '■2-&
It is esse nt I. al: : _
to find [a] bases for pride [,] for a nation 
may not be established long enough to have 
accomplished much.127
The basis for pride may be £13 given Cas in race), 
or £2} achieved as in historical interpretations of past 
events). Man Is:
behavioura1ly, the most flexible of all 
animals. Humans are born with a largely 
uncoded behavioural potential, the capacity to 
learn, i.e., to learn culture.12®
Man appears to be shaped not so much by nature
itself but more nurtured by everything human and peculiar
to times and places.
What is important is:
Without this recoanition of what is common,
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nationality cannot exist, or at any rate cannot 
work, and 1 i ve . x
The recognition of these singular and unique
differences form the common fundus of the in-group.
For each nationality is determined by contrast 
with others, and a nationality regards itself 
not only as distinct from others, but nearly 
always as possessing some exclus i-ve common 
qualities, being thereby separate from others 
as well as united within itself. 1:50
One can isolate specific elements of exclusivity
such as ethnic origin; language; territory; economic
interests; culture; religion; and political unity.
Elements which may form a province or domain unique and
exclus ive to the i n-group which may give rise to a means
affording an out—group delineation. Whatever elements or
collection of elements, either given or achieved, deemed
specific to the group, are incorporated into its specific
domain of reference and for a constituent element -
incorporated in its national mythology.
1. The Notion of Domain as a Political Criterion for
Nationhood
2. A domain is that which one is master of or has domain
over. It is, in effect, the scope or range of any
subject or sphere of knowledge, an aggregate to which a 
variable belongs. Virtually anything may fall within the 
province of a domain and be employed by the nationalist 
as an essential constituting element in the formation of
the constitution of nationhood and thus be considered as
belonging to his nation.
When narrowly applied, it is referenced to refer to
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physical beauty.
3. Territory is that which is occupied effectively not 
necessarily what is politically owned Cdomination).
4. The prima facie given difference delineating In-group 
from out-group of a given nation is that of territory.
The Napoleonic maxim, “the politics of states is in their 
geogra phy, “ 1 ::!51 emphasizes the importance placed not . 
only upon physical territory but on the-type of physical
territory inhabited by the nation. Physical structures 
of given societies take on political ramifications. 
Mackinder spoke of "an unparalleled struggle between the 
physical environment of a nation and a designed policy
based, on a national ideal-. Political
geography1emphasizes the importance of territory to
the inhabitants of same.
— Insights into human territorial relationships 
can be derived from studies of animal 
behaviour. An animal territory is a 
well-defined area which is regarded by a pair 
or a group of animals as being in exclusive 
pre serve.1
It may be that possession of a territory Is a 
natural phenomenon.
Territory is evident at many levels in the 
vertebrate animal kingdom, and arguably among 
some invertebrates. . . . Socio-political
amalgamation superceded clan forms by tribal 
organisations in all but the most hostile 
env i ronment s . 1355
This transition produced much more extensive 
political regions with populations of tens or even 
hundreds of thousands. It was usually accompanied by 
increased centralisation and remoteness of power. With
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the "physiograph leal central place generally replaced by 
a permanent political focus differentiating in function
from other settlements."136.
Nations are often inextricably re lated to t err i t. ory, 
and the ultimate political expression of the nation--the 
stater— is frequently ascribed to Clj population; <2> 
territory; C3D exclusive right to that territory by the 
population Csovereignty); and C4} a social arrangement 
administering that sovereignty (government).137 It Is 
an awareness of the physical environment that creates the 
psychological collective imagery leading toward group 
solidarity, a knowledge of self in something other than 
the form of self.1Domain is both physical and _
mental in nature.
Fundamentally the reason why terr it ory pda vs an
Important role in the development of the national feeling
may be that of security.
Nationalism symbolises the psychic need of 
entire peoples; . . . for solace and protection
in times of strife.1-’3"*'
These origins are both a physical and psychological 
haven in distress. Nationalism relating to territory is 
an irresistible force because of its appeal to that which 
is subrational, to the dimly understood Instinctual core
of human kind.
The fierce power of national feeling is due to 
the fact that it raises from the deepest source 
of our being. It is the primitive stuff of 
which we are made, our first loyalties, our 
first aggressions, the types and images of our
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souls. It Is fixed In the nursery and the 
spell of it is never lost. The thing we know 
as children, the standards we receive, the 
tones we heard, the pictures we stored in our 
minds, the scenery, the houses, the gestures, 
the prayers, the rhythms, games, shape us and 
colour us. They are our nationality, the 
essence of our being wh-ich defines us against 
the background of the world.1'-*0
Plato suggested that conflict is related to wealth, 
where wealth is associated with territory.1Al Hobbes 
supported this with his supposition that man is in a 
constant warring state. Territory, as a physical domain,
is frequently causal to wealth creation. Wealth is based 
frequently on primarily climate and natural given 
resources. It may also be related to a fortuitous 
location.1*2 General industrial affluence may be 
ascribed to temperate sones as opposed to tropical or 
sub-tropical zones,1'"3 The territory of habitation 
may be responsible for the development of individual
characteristics. These created characteristics, as a
possession of those individuals which inhabit the
territory, may become part of their psychological domain. 
A given territory with a characteristic climate produces 
amongst peoples:
First ... a direct effect upon man's health 
and activity. Second ... a strong indirect 
but Immediate effect through food and other 
resources, through parasites, and through mode 
CsicD of life.1'*'*
Climate may produce national characteristics which
themselves constitute an important portion of 'national
domain'. Markham thought:
Initiative, inventiveness, versatility, and the 
power of leadership are the qualities which
177
give flavour to the Teutonic race. Good 
humour, patience, loyalty, and the power Csic} 
of self-sacrifice give flavour to the
negro . 3 Z4"-'
These may he of economic importances
The nation which has led the world, leads the 
world, and will lead the world, is that nation 
which lives in a climate, indoor or outdoor, 
nearest to the - idea 1. 1 _
Galbra i th1 Z4"z forcefully ascribes ..the powerful 
industrial oligopolists to attitudes and patterns which 
developed in the industrial countries which, with little 
exception, comprised the so-called First World found 
wholly within the temperate zones. A synoptic view of 
climate producing a ’’national character” gives a pi eno 
pure argument to the idea of accomodation, the tendency 
to accomodate oneself to given conditions, and may
thus be part of the national domain.1*9
Territorial space which Duverger says cannot be
divorced from climate and natural resources is used to
Cl} delineate societies; C2} is required for the
arrangement of societies; and C3} is a determinant of the
location of societies.1250 If elevated to cognitive
awareness, the psychological possession of these
conditions amongst a people may be instrumental in
delineating nationhood. They become a constituent
portion of that nation's domain.
Quoth Montesquieu:
Island people are more Inclined to cherish 
freedom than peoples on the continent, . . .
the sea separates Cislands} from great empires, 
and tyranny cannot lay its hand on them.
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Conquerers are halted at the water's edge.
Island dwellers are not engulfed in conquests
and they preserve their laws more easily.1”51
The internal arrangement of societies are related to
space as in the case of French Departements and early 
Engli~sh shires. LePlay1 cited the example that the 
Norwegian fiords produced both isolation, encouraging 
close family ties, and a spirit of individualism, both of 
which affect national character. The development, 
through time, of cities is related to spatial
characteristics of territory. Citizens (nationals) are 
the product of cities Cc i vi ta sD1!S:3 which developed 
from a reason, that is, location of resources, 
availability to trading routes, military purposes, etc.
Territorial areas tend to be delineated into core areas
and frontier or boundary zones, all of which create a 
living space Clebensrauial^"’^ which were originally
based on territorial determinants of nations. Societies
had to adapt themselves to these given situations. By 
the process of adaptation, developing nations formed 
patterns and structures of society which are distinctly 
unique to the given society.1"-5-' Terrain, climate, and 
space lent definition to society’s development over time. 
Groups of people were given circumstances to which 
achieved differences among them were constructed. The
achieved differences were meat for nationalist doctrine,
fuel for the fire of nationalism based on the concept of 
differences between societal groups. The physical facts 
upon which they were founded are indisputably given.
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What the people made out of the given became their
domain. But the s1ngularIty of a physical and
psycbologica1 domain owes Its being to the fact that it 
is composed of an aggregate to which variables belong.
To so conceptua1ise a domain is to see it holistically, a 
necessary condition if integration is to be achieved.
In Sum
The problems facing man either individually or 
collectively suggest the necessity for solutions. Within 
collective society, solutions must be communicated and 
the vehicle for such is language. Language forms not 
only a vehicle for communication but also comprises an 
element of identification, a poIi s for the ethni
developraent .
To the Hellenes, the world of humanity that did not 
fall within the composition of their own identity were 
' barbaro i ’ or ’ barbaros ' , meaning foreign, a label 
attached to those of their out-groups. The given 
characteristics of race may be a determinant of 
out-group. Certainly the inhabitation of an out-group 
territory would determine out-group status. These are 
fundamentally given differences between nations. Another 
equally salient criteria for out-group status is the 
achieved differences betv.*een nations of which language is 
perhaps the most important. Race you see, language you
hear.
Language itself consists of memories 
incorporated in words, the latter serving as 
symbols for the former.1:3t'
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Wittgenstein observed, “whereof one cannot speak
thereof one must be s i lent . “ 1 “•2, z Taken from the
standpoint of self, if one does not understand another, 
the other must be foreign.13®
The elementary qualities of which the social fact 
consists, are present in the germ form in individual 
minds. But the social fact emerges from them only when 
they have been transformed by association since it is 
only then that it appears. Association itself is also an 
active factor productive of special effects. In itself, 
it is therefore something new. When the consciousness of 
individuals, instead of remaining isolated, becomes 
grouped and combined, something in the world has been
a 1tered.3
Social life is association between individuals.
Their association refers to the widely varying ; 
forms that are -generated as the’ diverse _ -
interests of individuals prompt them to develop 
social units in which they realise these - 
central or ideal, lasting or fleeting,
conscious or unconscious, causally impelling or 
teleologically Inducing — interests.14'0 
People’s associations proliferate through social
space and time. Social relations unite not only 
individuals and groups but also groups into communities 
and societies, or ultimately, nations.
Action is social in so far as, by virtue of the 
subjective meaning attached to it by the acting
individual Cor individuals), it takes account of the
behaviour of others and is thereby oriented in its
course.1*8,1 Social relations are profoundly influenced
by common values, structures which have si on i f i ca nee o f 
their own. which are indigenous to each given society and 
relate to needs. Society structures are influenced by 
societies’ evolutionary values and norms. Exchange 
transactions and power relations constitute forces that 
must be viewed in terms of'norms and values to arrive at
an understanding of the dynamics of the social structures 
involved and the social process of integration. Needs 
then are the primary motivating factor for man in society
and become salient to the consideration of integration. 
They lie at the root of current day nations.
Integration viewed on the transactional level alone 
empirically quantifies interchange but gives li.ttle -
consideration to motives. Political considerations
themselves refer to structural relationships which again 
give little indication as to individual motives. These 
two levels of consideration only when compiled with the 
sociological consideration can give a wholistic
indication as to the motive of integrating society. For,
in the_final analysis,_for integration to successfully
and completely transpire,_the social element must be
engaged. The patterns of association between individuals 
are strongly influenced by the social context i n wh ich 
they occur. The analysis of social interaction from the 
primary level onward cannot treat interaction as existing
in isolation from other social relations. The mutual
attraction of individuals and the exchanges between them 
are affected by the alternative opportunities provided to
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them with the result that competitive processes arise 
that include wider circles and that complement and modify 
the process of exchange and attraction at these
imperceding levels,1^2 The expansion of societal
structures accomodating social action is integration.
The expanded homogeneous social group may be considered
as the nation.
If multi-national European society is to be 
achieved, it must be achieved by the process of 
socialisation which was the process that, by allowing for 
social expression of the individual, developed European 
society—to the present level of the nation. -Nations' 
evolved because of a high degree of community and freedom 
to integrate through socialisation on the economic.
political, and cultura1-level. Before the three levels 
are discussed, it is necessary to determine the degree of 
commonality within Europe, the subject of the following
page s.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Commun 1t v_wi.t h i_n_Europe
Clv11i sat ion CCivilise + Action}1 is the term 
applied to the attainment of technique either mental or 
physical, frequently referred to in levels, which affords 
differentiation between societies in one period vis a vis 
those of a previous period. Culture CCult - a particular 
form of worship)2 refers to the training and refinement
of minds. It is the intellectual side of civilisation--'
and has to do with~the particular form or application of
civilised attainments.
This chapter argues sameness of Western European
civilisation^’ and fundamental sameness of culture.15
It argues that perceived cultural differentiations are 
cultura1-traits, subsectional.particularities of an
overriding culture, not different and distant cultures. It 
is posited here that cultural-traits exist because of fast
or aesthetic orientational differences. Aesthetic
orientations, when micro conceptualised cloud the confusion
inherent in the definitional problems of the term,
'culture'. When generalised, 'culture' has the potential of 
becoming a macro conceptualisation, a pre-condition
essential for the development of an integrationa1 profile. 
Aesthetic orientations may best be apprec1 a ted if concepts 
of nationalism were once again brought into consideration.
The concept of nationalism predominantly takes two 
distinct forms: Cl} the political form; and C2} the
cultural form. Political nationalism, which fundamentally
derives from the spirit of 1789, contributed toward the idea
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of self-determination and sovereignty of the nation. The 
political nation strives to form its own political 
constitution and to direct its own political destiny,
characteristic of Western national self-determination. The
cultural aspect of the national ideal is associated with 
peoples whose national consciousness has grown during the 
period when they had not -yet achieved or were deprived of 
their own statehood. Cultura1 nationalism is a striving for 
national identity.
The concept of two types of the national idea has been 
termed the Hans Kohn Dichotomy.7' Such a clear-cut 
definition between types of nationalism may be criticised on 
the grounds that characteristics of both the political and
cultural national ideals are exhibited in the same culture,
and that their differences, rather than clear—cut. are mere
shades, -incorporating portions of_the other. Given this ‘ 
reservation, it is instrumental to isolate the extreme poles 
for clarity.
Both political and cultural nationalism may exist 
simultaneously, but they, in effect, compose diametrically 
opposite types of nationalism. Whereas political
nationalism is a striving for a pluralistic and open 
society, cultural nationalism stands for a closed society 
and generally an author1tarian uniformity. Political 
nat ionali sm was historically a product of the Enlightenment, 
produced by general .euphoric enthus i a sm for the cause of 
mankind. Cultural nationalism was generally a product of 
xenophobia, focused on a narrow, self-centred, antagonistic
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self-entity. Political nationalism Is concerned with
national political ends, while cultural nationalism looks 
back to the past to fundamentally non-pol1tleal but more 
emotional history and conditioned factors. Political 
nationalism developed from the idea that nations grew up as 
unions of citizens, by the will ojf Individuals, expressed In 
contracts, covenants, and plebiscites. The concept of
cultural nationalism embraces the idea of a nation as a
po111ica1 ‘un11 centring around the irrational pre-civilised 
folk concept. The political ideal is legal, rational, based 
on a concept of citizenship and contains an appeal to 
individual rights. The cultural ideal appeals to collective 
rights-and lends itself to imagination and the excitement of 
emotions. Political nationalism is characterised by
self-assurance resulting from rationalist optimism.
Cult-ural nationalism provides a'compensation for inferiority 
complexes by over-emphasising reality and a degree of
ovei—confidence.
The national feeling, which derived through the 
movement of nationalism produced an identifiable ethnos, a 
group identity.
The difference between the developed group identity 
patterns relates to the polarised bias of the ethnos, either 
political or cultural, and affords the concept of Cl) 
political aspirations which eventually formed an ethnos, as 
in England, Netherlands, or Switzerland, or C2) the ethnos 
which strives for self-determination, as in Poland and many 
Eastern European nations. Regardless of the validity of the
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dichotomy's existence in its extreme forms, what is salient, 
is the notion of common ethnos orientations. The construct 
of the ethnos, although superficially appearing compatible 
with others, may rest on radically divergent propositions.
-The common Ethnos may be aligned with the concept of 
culture, which may further be aligned with the idea of group 
aesthetics, that being, a common appreciation of things.&
If the assumption were made that integrating collectivities 
are more prone to so act when aesthetics are compatibly 
aligned, that could mean common cultures would so act more 
than non-common cultures. The politisation or lack of 
politisation of the ethnos as Kohn highlighted may indicate 
the primary obstacle placed in the way of European
Integrational endeavours. An obstacle whose difficulties 
being either implied or real, relate, to the po 1 i t ic i sa t ion;
of culture.
Homo erectus alone responds in any appreciable degree
to the stimulus of culture,"5, as he is so educable an
animal that it is difficult to distinguish between that part 
of character which has been acquired through education and
circumstances, and that which was in the original grain of
his constitution.10
It Is not possible here to isolate the singular effects 
on the Individual of stimuli; only patterns of behaviour can
be i solated. 1 1
Patterns of culture and the individual Identity are so
interlocked that both are reflections of each other. "A
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nation's culture, includes the points of view every one has
about individual social-constructs and social
relat ions .
Culture has a material and a non-material component.
It Includes artificial objects, institutions, modes of life 
or thought characterised by the group or supra-ind1vidua1 
notion. It is unique. Culture does not travel in toto into 
other cultural areas, but.may be transported by individuals 
and so become enlarged. Despite uniqueness, "no tribe is 
culturally a self-complete unit. Each is a borrower from 
others"13 to some degree and as such is a functioning 
dynamic with the various traits that compose it being 
independent, both from within and from without.
Western civilisation may be aptly considered a common
culture_and not as a composite of cultures._as national
-doctrine decrees.1^ The Component Culture traits, those 
of industry, manufacturing, economic activities and 
organisat ions, political life, education, literature, 
science and technology, art. law, ethics and idealism 
permeate the entire European entity.
"Western Civilisation developed out of Germanic 
Kingship groups and forged ahead only after contact with 
Graeco-Roman culture"13 and influences. The view may be 
taken that either Graeco-Roman influences diffused science, 
literature, architecture and law, medicine and education 
from Mediterrean areas to the North and West of Europe, or 
that the Germanic and Celtic peoples were Hellenised and 
Latinised to the extent that they chose to adopt or revive
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aspects of those Mediterranean cultures. Whatever the 
position, what is important is that between these various 
culture groups were contacts and borrowings. The assertion 
of a separate English, French or German culture is a rolero 
conceptualisation introvertedly and not system focused.
Eac-h sub-culture has borrowed traits spread from- one 
subsidiary culture area to others.16 _
Generally cultural traits spread because -of obvious 
utility and appeal. Adaptation or deletion of a cultural 
trait significantly alters the overall culture.
Modernisation, specifically the technology aspect, affects 
culture and to a great degree affects the creation of 
compatibilities, if not identical entities.17
Modernisation creates an environment both physically -
identical and mentally identical.18 A time perspective 
would suggest an inevitable cultural; convergence as 
modernity introduces the requirement for culture to 
equilibrate and accomodate advancement.19
Western Europe received from other areas most of the
more basic and fundamental elemental traits of its culture
prior to the advent of modernisation.20 Diffusion was
either slow or fast and takes on the characteristic of
pseudo-acculturation. The utilisation of fructifying 
cultural contacts is a potent and significant factor in 
cultural change. When two cultures come into contact, each
influences the other. Their influence is considerable if
the contact is sympathetic and intimate, and, even when not
mutual influences are transmitted if contact is extended
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over appreciable time.23
The beginnings of the new trend to diffusion of
cultural traits commence with the Enlightenraent22. The 
argument here is that i dent ity is individually subjective, a 
unique feeling inherent in the singular entity and as such 
is a menta lj pos it ion. The convergence of a common identity 
developed through the growing confidence in powers of human 
understanding. The acquisition of reason over traditional 
authority and tradition, the challenge to politics, theology 
and philosophy presented by science, reason over
superstition, intolerance over despotism, where related to 
the developing education and subsequent understanding of the 
masses. Commencing with the Enlightenment, it is, in 
effect, an ongoing revolution starting with the works of
Newton and Locke.'-23
- The growth of objective humanistic liberalise over
subjective authoritarian prejudice appears to have commenced 
in three areas.The three areas of change: the Social, 
Political and the Economic may be isolated as follows. Cl) 
The Social Cultural, change began with the Revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes C1685), marking the beginning of the end of 
French hegemony; and the English Revolution C1688-89) 
marking the beginning of liberty and British dominion. 
Britain demonstrated a material and spiritual lead in this 
process. The consolidation of the Austro-Hungarian
dominions C1687); the introduction of Russia into western 
civilisation C1689), with her rise to a great power C1721);
as well as with the rise of Brandenburg into the Kingdom of
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Prussia (17017 and the transfer of Spain from Hapsburg rule 
to Bourbon rule (17007, marked the beginning of an epoch of 
massive cultural change.2® (27 Pol It leal . The political 
structure of Europe changed partly by a series of wars 
(Internal and external) and struggles for colonial empire by 
chiefly England and France! and partly by the conflict for 
control of central Europe between Austria and Prussia and 
the conflict with Russian for Eastern Europe domination. A
series of national alliances and coalitions and a me 1ee
known as the Seven Years' War (1756-637 led toward expansion 
and consolidation of the British Empire, the Prussian 
Empire, and the Russian Empire, at the expense of France, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, and Sweden.26, (37 
Econom 1 c , change occurred with the tra.nsfer of wealth and 
power from one nation to another, and from one clan to
another within the same state or intra-states. The older
privileged classes lost ground, prestige, and economic
importance to the Third Estate or bourgelose. Further, 
economic change was influenced by the developing rule of a 
wealthy burgher class in the Free cities of Germany and 
Switzerland and by the birth of either democracy or a 
benevolent despotism. The latter, which while still denying 
a share in government to the people, recognised as an 
obligation the necessity to provoke the prosperity and 
happiness of inhabitants.27
These beginnings of the post-Enlightenment era, were 
the beginnings of modernity. If it were considered that 
Europe had developed separate cultures during the Feudal
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Period, these beginnings would mark, the confluence of these
separate cultures toward a common entity."^"'
If nations actually borrow from their 
neighbours, they probably borrow only what they 
are nearly in a condition to have invented 
themselves. Any singular practice of one 
country, therefore is seldom transferred to 
another, till the way be prepared by the
' _ introduction of similar circumstances.2'5' _
The commencement of rapid change provided-stimuli 
and circumstances conducive to frequent and rapid
cultural diffusion.
As "in the realm of ideas, there are neither
frontiers nor custom-houses,"30 given the modern
blending of diffusing particularities, the problem would 
be in defining anything specific that could be termed as 
belonging to a truly independent culture, and not just a
cultural trait per se.
Cultural traits are interaction variables __
operational in a differentiated social system. A social 
system consists in a plurality of individual actors 
"interacting with each other in a situation which has at 
least a physical or environmental aspect," actors who are 
fundamentally "motivated in terms of a tendency to the 
'optimization of gratification’" on the individual or 
collective level" whose relation to their situations,
including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of 
a system of culturally structured and shared "values and 
symbols."31 Such a social system is identified with
civilisation which is:
not merely mechanical improvements, and greater
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speed and comfort of living: but a force of 
social organisation in which men and women, 
thrown into close relations, are enabled by 
their diverse gifts to enrich and enlarge one 
another's lives.32
This conceptualisation of civilisation defines culture as 
the sum total of behaviour patterns, attitudes and
values, shared and transmitted by members of a given
society.
It may be that distinct constituents of a given 
cultural configuration, may within the totality of that 
civilisation "make different arrangements for satisfying 
the needs of members and those institutional arrangements 
may give rise to the kinds of social behaviour
characteristic of the given constituent,”35^ but these 
constituent entitles are sub-cultural societies, portions 
of a whole.35-' Sub-cultural societies may "make
institutiona1 arrangements which ~include a formulation of
aims and prescriptions of techniques, practices, and 
approximate timetables for passing milestones” in the
socialisation process, 35 e‘ but such action does not
necessarily qua 11 fy that sub-cultural society a_s
culturally distinct. This is so as the overriding 
cultural prescription taken by sub-cultures are directed 
by ideological orientation, and within the European 
context, ideological orientation Is highly compatible.
Ci vi11 sat 1 on ;
Essentially the European common denominator is 
civilisation. When the general functions of the concept
of civilisation are examined to determine the common
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quality causes, all the various human attitudes are 
civilised. It becomes evident that divergencies of this 
concept express the self-consciousness of the west, or 
the national consciousness. It sums up centuries of what 
Europeans (some) believed of themselves, subjectively 
superior to earlier societies or ’more primitive’ 
contemporary ones.3’7 This national aspect of
civilisation emphasises levels of technology or the 
development of science, etc.3® This conceptualisation 
compr ises only a very superficial appra isal of the 
surface of the physical world. The conceptualisation of 
the non-physical world, its component parts relating to 
thought, idea bu-il-ding and recognition of the. physical 
can only be treated with the term "culture." "Culture"
refers,_essentially,__to intellectual,__artistic, religious
facts. These facts are in sharp* relief to the political, 
economic.__or social facts of civilisation.
An objective view of world society incorporates the 
notion of a European civilisation, or indeed western 
civilisation, but only in contrast with non-European
civilisations. There are more civilised attainments
amongst Europeans in common, uniting them, than with non­
European civilisations. Likewise, world culture would
permit a European differentiation vis a vis 
non-Europeans. The interplay amongst cultural and 
civilisation variables in the globalised setting can 
permit Isolation, of differentiated macro relationships 
but the interplay amongst Europeans cannot. This requires
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a micro differentiation of relationships suggestive of 
sub-cultures. Any such European differentiation is but 
an unique arrangement of cultural-civilisation phenomenon 
and not of the phenomenon themselves. The internal 
arrangement variations are unique to the group traj/ts.
But these traits are'not sufficient enough to suggest 
separate cultures or civilisations. The differences that
do exist are sub-cultural constructs which relate to
societal groupings.
Man's subjective and his objective world are in 
constant interplay: nothing that he knows
about the universe can be disassociated from 
the facts of his own life; and no product of 
his culture is so detached from the larger 
groundwork -of existence that he can impute to 
his individual powers what_alone has been 
possible by countless generations of men by the — 
underlying cooperation of the entire system of 
nature .
The rea-son why the differentiation between :
cultural-civilisation variables exist may be attributed
to the philosophical development of man.
Man's life differs from that of most other 
organisms in that individuation has become more 
important to him than strict conformity of 
type: he participates in all the characters of
species and yet, by the very complexity of his 
needs, each individual makes a life-course of 
the species and achieves a character and 
becomes a person/'0
The more fully the individual organises his
environment, and the more skillful he becomes in
socialisation through groups, the more constantly he 
draws on his social heritage, the more does the 
individual emerge from society as unlque and independent.
The propensity amongst Europeans to insist upon
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national differentiation nay be related to the key fact
that individuals are different, unique, and independent. 
Assuming both equal accessibility of technology and 
scientific attainment brought about by modernisation 
throughout Europe, the assumption may be made that Europe 
pos-sesses a distinct civilisational and cultural- 
homogeneity. Do Europeans look at and perceive things 
differently? If so. this would be a real aesthetic
differential. If there is an aesthetic differential, is
it sufficient to categorise autonomy?
The Aesthetic Differential
The centuries-long tendency in Europe has been
toward individuation. I nd i v i dua.1 i sm is' ref lective of
relative values/"5 Roughly since the Enlightenment,
the individual “has become one" in the world, and the
individual-4 st values tend to rule “without restriction or
limitation.”^2 The tendency has been away from
unlversals and collectivism, toward individualism,
atomism, and secularism. i‘3 This tendency has led to
the contemporary operational imperative indicative of an 
open society*4* and highlights the previously 
illustrated conceptual differentiation of Gemeinshaft and 
Ge se11scha ft.•4,r-i The old Idea of collective unity or 
fellowship contrasts sharply with the newer Idea of 
representative unity where the representative is set
above the group,A& in an organisational structure.
The movement has been toward societal institutions with a
a polarisation of aesthetic differentials. Aesthetic
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differentials may be considered broadly as an ideological
orientation. Throughout time, the European world
developed a coalition in response to Napoleanic
imperialistic tendencies which after 1815 gradually
deteriorated and broke up into a condition of pluralistic
particularism. The-particularistic tendency was of such
an evident nature that the British Foreign Secretary .
Palmerston <18361) wrote that this separation was:
. . . not one of words, but of things, not the
effect of caprice or of will, but provided by 
the force of circumstances. The three and the 
two think differently and therefore they act 
di f ferently.
The fact that there developed a dif f erence in th i nki ng 
may be related to the fact that. a_t this time society was 
becoming highly structured, the most prominent
manifestation of which was the development of the modern
State. The aesthetic differentia 1s, reflected in
interests and philosophies was exacerbated by the
construction of the state and was a movement which
parameterised nations. The result was one of an
establishment of a definite link between Nation and State
or Nations Cwith generally one dominant, one or more 
subservient) and State. Palmerston indubitably referred
to the distinct posture taken by States. States, if 
considered as essentially the construct of nations as an 
autonomous self-entity, tend to exhibit self perpetuating 
ends.Ae Society, which was previously broadly
vertically i independent, with the definitional element
provided by state, became horizontally conta 1nerised
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within a set of confining structures. States tend not to
operate with the sole interest of their respective
nations as principal motivation. They act ‘'not as a 
matter of principle, but of expediency."**9 States 
appear to operate with regard to their own specific 
orientation and not necessarily with any particular 
regard to any overriding ideological or ientation.5*-’
This means that it i-s possible that arrangements 
made by States may not necessarily be due to an 
overriding concern for "community," in a Deutschen sense, 
but may be more for the achievement of some specific 
state goal, i.e., political, economic, social, or any
combination thereof .
A sense of community would follow from an
ideological and not necessarily from a political 
orientation. Given the degree of preserved differences 
between European States and the apparent desire for 
integration, the absence of an ideological orientation 
would tend to hamper the development of 'community'. 
Referring again to the Kohn Dichotomy, the politisation 
of domestic national tendencies inhibits expansion of
same .
Two positions can be stated by which this can be 
best appreciated in the context of international
re lat ions .
Cl) Posit ion one, The notion of a Balance of Power.
or the concept of an arrangement of international 
relations based on perceived gains by a minimisation of
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disadvantage. This is essentially an arrangement based on 
expediency. It is an alignment of an interest formation 
concerned with power, or security, or advantage, and has 
little to do in the first instance with ideology, it may 
be that "ideological affinities among regimes are merely 
the immediate impetus" to such lateral or-multi-lateraT 
alignments,-’-- not the enduring common locus .
C21>The second position, is one where alignments are
made upon ideological grounds as primary interest, where 
ideological, cultural or other similarities are crucial 
to forming an arrangement This position argues
fundamentally that similarities of ideology are more apt 
to be causal to multi-group arrangements than
diversities..
Position one is fundamentally related to political 
ends, a conception of a desired achieved goal as 
functioning as modus operand! for an arrangement. It may 
or it may not be related to the nation or a national
position; it is most definitely always related to State. 
Position two is that of a society orientation. It is 
directly related to the nation and the State as executor 
of the national ideal. The current integration overtones 
made by the EEC are political and thus fall into the 
first school of thought, it being a system of relations 
relating toward political goals which may or may not be 
nationally oriented. The du ut des principle is evident 
on all levels of discussion.55* The implication is
that if the second principle were the overriding
209
imperative, integrations! gains would be far more
noticeable.
Why is it that common ideology is not operable in
practice? Why is it that political considerations far
overshadow social? Referring to the League of Nations,
Ramsay Muir made-the following observation?
The League was a League of sovereign states, 
and it was definitely stated that it would not
, interfere with the sovereignty of its members.
But the purpose for which the League existed 
could not be fulfilled unless there were some 
limitations of the irresponsible sovereignty of 
its members . :s’z
In 1921, Norman Angell rioted that his pre-war
view of international affairs, his Functional idea
that cooperation between states had become essential 
for the very lives and welfare of their respective 
nation’s individuals, was no longer valid. He noted 
that cooperation no matter how essential and
apparent was not taking place because of States 
exerting dichotomous positions. He wrote of the 
Functiona1ist argument:
This line of reasoning is no longer valid, for 
it was based upon a system of Economic 
individualism, upon a distinction between the 
functions proper to the State and those peoples 
to the citizens. This individualist system has 
been profoundly transformed in the direction of 
national control by the measures adopted 
everywhere for . . . [other, most generally
domestic political purposes]/"’®
This condition, that of autonomous States acting for 
themselves he likened to individual anarchy.®^
Chapter six of this paper will look at the problems
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between the nation and the state on the honio_econqwicus, 
politicus. and soci_ujs level and attempt to analyse these 
dichotomies between the Nation and the System, but the
attention here will be drawn to the difficult conflict
between ideological orientation of the nation and
societal control of the state. " •_
Ideologic a 1 ("Aesthetic?.) Operations •
Aesthetic values relate to orientations and
orientation to belief systems.*0 In a common
civilisation confi aura tion things material operate on a 
neutral level, “Technology gives us material power, and 
this is morally neutral; it can be used at will for 
either good or evil.”*'3 The use of material objects 
demands some sort of orientation, or knowledge. Public-
collective consensus introduces the utilisation of such
objects through the concept of. morality, an ideology.
The gap between things physical and the intellectual 
abilities dictating utilisation has been termed a 
morality gap. *- Governments are aggravating this 
disparity by operating politically in a Du ut des sphere 
of action and not wholly in the ideological sphere*"' 
for short term strategic advantage or gains. The 
morality gap is directly related to the meta-need of 
intellectual security.
The morality gap may be dehumanising society by 
placing priority on achievement of wealth or status or
power in acquisition. The individual has been labeled a
homo sapien. man the wise, not homo faber, man the
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technician, because of the quality of thought which was 
noticeable, separating the individual from other forms of 
animal life. The morality gap may be placing more 
evidence on man’s material nature, rather than any _ 
cerebral attainment,''-'^ and, If this Is so, the
existence of the morality gap. demonstrates -an aesthetic" 
differential between man in society and the State's 
conceptuality, personification, and act ua 1-i sa t 1 on of 
collective society.
The_Ca^usa t i on_ o f _Ae st he t [c pifferentfals
The individuals’ alignment with the physical world
is a product of thought. The major influence on
collective t.nougnt effecting justification of the
individuals the natural world. is__rel_fgigus .
European Society exhibits common evolutionary development 
with t-h is regard but ver cultural traits.- aesthetic
orientations are evident. Thought has developed through 
exposure to stimuli/-'-' Preiudism or preference is a
result of a lack of contact with conflictlve
stimuli.*’*' As common collective thought weakened its 
bias with the idea of collective unity under
Christendom,*"'7 the role of religious orlentation was
assumed to a great degree by Nat ional ism. Through
nationalism, conflicting stimuli became orientated 
1 nt rovertedly. Religion will be used in the following
section to introduce the causalltv of aesthetic
ori entat ions.
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Societal evolution has transformed religion and 
frequently religion has been used by governments for the 
substantiation and legitlmlsation of the various raisons
d'etat. Protestantism and the counter-Reforma11 on took
religious notions in the direction of anti-feudalism by 
developing the concept of sovereign monarchal power.
These notions evolved into the concept of tne nation 
organised to promote the publ i.e weal. Generally 
speaking, tne original concept of an equal citizenry, 
united in a Joint religious participation transcending
the__ba r r i_e r _of _b£r t h , e'‘,‘ gave way to an Increasingly
Identified religious expression aligned with the
instruments of nationhood.'"’’ The utilisation of the
notions of religion allowed for a degree of. homogenat1on 
of the society by the elimination of heretics and 
dissenters to rally collectivities into a national 
collectivity. The manipulation of belief by, amongst
others, the means of forceful conversion, created a basis
for political cohesion. From this foundation emerged 
national religions and the concept of absolute
monarchs . 71
Through the period of national consolidation, the 
notion of patriotism was acknowledged as to be acceptable 
to God.72 As the Pont ifMaximus gave way to the 
Pope and Roman Law was implanted throughout Western 
Europe, the adoption of Christianity by that central 
authority anchored within the embryonic nations of Europe
universally common codes and traditions. These
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traditions became institutionalised in as much as there
became established recognisable patterns of behaviour 
characteristic of groups of people and essentially 
European society. The violation or non-observance of
such behavioural patterns caused disturbances or
discomfort because it threatened widely he-ld values.73 
Institutions are often, however not exclusively, 
important means of social control. Frequently 
institutions are given credibility by legitimisation in 
either overt repetition or formalised in law. During the 
nation-forming stage in Europe, the church was the 
dominant force in establishing institutions. It 
eventually gave way to economic institutions and later 
economic institutions have essentially given way to 
political institutions as a primary force of social 
control. Assuming a relatively free society, where no' 
particular institution becomes ascendant over others, 
there is a distinct limitation of power evidenced by a 
certain degree of resistance to absorption. In such a 
free society, rivalry amongst institutions is 
characteristic of an active society. A society, based on 
individual preference orientations, in which one
institution dominates others, especially when force or 
compulsive pressure is employed, does not lend itself to 
a situation in which human interests can afford variety. 
It is a society characterised by pre judicial
o r i e n t a. t i o n s . yThis leads to static society. It
was, by far, this lack of freedom during the early period
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of national development prior to the fragmentation of the 
universal church and the foundation of splinter national 
churches, that forced the permeation of religious ideals 
homogenously throughout Western European society.
Because of this, fundamentally individually held societal 
ideologies possess a remarkable degree of homogeneity 
during the current period of European history. The 
achieved differences, those.that .form aesthetic
differentials, formed during the early national period.
In the modern period, these differentials through 
modernity are becoming marginalised.76
The anthropological approach to society, initiated 
by Durkheim postulates a close relationship between 
social si ruet ure s and functions within given 
collectivities. This school maintains that religion 
subserved a variety of functions in society and that 
these functions were latent rather than explicit.
Religion provided occasions of reunion, the reassertion
of social solidarity and so sustained social cohesion and 
it has solemnised the social order. It is by this means 
of analysis that social control may be identified.7*’ 
Religion prescribes moral norms which are enjoined on the 
people as requirements of a higher supernatural order.
The Judeo/Chr i stian tradition prov i des specific
religiously described sanctions of behaviour. Good 
behaviour was the way to win merit in the economy of the 
Divine Order while bad deeds would incur punishments that
would be visited on the wrong-doers, perhaps in this
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world, but certainly In the life to come.77 Th 1 s
demonstrates the 1 inhibitory structure of Individual
personality which is within the sphere of
institutionalised religion. Religion sanctions the 
re1inquishment of direct impulsive gratification by an 
appeallto a symbol i-c order to the primitive cravings for 
universal protection and for cosmic participation. It 
ensures standards to which dissent in the community is
made difficult,-7® and it affords a basis for aesthetic
orientation. These assured standards throughout history
have either been the result of individual volition or
institutional enforcement. The accomodation of the early 
Roman Church gave way to an all-powerful, non-tolerant _ 
Roman church, which, in turn, gave way to a myriad of 
powerful ecclesiastical institutions through the Western
world, which in turn, since the Protestant Reformation,
have ultimately reversed back, to a fundamental 
accomodation amongst ecclesiastical institutions.
Societal order, as indeed the institutions themselves,
have become less of a pure religious organisation and
have assumed more a socio-political posture.
The social pattern of impersonal administration 
appears to have been developed in the West by 
the Church. Persons forsook, their family 
obligations and devoted theselves to the 
service of God through the service of the 
Church. In the language of social psychology, 
such persons were detached from loyalty to 
primary symboIs and attached to the service of 
secondary symbols. The practice of poverty, 
chastity and obedience was perhaps of decisive 
importance in integrating the pattern of the 
impersonal administration which is so essential 
for flexible adjustment to a variety of new
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large-scale, enterprises. The modern states of 
Western Europe were able to take over, not only 
the culturally established pattern, but in many 
cases the personnel of the Church.7"”1
The well organised comprehensive system of theology which 
is found among Western European peoples embraces a 
normative element which transcends the purely speculative 
realm. The great ideal of a- universal, cosmic, moral and 
ritual order imposes a binding obligation on those who 
acknowledge it’5,° and significantly influences those
that do not, for it is here that rules of conduct and
morals develop. 1 The ethical code of a given society-
forms a part of its normative system. The normative 
system is the system, the body of rules, legal, or 
practical, which operate as orientations within the .
system. This influences the conduct, and regulates, 
individuals in that system. The whole body of rules is 
integrated" into a unitary system and no aspect of it, no 
isolated body of norms, can be considered apart from the 
system as a whole.e,7i In the more highly developed and 
introspective religions, norms are set up which define 
for each religion the idea of a world or society 
permeated by the spirit of that religion.133 It is
because of this that Christianity has been one of the
primary and fundamental influences in the creation of 
Western European societies and its teachings and 
philosophy have acted as the basis for the development of 
Western European ideologies. The fundamental ideologies 
of the nations of Western Europe which act as a 
significant constituent part of their identities, are
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within the European experience, overall Identical;
differences are individuations reflected by aesthetics 
and operable through individual orientations.
Orientations, in terms of cultural traits do exist.
These orientations differentiate collectivities as
subsections of an overall cultural constellation.
Ideological orientations dictate the emphasis given . 
treatment of the materiaj world. At one point in time 
these ideologies when broadly sketched were more or less 
compatible. Current divergence in cultural traits today 
related to particular specifics frequently domestic. The 
mechanics may be illustrated by the case in point of 
EnglandIt s political head of .-state,- the monarch 
appoints, and thus, has control of the archbishopric of 
Canterbury, the head of the Anglican_Church, an 
arrangement developed through the period of divine right 
of kings in which the political authority subsumed 
religious authority. Subordination of religious 
authority by political authority does not have to be of 
such an overt nature as in this example or the concept of 
CUJUS REGIO, ECUS RELIGIO, It could also develop by way 
of a general evolution of many-faceted influences. ez'
Furthermore, there is and may always have been a 
continuous linkage between political and religious 
authority. In the time of Christendom where both were
exercised, more or less from the same source, effects 
were more or less equally distributed amongst Europe and
Individual Europeans. Where the political bifurcation
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from the unit resulted in separate centres of political 
power, religious unity took on a diatropic posture. This 
diatropic posture was directly related to the
individualistic turn of thought’3'® and the exhibited 
particularistic character of the State. Thought both 
encouraged and was held hostage to action. “There lare 
these who imply that sovereignty claimed and exercised by 
the State” is an undesirable thing because of its. 
psycho logi ca 1 power “to control aesthetic judgment “. e*15*
The point here is not to subjectively value 
sovereignty but to recognise its existence and the extent
of its influence on the development of aesthetic
orientations. “The Special nature of the modern state" 
allowing it to claim and exercise sovereignty relates to 
its “physical_, corporeal nature. It Is an extension of 
territory, included for its identification and defence by 
tangible, military expression of statehood, like
f ort i f I ca 11 ons and fortresses."®7 But its
impermeabi1ity goes beyond the physical dimension and
stretches into the realm of thouqht. t3>3‘ This element
of control is the major contributor toward aesthetic
diveraences amongst European peoples. The state
exercises significant influence, which if integration of 
nations of Europe is to be accomplished, must be 
overcome. It may be argued that the
sovereign-nation-state is solely an anachron i sm . e'3' If
so, the concept of a “classical nation state has perhaps
219
lost its principal raison d ' etre .
This position could be supported by the notion of
economic, political or ideological penetration from 
without. Penetration, interdependence and eventual 
dependency may be characteristics of the modern 
historical epoch.'5’1 The Aesthetic orientational 
divergences which developed during the period of state 
domination and may be evidenced by cultural traits today, 
may be converging via the penetration, interdependence, 
dependency nuvom. The idea of an anachronistic 
nation-state must holistically be considered in a time 
context. The nation as causal to the development of the 
political states both theoretically extended the mandate 
of perpetuation to the state and fell hostage to the 
state dictates, with the introduction of general literacy
due' to modernisation. The education function fell '
generally within the sphere of state control, either 
directly through administration or indirectly through 
influence, and hence the state had placed within its 
means the ability to become se1f-perpetuat ing. At its 
disposal was placed the assurance of identity control, 
through the socialisation process, necessary to 
perpetuate its devised ends. It propagandised itself 
where propaganda involves for its success an appeal to 
reason and emotion through symbolic agencies‘?2 
exercised ostensibly in the name of the nation but 
basically for its own existence.
. . the special needs which government
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satisfies or helps to satisfy are: Cl} external 
security; C2} internal order; Co} Justice; C4-} 
welfare; C5} freedom in varying forms and 
proportions, interpreted, Justified and 
elaborated in a variety of ways, in different 
times and places.93
The functions of a state through its government is 
order and security. A state accomplishes this through 
Justification, solidifying its position in-the eyes of 
its nationCs}. In effect, it makes adjustments of 
personalities to enable men to live and work together in 
the framework of the general good. "The biological and 
social heritage brings forward a broad variety of 
different types of individuals who must in one way or 
another be set in the enmeshing webs of social and 
political relations without tear I ng-themselves 
apart. This is accomplished by developing
personality by bestowing identity recognition.
Personality develops through Cl} “some interaction and C2} 
some shared values with others.913 However, the
environment must be clearly defined. Hobbes observed how
this is accomplished . . .
not only a declaration of the law, but also 
sufficient signs of the author and authority.
The author, or legislature is supposed in every 
commonwealth to be evident because he Is the 
sovereign, who has been consolidated by the 
consent of everyone, is supposed by everyone to 
be sufficiently known.96
A personality develops vis a vis an organisationa1 
community. Evidence of the boundaries of regard of the 
community are frequently supplied by the state.
This essentially required states to control and
assure their position by way of exercising that control.
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A community must have one method of settling 
disputes, and it is easy to construe this as 
requiring that there must be one and only one 
rigidly formulated law establishing a hierarchy 
of courts and legislature competent to 
pronounce on every question.97
A government acting in the name of the state, for 
and in behalf of the state may, and often is, supreme 
over their subjects, but are characteristically ‘’the
servants of circumstance and the slaves of their own
ideologies.9'’'0 The sub-cultural ideological -
differences that do_exist do so partly because of the
personification and subsequent autonomous nature of the
state,_and partly because of the mere fact of difference
i_t^se 1 f . . '
Differences exist amongst individuals, if for no 
other reason than by se1f-definition. Individuals are 
different.'5"5' Distortions singular or aggregate-’ 
occur.300 Attitudes,101 assessments,1071
procedures and adjustments1035 vary due to stimuli and 
individual. Reality, if existent and not just the 
product of perception, itself is contradictory.109 
Illusion or ha 1 luc i na t i on1053 play an important role.
An individual as self—agent exercises freedom to 
ascertain and develop a conceptualisation of stable 
equilibration in the dynamics of physical and social 
life, not just the cerebral ability to wish or to will, 
but to also put it into practice, to actualise the power 
to act successfully in the world.106 This type of
determinism comes from more than an execution of
222
transcendent and unfettered will and a knowledge of 
forces Involved. This awareness produces insight and 
imagination.107’' Correctness, integration, character,
health and survival, self-realisation, ideas, norms, 
progress, beauty, truth, reality, adjustability, and 
freedom are all individual subjective tolerations.101*' .
The result of what the literature terms 'individual
hermeneutics'.10’’' Hermeneutics which are the result
of "human action - (being) - and the product of conscious 
mental acts." By such a process, "we have produced 
immensely complex codes of religious, moral and aesthetic 
behaviours. We have, by using our ability to think, 
created complex political and economic
organizations."110 On the Individual level, groups
form because of compatible_exposure to stimuli__1 n__the
socj. a 11 sa 11 on process. Compatibilities which produce 
collated or 1entations.111 These orientations give the 
form and shape of communities along an important 
phenomenon axis of symmetry concluding in vertical or 
perceived vertical collectivity. Orientation and 
adjustments define relationships, either singular or 
group. Things look as they do. because they are 
perceived as they appear. Appearance is emotive or 
physical,11^ depending upon the stimuli. We make out 
of our world what we make out of it.1175 We constantly 
change our orientation and value.1121 And due to the 
individual's social requirements, he "learns" by 
intellection through imitation.115 The closeness of
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the group affects the homogeneous or heterogeneous
compatibility of such learning and collective
re1a tedness.
I) iscussion
■- Common values of various types can be conceived of 
as media that expand the compass of social interaction 
and structure of social relations through social space 
and time.116 They afford substance to commun ity. A 
general consensus on values amongst a given society 
serves as the basis for extending the range of social 
transactions beyond the limits of direct social contacts. 
A general .concensus of sorts aids the' developing ana 
perpetuating of social structures, facilitating 
transaction beyond the life span of individual
participants.' Value standards are: aesthetic 
orientations, views, impressions and opinions, held 
individually, which are expressed collectively. They 
function as a media of social life, transmitting and 
moulding the forms of social relationships and mediating 
linkages of social interactions. They resemble the 
concept of communication through language117 as they 
lend a tangible medium to the functioning of fluid social
i ntercourse.
Orientation through value and assessment is both 
individual and collective, and explains salient 
differentiation between individuals and between groups.
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They are either individualistic as in particularistic 
values and opinions, or collectively expressed by 
universa1istic values and opinions. What determines 
particularism or un i versa 1i sm is whether or not the 
stimuli as criterion for their development is dependent 
or independent.1113 “ The criterion which yields' 
operational concepts of universallsm or particularism is 
to a great measure developed throughout the relationships 
governed in a collectivity.11'5* As an individual's 
status affects the impact of his approval or disapproval 
of, and within as a part of, the group, adoption or 
rejection is a matter of weight given options. The
distinctive values shared within a collectivity unite
same in common social solidarity and extend the scope of
further uniting through the creation of integrative bonds 
which extend beyond personal feelings of attrac­
tion. 1:20 The particular shared values that 
distinguish a collectivity from other collectivities 
constitute a distinctive medium through which its members 
are bound together into a cohesive unit and afford that 
unit distinct and unique status within a group of like 
constructed units. The commonality of view mediates 
personal and collective bonds of attraction and 
preference. However, ’’What is common to humanity does 
not serve as a distinctive symbol of group 
identity."1*1
To illustrate, using the example of religion, "As
Christianity spread through Europe, it [took] on new
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traits with each adaptation and [lost] some old
ones.”122 It developed different forms and took, on 
different functions, but such partIcularIstic development
is not sufficient to, in terms of a m i s e e rt_scene today,
characterise that development of different Christian 
traditions as anything other than specifically cultural 
traits. In this example, Western Europe is functioning 
within the general orbit of a single civilisation with 
collected knowledge about religion CChrist1anity}. It 
exists also within a single culture with collecitve 
conceptualisations of that knowledge (theology}.
Existent cultural traits are evidenced in adaptations of 
that conceptualised knowledge (sects}. .
Culture is spread horizontally from one locality to 
another. Traits which vertically develop within 
localities are just" that. x*a-;s‘ Domestic traits, 
vertically permeating a collectivity as dem1-roonde are 
unique, but not unique enough to characterise overall 
cultural differentiation just as individuals are unique 
but do not supply sufficient enough criteria to 
distinguish anything other than traits, unique within an
overall conste1lation of similarity.
The development and acceptances of collective 
Individual traits came down to the present age through a
long history of thought, leading toward individualism.
It was the product of the freedom of judgment over the 
bondage of authoritarianism. It was propelled by the
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process of modernity. It is, in effect, fragmented 
thinking.1Europe is the custodian of both a common
civilisation and a common culture.12* The evolution
o f thought,__t he __ values assigned aspects of collect! v e
living evolved from the evolution of moral comprehension
inextricably bound up with theological transformation
from. Religious Authoritarianism to modern secularism.
The rapid change introduced within the present historic-al 
era provoked an attempt to equilibrate the system, by the 
development post 1815, of collectivities polarised around
a series of 1 dent 11y-locat i ve-polie. Such a structure of
the internationa1 system produced the environment for the 
development of vertical traits. Vertical traits afford 
identity to those confined geographically to given areas, 
who come under the same politically induced influences.
- The developed vertical i-dentitv traits became
institutiona1ised and universalised within groups and 
provided points of orientation for national
ident i f icat ion . The institutionalised State became
the steward of that nation and as such chief propagator 
of discerned particularisms.12®
The horizontal tra n sf errence of i deologi cal 
orientations became parameterised by the state and thus 
is today significantly synthetically vertica1ised, the 
state is the major inhibitor to further free
socialisation and as such the chief inhibitor toward 
further integration. Genera 1 ly1 S2'5!' for a social system 
to work smoothly, it helps to have individuals with the
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same conceptual picture of things or to believe the same 
things about matters of common interest.130 The State 
autocata lyse s , through the requirements of domestic
structural!sat ion and institutionalisation, the
internalisation of compatible conceptualisations by the 
hypertrophic propagat1on~of their collectivity.1^1 
The produced state, as a D i ng an si ch, both cuts and
divides nationalities. • By capitalising on original
ethnocentrism, modern ethnicism with associated trait
differences has created the European pattern of
uniqueness and exclusion.13® Particularistic
development, associated with politically oriented
nationalism, with its myths, memories, and symbols
(mythomoteur)133 and enforced ceritrrfugal propagation 
is essentially in thi.s respect an inhibitor toward 
further European integration.
I n Sum
Individuals are a constant. Within Europe, 
civilisation and culture are compatible. This would lead 
toward further socialised integration were it not for 
artificial reinforcement by State of particularistic 
traits. Justification of the compatibility of European 
homo erectus and of the States inhibiting posture toward 
integrated expanded society will be demonstrated in the 
following chapter, reflecting homo economicus, po11t1cus,
and soc 1 us . 13Z’
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CHAPTER SIX SECTION A
Homo Economicus •
For the attempted satisfaction of needs, the individual 
engages in activities in the process of socialisation.1 
To achieve a more optimal position, the individual 
integrates. These activities are chiefly transactions and 
the transactional dimension of socialisation is the primary 
consideration of economics. The frontier boundaries of any 
human behvioura1ist study are Indecisive as those frontiers 
are characterised by distinct fluctuations. The focus on 
economics is nothing more than a convenient way of viewing
activities. It is not hermetic.a
Provisionally the particular aspect of human behaviour
dealt with by economics is that behaviour which may be
labelled in modern and more general terms as having to do
with Business. Business has to do with production and
exchange. In this respect, it may be summarised that the
whole of economic activity of humanity Cthe most complex of
activities which is termed 'the Economic System'} consists
of nothing else but an immense cooperation of workers or
producers making things and doing things for consumers.3
The central focus of the Economic System is the individual,
or collectively as an extension of the Individual, the
group, or In the modern era, the nation/'
National men live for themselves, each one is a 
unit, self-dependent-man, as a citizen depends 
on the community of which they are a part - 
individual citizens are the numerators of a 
fraction whose value depends on the
denomi nat or, i.e., the nation.55
Interaction with the group produces group 
solidarity.Interaction amongst numerators which
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produces solidarity Is based on a concept of core values 
held in common, "'Core' values and Interests can be
described as those kinds of goals for which most people 
are willing to make ultimate sacrifices."7 Generally 
the closer the interrelations, the greater commonality of 
core values, and the greater compatibility and solida-rity 
feeling.19 Expansion of interrelations is the essence 
of integration. The root of the concept of Integration
is the Latin tangere, "to touch," and relates to
integrare, "to enlarge" and finally Integra 1 i s , "to make 
a complete unit".'55'
Functiona1ist theory supports the Integration 
in-system growth, working together to form dimensionally 
greater unity. This may have been the process which 
produced, through time, the developed, sociologica1ly 
divided entities known today as nations. However, the 
national evolution of society was conducted in an 
environment essentially lassez faire; today, this has 
changed. It may be that "a 'nation' has been cynically, 
but not Inaptly, defined as a 'society united by a common 
error as its origin and a common aversion to its
neighbors'."10 This definition has been promulgated 
vociferously through action by states. The state, taking 
custodial power over the Nation, extends itself into the 
regulation of domestic affairs, doing such by way of its
mandate to ensure internal order. In the consideration
of the transactiona1 dimension of social activities, this
necessitates a conceptualisation of economic
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GeselIschaft. The core values of a given Ge se11scha f t or 
’’core interests , . . are most frequently related to the
self-preservation of a political unit ... to ensure the 
sovereignty and independence of the home territory and to 
perpetuate a particular political, social, and economic 
system based on that territory."11
In the modern economic setting, there is a severe 
pressure exerted upon the individual to add to his 
personal wealth; 1=1 collectively the same pressures 
require States to engage in similar activities.13
Hence, the state has moved from the classical notion of
preserving the peace, ensuring the rule of law, and 
providing required infrastructure1* to leading, 
directing, and stimulating the economy. Economically, 
the state has, amongst others, shifted its position from 
a lasses fa ire status to that -of a major actor. In _ 
Europe, post war International debate was aimed at 
guaranteeing a working environment inclusive of peace 
maintenance, which developed States as major economic 
participators in multi-national society.
Preferential economic arrangements have always been
a feature of international relations.1® These
arrangements influence economic development through trade 
patterns, having likely repercussions on domestic 
economies. These arrangements, albeit In a diluted form, 
may be regarded as arrangements of economic Integration. 
The best known example Is the economic integration 
developed through the Imperial period of British world
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hegemony, which resulted in, amongst other things, a long 
tradition of cheap food in dome st i c Br itain. A more 
formal type of economic integration is a free trade area, 
membership in which produces domestic advantage by 
providing both import potential for raw goods and export 
markets for finished goods. -In a free trsTde area, member
countries undertake to remove barriers on mutual trade,
whilst retaining the right to determine the level of its 
tariffs and the severity of other trade restrictive 
practices vis a vis non-members. For Europe, the most
prominent post war free trade area to be created was that
of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
In contrast to a free trade area is a customs_un ion,
essentially an internal free trade area, but with the 
distinct difference of a common imposed joint tariff vis 
a vis third parties. The obvious post war European 
example is the European Economic Community. This further 
joint undertaking, conducted within a common market which 
endorses working toward a higher degree of economic 
Integration through coordination of domestic economic 
policies, is an Economic Union.112, Membership or 
participation by states in a free trade association, 
customs union, or economic union is taken ostensibly in
the name of national economic welfare.
Facilitating aid to the EFTA and EEC establishments, 
as well as developing general favourable International 
trade conditions, in the post war era, has been extended
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
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The kernel of the GATT arrangements is based on
non-discrlEination in trade, an agreement undertaken by 
all contracting parties.17 Although the GATT 
philosophy is opposed to preferences, it permits the
establishment of both customs unions and free trade
associations providing that there is an eventual removal 
of overall tariffs. Subscriptions to these
arrangements are undergone by states, for the achievement 
of the domestic gains implied by such action. The 
arrangements are de facto economic integrat1ona1 
arrangements and theoretically could lead, via increased 
multi-party economic activities, toward greater 
integration as in the Functional postulations.
In the German model, this may be evidenced by the
1833 creation of the Zollverein.19 However, the
unique difference between nineteenth century examples and 
twentieth century intei—state economics is that, whereas 
previously inter-state tarrlffs were the key feature, 
today, quantitative and qualitative restrictions,
exchange controls and domestic support programmes are the 
primary impediments to trade. This difference emphasizes 
the changing nature of the state. Tax, as tari f f,
previously was leveled as a source of income and as a
feature of protectivism. Today, discriminatory practices
are more directed at some domestic economic
consideration, as in jobs, rather than as revenue
production measures. To externally ensure its power
position by an economic presence, the state must have a
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functioning economy, which it seeks to protect. If a 
state maintains a relative balance of payments 
equilibrium by means of import restrictions rather than 
domestic financial policies, the removal of restrictions 
as controls, with the participation in a customs union, 
m1ght-generate a serious payments Imbalance leading 
toward a net overall deficit position. To protect its 
economy, the effective costs of an expanded market via 
membership in a trading union requires tighter internal 
financial control, meaning more government interaction 
into the classical lassez fa ire domestic economy. Hence, 
Government has been thoroughly introduced Into the Basic 
Domestic Economic equation of nations.20 '
The Governments of States tend to intervene in
economic life more extensively than previously. Taxation 
accounts for-a higher proportion of total national 
expenditure today than ever a half century ago, as a
direct result of increased national demands on states'
governments. A portion of this demand is in the form of 
propping up ailing industry through subsidies.
Subsidatlon by governments may have as its motive other 
than economic consideration (i.e., domestic political, 
etc. or external). Distribution of revenues by the 
state, is frequently motivated by political or social
reasons at the expense of economic reasons (as in defense 
spending in areas of high unemployment, etc.}.21
Thus, in the short run, Economics relates to the current
positions of the Nation22 (or a short term future
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position) and the governmental consideration tends to be 
so-called nationalistic In nature, but more aptly, 
protect1 on i st ic.23
In the long run, economic well being, or an increase 
in Per capita income, is largely due to a configuratIon
o f cultural, organisational, and 5. list 11 ut 1 ona 1
a1t 1 tu de s . 21 z‘ Culture, organisations, and Institutions 
a re very highly associated with a government's political 
status. s*-’ The dichotomy Implied is that, in the short 
run, static position, determinalistic government
behaviour influences performance. However, long term 
growth is the outcome of sociological dynamics.26 
Economic intervention by the state, in the short run, may 
or may not be economically advantageous in the long term. 
Because of electoral sensibility, short term gains are 
frequently employed at the expense of long term measures.
It is becoming increasingly more difficult for
States_to act independently of exogenous economic
factors. In an interlocking world economy, when supply 
outstretches demand, the world markets tend to go into 
cycles of contraction as individual participants are 
unable to maintain adequate consumption levels.27 
National growth rates tend to follow a regular pattern 
which20 influences the setting of priorities by the 
nation state, a pattern which, because of the political 
electorial cycle in roost Western European democracies, 
tends more frequently than not, to be short term in 
nature. They tend to focus on immediate static results
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and not on cultural dynamics. This Is In the long range 
economically restrictive as “economic dynamics Is 'the 
study of' economic phenomenon In relation to preceding 
and succeeding events."2’  The price paid for today’s 
performance must be met by future revenues and future 
revenues are the result of today’s performance.30
The macro conceptualisation of a united Europe was 
peace but the micro aim was to redress the decline of
European Influence In world economic affairs. The meso
outcome, the Free Trade Area and the Customs Union, was 
to assure domestic prosperity while keeping abreast of 
foreign, non-European economies.
“It was clear that Europe would finally lose its 
hegemony of world power''--1 because of the economic 
situation brought to a head by the events of the 1939-45 
war. The position was basically one-of economic 
deterioration as Cl) foreign Invisible Income 
disappeared, C2) productivity declined Cdeclinlng exports 
resulting In increased Imports to maintain a tolerable 
living standard) C3) terms of primary products Cfood, raw 
materials) became less favorable, and C4) doubling of the 
price level.3-21 This post war condition fostered 
domestic part 1c1 pat1 on In regional organisations with at
least a tacit concurrence to maintain standards. This
was required to provide the domestic units with the
wherewithal for Individual advancement. The forces that
actuate individuals, keeping Individuals productive are 
forces which aid the Industrial economy as a whole -
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acquisition, service, Interest In others, and self, or a 
combination which relate to the attainment of physical or 
psychological needs and subsistence.33 The average 
Individual with a degree of enlightened self-interest is 
the homo economicus. The State, in the process of 
organising economic affairs for some reason other than 
the overall long term good of the homo economicus, may 
be, in the long run, not enhancing the individuals' best 
future possibilities.
The homo economicus requires an adequate array of 
circumstances to allow him the opportunity of
maximisation. This is in essence the new role of the
state. Advanced modernisation makes mandatory labour 
divisions, the advantages of which cannot adequately be 
achieved through governmental intervention.3^
The western economic philosophy places the onus of 
performance on the shoulders of the individual. "The 
incentives to private gain, however poorly . . . [with
regard to ethical considerations . . . do] provide some 
stimulus to effort and economy." If it is removed or 
partially suspended and replaced by orders from the 
centre, "there is no certainty In the nature of things 
that the machine will continue to work smoothly."3"-5 
Activity and private goods are called into being by the 
market as "the sums in the hands of the consumers and . ,
. proportionate claims on the services of the factors of 
production."36. The more the state intervenes and
centralises, the less adaptable to market condition, and
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hence the less viable the consideration,37
As world economic performance fluctuates in cycles, 
the more centralised the Industry the less adaptable to 
change. In other words, the greater the governmental 
intrusion into the market, the less is the ability of 
free -market forces to control development. This - 
emphasizes the difficult role of government especially in 
light of its political sensitivity,3® an endemic 
instability inherent in the capitalistic system.
Background
It is generally agreed that it was the
Industrial revolution, in the sense of the 
general adoption of improved technologies of 
production based on t'he deliberate application 
of scientific knowledge to a wide range of 
agriculture and Industrial problems, that
. permitted the relatively rapid and continuous 
growth of real incomes per head In countries 
that are today regarded as 'advanced' or 
'developed'.3'5’ .
The effective beginnings of the transformation can be 
placed in eighteenth century Europe.^0 The revolution 
was not the product of any one 'revolution' as such but 
was the product of the synergies of technology permeating 
all manufacturing and production, Indeed, permeating all 
of the life of homo economicus.1 Change, a
willingness to depart_from time honoured tradi11ona11sm
accelerated with each success and diffused into ever
widening areas as appl1 cationa1 results challenged
convention. Technology and science engulf all of human 
society in uniquely new historical epochs.2'2 The
Interrelatedness of cross-society connections,
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transference of knowledge, results of application plus 
market, absorption, production and raw material supply, 
etc. commenced noticeable cyclical relations between 
European states. Within these cyclical relations, the 
local economy became less autonomous and more interlocked 
and interdependent.'1’3 It can best be described as a 
new 'spirit* motivated by a new look at
traditionalism.^" As modernity advanced, linkages
started to result In trade—off cycles between states, a 
cause, effect, cause relationship of booms and slumps 
occurring regularly where a rhythm of industrial activity 
was created as phases of prosperity giving way to phases 
of depression. The cyclical trade-offs were causal to 
great social restructuring, centralising poverty, 
relocating populations, disrupting or producing new 
markets and resource supply.""' A great upheaval ' 
creating a new total control of wealth'**’ necessitating 
ever greater governmental control and intervention within 
the domestic and external sphere."7 The State as 
regulator, guarantor of_'freedom', became more and more
the state of control.
Economic development that started through a series 
of fortuitous circumstances in England spread rapidly 
throughout Europe. This development created the need for 
economic planners who became increasingly “aware that the 
ingredients of economic growth are more than mere 
physical quantities of labor, domestic capital, foreign 
exchange, and so on.""® A host of intangible elements
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affected the psychological and social climate of an 
economy- The climate became the responsibility of 
government and its worries became the worries of the
State . ‘£* The transformation of State was brought
about by change. “Change implies that something is 
happening through time-and that what was true at one time 
point is different at a subsequent time point.11’2''0
The diametric growth of means of transportation, 
communication, and exchange of goods, money, and ideas 
has helped bring about an unprecedented "inter­
connectedness” between societies; the development of
closer and multi-dimensional contacts between societies
constitutes one of the fundamental forms of systems 
change in the twentieth century.551 The new 
international system had as chief actors a 
collection55* of states, each attempting to control its 
domestic environment by mediating difficulties whilst 
ensuring its legitimate sovereignty and external 
bargaining amongst more or less peers for advantage and 
whenever possible influence, dominance or control.
The texture of economic considerations was
transformed, a transformation characterised from one of
basic simplicity to one of extreme complexity. The 
control and dominance of States through governmental 
organs and institutions made the extreme complexity of 
economies vulnerable to exogenous considerations. As the 
domestic economy became more open to other than purely
economic notions, it became subject to political motifs.
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Not only were economic systems becoming sensitively aware 
of externalities, governments were also. Any effort “to 
make decisions purely in terms of short-run national 
advantages - increasing national autonomy - . . . [were
resulting] ... in trade wars, currency instability, 
.decline of investment, unemployment, and ultimately 
recession or depression."53 The apparent necessity 
was that of somehow regulating inter-societal relations. 
"Transaction flows, mutual responses, shared values, and 
the like” which are part and parcel of, and needing, 
regulation “are posited as necesary conditions for the 
creation of security communities.,,S5Z* For the domestic 
economy to function optimally it became necessary to 
secure economic relations assuring some sort of advantage 
within a community. The psychological environment for
economic progress -needed definitions as it is this 
consideration, which provides the core stimulus to the 
individual participants.
“The emotional commitment to 'Europe' was an 
important part of the milieu in which plans for the
Common Market were launched.,l:5'5 The Common Market was
seen as a possibility for “the creation of conditions 
under which stable peaceful relations among nation states 
are possible and 1 i ke ly. ”S5'S’ The peaceful relations or 
broadly "the search for peace justified the intellectual 
pursuit1"57 of defining new patterns of i nterna 11 ona 1 
cooperation. “The most compelling appeal of regionalism
is that the rise of regional communities may provide a
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stepping-stone on the way from a world of a hundred-odd 
states to a world of a stable and just peace."5,13 The 
Community, via economic interest was seen as not only an 
expansion of economic interests, but also of political 
interests. The tie between the economic and political 
spheres of activity merged. The Community concept ’’made 
it possible for Europeans to enjoy the fruits of a large
market and customs union while at the same time
sacrificing neither cultural identity nor political 
authority. Coalitions are critical; the
complexities of pluralistic decision-making compound the 
economic problems coalitions are intended to ameliorate. 
"Talk of a tri-lateral world - the United States, Europe 
and Japan - is fashionable today; but the economic 
indicators suggest it is rapidly becoming even more 
complex mult1-lateral world with overlapping networks of 
common interest groups."60 A tri-polarity suggests an 
economically unified Europe,61 such creating an 
environment for the protection of influence of smaller 
parties within a coalition of Europe. An economic du ut 
des self-defense necessity, on a shrinking globe.
Economics, in a theoretical sense, probably is the 
most highly elaborate, sophisticated, and refined 
discipline dealing with individualisation.62 
Economics deals with action within a given institutiona1 
role structure, the process of allocation of resources, 
i.e., "labour power" and facilities within the system.
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Further, it deals with the motivational process of 
balancing advantages and costs with special reference to 
the settlement of terms and with a given role structure 
and a given set of power conditions.153 The _
institutional role structure is defined by government 
action, ‘’the harmony which is being realised is therefore 
a 'created harmony’, created by intervention and by 
planned coordination of intervent ions. ’It is the 
opposite of the natural harmony of the old liberal 
philosophers and theoreticians."6"' Planning is an 
adoption of environmental conditions to a best possible 
arrangement. The best possible is defined frequently by 
Governments' motives which may or niay'not be consonant 
with individual long term goals.6® The extension of
the economic area in terms of the EEC for those member
states or the'EFTA respectively is an attempt to achieve 
a degree of best possible arrangements for the domestic 
participants. Specifically, the EEC is
revolutionary,66 but in many respects it is not
achieving Diuch.67 The interlocking economics of
advanced economies66 is irrefutable. The need is for
coordination, but is coordination that of government aims
or of individual aims?
Some sort of economic coordination was behind the
creation of the European Community. The need was 
essentially that of an expanded market for technology, 
induced increases in domestic production brought on by 
economies of scale. But creation of such a homogeneous
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customs union was also causal to a more vulnerable
trading area for most noticeably American manufactured 
goods motivating a rush to ’’corner" the European market. 
The rush to corner provoked the Impassioned outcry of 
many, most noticeably Servan-Schrelber69 who spoke of 
the possibilities of American penetration dominating 
European economies with effects on growth rates,
Investment securities, and distri but ion of national
incomes affecting European political, social, and
cultural considerations by "secret meetings" between Wall 
Street bankers and European cabinet ministers. The well 
documented history of the EEC70 is one characterised 
by attempts •to develop a degree of economic coordination 
vis a vis U.S. domination, a focus on a struggle for
economic viability vis_a vis the capitalist giant
America.71 The need, partly motivated by the nations 
of Europe Ci>e., employment, consumption) and partly by 
the States (prestige, power) was there and recognised by 
the elites of Europe. The kudos of its success can be
attributed to these elites; its failure can be attributed
to the lack of political will,72 The most prominent 
failure may be illustrated by the lack of ability to 
institute a common currency.
Di scuss ion
One of the European Communities is
the European Economic Community. The idea was a common 
market, a place for the distribution of goods. This 
necessitated a degree of consensus relating to the medium
253
of exchange, the currency and its value. An economic 
community is more than Just a trading market. Sales is 
one part of an overall considerat ion of resource 
allocation, employment, and production. The intent to 
coordinate and harmonise was called for and implied 
within the coBsffiunity.73 However, the actual i sat ion 
proved sufficiently difficult to limit such coordination. 
The importance attached to the question of the
introduction of a European currency is such that it 
consistently remained at the bottom on the list of 
importance by polled Europeans.7^ In a 1974-75 
survey, carried out by the European Omnibus Survey the 
following was produced after polling device segments 
randomly selected of the European countries.73
TABLE 6.1 -COMPARISONS OF ATTITUDES TOWARD A SINGLE 
EUROPEAN CURRENCY (expressed In percent of those 
respond ing}
1974-75 1976
For 54 50
Indi f ferent 22 7
Aga i nst 24 43
Information adapted from Table .10, p. 18,
EuroBarometer, No. 23, June 1985, Commission of the 
European Communities, Brussels.
The proportion of interviewees In favour of a single 
European currency remained relatively constant at 50% in 
1976 and 54% In 1974—75, but the percentage of those
against significantly increased. There may have been a
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psychological problem in the polling as the questioners 
used the word ‘'creation” of an European currency 
connotating the supresslon of a national currency. The 
result of this massive swing against the creation of a 
single country lent motivation to the creation of the 
European Currency Unit CECU) as-a prototypical currency 
and its success relating to its acceptance was tested in 
1985 with a-new formulated question emphasizing the ECU 
functioning a loners ide domestic units.
TABLE 6.2
COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE REPLACEMENT OF A 
NATIONAL FOR A EUROPEAN CURRENCY AND THE USE OF A 
NATIONAL ALONGSIDE A EUROPEAN CURRENCY Cexpressed in 
percent of those responding)
To the answer of the Eurobarometer question in 
1985^ of .
—would you be for, against, or not mind either way 
if your national currency were replaced by a 
European currency? _'
and -
—would you be for, against, or not mind either way 
if, as well as the existing national currencies, one 
could freely use a European currency which would be 
acceptable in all the countries of the European 
Communit ies?
Replacement of / Use of
national
nat iona1 by / alongside Euro-
European currency / pean currency
1976 1985 / 1985
For 50 35 / 63
Indi f ferent 7 24 / 18
Aga i nst 43 41 / 19
Source: Adapted from Tables 10, 11, p- 18,
EuroBarometer, p. 23, June 1985, Commission of the
European Communities, Brussels.
There was evidence of a strong shifting from
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support to indifference. This suggests the trend
first noticed in 1975; i t is easier to support a
European currency when no danger to the domestic is
perceived, an evidence o f the psychological
importance of currency. 77 The evidence of this
is that the stronger the national currency on the 
foreign exchanges, the greater the attachment to it 
by domestic populations. In the spring of 1985,. the 
European Barometer results showed the following.
TABLE 6.3 - COMPARISON OF ATTITUDES TOWARD THE 
REPLACEMENT OF A NATIONAL FOR A EUROPEAN CURRENCY 
AND THE USE OF A NATIONAL ALONGSIDE A EUROPEAN 
(expressed in percent of those responding)
Replacement-of - / Use of national
national by Euro- / alongside Euro­
pean currency / pean currency
Germany Italy / Germany Italy
For * 15 . 63 / 46 : 80
Indifferent 25 20 / 30 13
Aga Inst 60 17 / 24 7
Source: Adapted from Material in EuroBarometer, No.
23, June 1985, Commission of the European Counci1,
Brussels and Europe as Seen by Eur■opeans , Periodical
4-1986, European Documentary Series. Luxembourg,
.1986, pp. 19-20.
In the spring of 1985, the Deutsch Mark was 
relatively stronger than the weaker Italian Lira. A 
breakdown of the public polled by the Community showed 
that age had no effect, but men with better than average 
education, higher incomes, and more responsible jobs were 
more pro and likely to support a common currency than 
those not so well educated, incomed, or employed. 
Collective thinking regarding a common currency is
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directly related to expectations or Image perceptions of 
domestic performance. On the government level, as 
Interlocking currencies would prohibit the domestic 
States* use of one of its most influential controls 
through fiscal policy, It Is also not highly 
underwritten.7,1 The problems of fluctuating currency 
rates exacerbates the difficulties of such things as the 
Common Agricultural Policy'30 and Balance of Payments.
To adopt a European currency would require states to 
totally coordinate and harmonise economic policies 
effectively surrendering economic sovereignty. On 
December 12, 1975, the Belgian Prime Minister, Leo
Tlndemans, filed with the governments of the Member 
States, a report on European Union at the Paris Summit 
proposing a series of measures which Included a common 
economic and monetary union.01 It highlighted the 
necessity for economic union but because of 
operat1ona11ty problems it was never adopted. Such a 
step would have been, In effect, a prescription to change 
an International system. Its adoption would have led to 
a marked Increase of integration; its failure suggests 
d1s1ntegrat1on.02 To change an 1nternat1ona1 system,
In this case, an institution, has to do with the
relationships between actors and the perceived Interests 
of governments.°3 Currency coordination is clearly 
not evident. The operational imperative is d > ut des.
The establishment of the Common Market gave the
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European economy room to develop, particularly as it case 
at a time of worldwide general economic expansion in the 
post war era, fueled by low energy costs and exchange 
rate stability under the Bretton Woods accord. The 
change seen by the Community has been a decline of many 
traditional industries and the increase for markets by-
the slow industrialisation of Third World economies. . The
Community's lag was exacerbated by its slow replacement 
of traditional solutions by application of 
technologically new solutions.®^ The recession 
initiated by the third oil crisis demonstrated the fact 
that the European Community was less successful than its 
main competitors in adapting to change. The Community 
has seen its share of world manufactured exports decline, 
while the U.S. maintained its share and Japan increased 
its-share to become a significant world economic 
part i c i pant. eS5 The main cause of European industrial 
decline in overall product ivity is demonstrated by 
inadequate investment seen by the fact that vis a vis 
Japan with five million and the U.S. with nineteen 
million, the European Communities have only produced two 
million new jobs between 1973 and 1983.&e> This 
demonstrates the fact that European governments were 
apparently interested in someth!ng other than long term 
growth, expansion, and development.
Economic Protectionism87 of regional markets from 
unwanted competition is not the optimal solution. The
solution is a unified internal economic posture. If
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currency evidences the lack of coordination, the
magnitude of the problem would require a further attempt 
to achieve cooperation if European Economics does not 
become subsumed by the dictates of ’’secret meetings” of 
non-European actors. The overall object of stabilising 
European economic influence in world economic affairs 
caused the Community to adopt the notion of a unified
European internal market. The Single_Europe Act was
designed to establish a true multi-sided economic union 
to achieve a viable European community in a tripolar
economic world. Under the terms of Article 2 of the
Treaty of Rome, the Community Is Intended to promote 
’’throughout the Community a harmonious development of 
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, 
an increase in stability, [and] an accelerated raising of 
the standard of living.” This objective is achievable 
today only via the assumption of a corresponding position
within World Economic affairs. In economic terms, it is:
self-evident that a large market without 
internal frontiers could not be completed or 
operate properly unless the Community had 
instruments enabling it to avoid Imbalances 
interfering with completeness and inhibiting 
the growth of the Community as a whole.6363
The necessity of a greater degree of coalition was 
remarked upon by the President of the Common Market, M. 
Delores.0'5* ”It is the pace of economic integration 
that will determine the outcome of the world race against 
the clock on which European survival depends. This Is 
why we have changed gear,” referring to the new act.
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“The Community . . . must assert Itself at home by
finding lasting solutions rather than stop-gap 
palliatives. ,,'5’°
In Sum
With sufficient enough interests in common allowing 
individuals to so do, they generally integrate. -
Historically, this was demonstrated in economic terms 
with the Zol1vere i n, an economic arrangement which 
allowed for the expansion of Interests through the 
mediation of economic needs in the form of an expanded 
collectivity. The creation of the Community was an 
attempt to apply that model to the pan-European 
community.9,1 The model supports the theory tJhat
increased transactions lead to increased tolerance for,
and eventual identification with, others. The German
model was a total economic model;.the European
application, at least until the Introduction of the 
Single Europe Act, is but an expanded Common Market.'5'31 
Another difference is that Europe today is a compilation 
of expanded sovereign states whose Interests go well 
beyond the maintenance of geophysical parameters. Its
internationa1ist activities are more extensive than the
essentially lassez fa ire of pre-1870 Germany.93 An 
attempt to neutralise these difficulties motivated the 
Single Europe Act
How does the Community consider that the 
amelioration of the divergent members states' economic 
positions can be considered to achieve the goal set out
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In the act? Rhetoric is more abundant than operational 
solutions. Overall harmonies develop in the Community 
through the strengthening of its economic and social
cohes ion.
Such coordination serves as the framework for 
an economic policy consensus at Community level 
pinpointing t-he course of action to be put into 
effect at national level by appropriate 
decisions that will in turn contribute to a 
closer convergence of Member States’
economies.9^
The fact that such programmes are still largely 
imperfect and certainly inadequate highlights their 
complexities. The major obstacles often termed ’national 
interest’ are fundamentally domestic political 
interests^95 The homo economicus, motivated by his 
individual needs, reached out and pulled the State into 
his life, by a desire to regulate the environment for him 
4:o achieve a relative equilibrlun.96 As modernity 
continues, the state is rapidly becoming more 
restrictive. Because of its controlling nature, 
alternative solutions open to the individual are 
encumbered by lack of readily assessible alternatives
and, to a great degree, knowledge.
CHAPTER SIX SECTION B
Homo Politicus
“The life of most human beings since the beginning of 
time has been mainly taken up with gaining food, shelter, 
and clothing for themselves and their families.”1 These 
activities, as the subject of political considerations, 
define the actions most prevalent in society.The 
process of socialisation allows for the accomplishment of 
these activities. Integration allows for the greater 
definition of Interaction, an equilibration for a more 
optimal satisfaction of needs. The formal parameters around 
society, the structures of which allow for the abatement of 
economic needs, are essentially the political structures of 
society. Han is an economic animal; he is also a political
animal.3
To a great degree, history moves forward by the clashes 
of conflicting interests and outlooks,'* but the outcome - 
of conflict in a regularly growing society is likely to be 
governed by ultimate cons 1 derat ions of communal
contInuity.® It is argued, for example,
that things get done gradually only between 
opposing forces. There is no such thing as 
self-restraint in people. What looks like it 
is indecision. ... It may be that truth is 
best sought in the market of free speech, but 
the best decisions are neither bought nor sold.
They are the result of disagreement, where the 
last word is not ’I admit you’re right,' but 
'I've got to live with the son of a bitch, 
haven't I?'fo
This is the process of adjustment and accomodation. It 
is the substance of political considerations.
Changing economic considerations, and changing
economic inter-relations have a direct bearing on the
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political structures of society and the political 
relations between nations.7 The centralised intensity 
demanded by modern1 sation created a much more formal and 
structured society than that of the Pre-modern 
period.0 Achieving in essence a greater politisation 
-of issues, a change in legal and political i n-st i t ut i ons 
and social ideology.The concept of the individual, _ 
the major Grecian legacy towards European thinking10 
and its conceptualisation as it passed down from Roman 
times, has underwritten the democratic model upon which 
Western European political structures are based. The 
unique cultural traits regard ing spec ific adoption of
those broad ideals are the hallmark 'of individualistic
European societies. These unique cultural traits provide
•:v
a general differentiated system defining instrumentally 
oriented society in valuing the definite plurality of 
interacting actors. The developed political traits as 
demonstrated by inst1 tutiona1 patterns, constitute a set 
of value orientation patterns relative to a specifically 
structured interaction situation defining Cl) the 
individuals' goal attainment process C2) exchange 
relations C3) and overall cooperative relations.11 
The value orientation pattern of European culture had its 
common origins in the Grecian-Roman world and was passed 
down through association with elements in subsequent 
political cultures to the modern Europeans, inculcated in 
legitimate institutions incorporated within states.12
The complexion of political action has changed
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radically in post-modern history. Originally it was 
concerned with the organisation of society, emphasizing 
attempts to maintain what was felt to be an equilibrium 
among either individuals on the micro level or states on 
the macro level. kn equilibrium supported by shifting 
alignments and accomodations among individuals or groups 
relating to either real or perceived power.13 The 
momentum was on control through stabilisation. Today, 
with the system-inherent complexity, the expansion of 
control issues has gone beyond that of maintaining an 
equilibrium tolz‘
economic issues related to the scope and terms 
of trade,, economic development has emerged as a 
major goal . . . [domestic-politica1
considerations seem not to assume greater 
importance in foreign policy decision making]
. . . and, the norms of international behaviour
have expanded considerably beyond a focus on 
the use of force to questions of the most '
equitable distribution of welfare and the ~ 
expansion of economic well-being.1®
The exponential increase of both populations and 
knowledge require greater political penetration into the 
very intimate lives of individuals.1® Formal
structure is the characteristic of the modern age.
Highly formal structured societies are, generally 
speaking, highly modernised societies or ’’high mass 
consumption" societies.17 In political
conslderatIons, the ratio of inanimate to animate sources
of power10 defines modernisation. The higher the
ratio, the higher is the degree of modernisation and the 
greater the formal structure. It has been suggested that
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the degree of structuralisation necessary due to the 
needed societal accomodations to the demands of modernity 
posits society “between two ages," between the political
nation state and some sort of unknown future.1'5' In
other words, politically, society is outgrowing its 
present structural parameterisation.
Social change, primarily the result of economic
change, is both profoundly affected by, and itself
effects, political change. The causation of these
multiple and inextricably linked changes is
modernisation. Despite the elastic consonance of the
interlinkages, political change as an Independent
phenomenon may be isolated by its characteristics.20
First, it involves the rationalization of 
authority: the replacement of a large number
of traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic _
political authorities by a single, secular, -
national political authority.
Secondly, political change:
involves the differentiation of new political 
functions and the development of specialized 
structures to perform those functions. Areas 
of peculiar competence ™ legal, military, 
administrative, scientific - become separated 
from the political realm, and autonomous, 
specialized, but subordinate, organs arise to 
discharge those tasks.
Thirdly, political change:
involves increased participation in politics by 
social groups throughout society and the 
development of new political institutions - 
such as political parties and interest 
associations - to organize this
part i c i pat i on. 2ii
This is a general model of political growth and
change resulting in a general character change by
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government, one shifting from la tssez f a ire to one of 
greater interest awareness and Influence. With political 
modernisation, individuals in society become, with 
increasing frequency, not only more cognizant of
po11tica1/governmenta1 processes, but feel the influences 
of that pressure.22 The injection of political 
considerations, to an ever increasing degree, into the 
functioning of the socialisation project is due to the 
increase in transaction and contact among individuals. 
Externally, the politicalisation of inter-state
activities is likewise due to Increased controls.”
The first phase of political expansion is essentially 
that of interdependence.2"4 I.interdependence .is led by 
the cumulative effects of both the development and 
application of Knowledge through scientific and 
technological expansion. Cumulative knowledge knows no 
geographic boundaries and hence is essentially
transnational . 3155
No matter where . . . the technological
innovations emerge . . . the economic growth of
any given nation depends upon their adoption.
In that sense, whatever the national
affiliation of resources used, any single 
nation's economic growth has its base somewhere 
outside its boundaries - with the single 
exception of the pioneering nation, and no 
nation remains the pioneer for long.a&
Given that the "normal expansion of science that we have 
grown up with is such that it demands each year a larger 
place in our lives and a larger share of our
resources,"27 governments via political actions have
sought greater control of individual and collective
266
endeavours. The well-being of the nation, which now 
depends on a finely tuned social system engaged in 
economic activities, requires greater coordination.20 
If both the internal- and international political 
dimension is changing, is this structural or character?
Is the nature of politics changing, or are the outward 
manifestations changing? What is the political 
considerat ion? _
Politics has to do with the po1i te s,the
citizen. The citizens’ organisation in structural society 
is political Cpoliteiaj. Essentially the aims of society 
are those derived from needs. Primarily needs have to do
with the basic assurance and maintenance of life, with
its existence. The forms of its existence, are results
of society's seta-need structure. _
Political needs may best be summarised by the notion
of security. Primarily, political security deals with 
the minimalisat ion of danger. Meta-need political 
security deals with the marginalisation of anxiety.30 
The security dealing with the minimalisation of danger 
directly correlates with the overall object of collective 
living, the defence of the individuals, the defence of 
the collective structure of society. The marginalisat ion 
of anxiety deals also with economic security and extends 
to all other organisational patterning of social
interaction to facilitate same.251 The traditional
concept of security, military strength, is perhaps the
oldest consideration for the unification of individuals
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into collective structures. Strong bows, fast boats, 
high walls, all demanding coordination in defence were 
replaced by an ever increasing sophistication of weaponry 
conjunctural with the advance and accumulation of 
knowledge. The technically induced urgency of security 
“through political . . . gestures and institutions" has
caused "men's remoteness from modern life** to become
"exacerbated."32 Remoteness is akin to the
aforementioned 'morality gap'. It is a conflict between 
the social and the institutionalised political element of 
soc iety.
Working together to achieve a degree of security by 
cooperative functioning, es-sentially a security 
community, is correlated highly with integration. Such 
integration is evident when individuals on the group 
level, or states on the inter-state level, forego the use 
of violence as a means of settling their potential 
differences. Working together can be identified by way 
of the process when the range of transactions as well as 
the presumed results of those transactions constitute 
integration.33 The traditional conceptualisation of 
government, on the internal level, that of peace keeper, 
is maintained through security agencies such as the 
police. A western European government's position is 
enforced by the triadic considerations of sovereignty, 
loyalty, and legitimacy. Externally, governments are
concerned with the achievement and maintenance of a
best-possible situation vis a vis third parties.
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Externally, ’’militaristic, ioat erial 1 st ic , and scientific 
forces have been organised to impose the will of one 
section of the human race upon another, regardless of any 
question of right and wrong.1’3'’'' In an international 
sovereign state system, a ’’fragmented” system of human 
society,355 stability can only be introduced by 
bringing states into some sort of organic union. Where 
previously strength generally determined dominance, 
technology has brought mankind In artlculo mortis with 
the event of new weaponry technology. The interesting 
result is that any necessary effort to organise society 
must seek alternatives to that of strength alone.
There are two essential ways of organi-sing society, 
both-of which are political in nature. 1) The first of 
these ways organises through force, political
considerations, structures, organisations, or
authoritarianism. 2) The second employs no force; it
organises through ethical Cas in religious!) or mores 
considerations The polity of society, the scheme
of its arrangement, must be grounded on an overriding 
principle. If force is out of the question, arrangement 
without force is the option. Ethical considerations are
constructed upon common interests.3 This sort of
arrangement fundamentally results in international law. 
International law is essentially a series of bilateral or 
mult 1-latera1 agreements to which sovereign states 
restrict themselves. It is an ethical approach to
organised society based on minimum force. A type of
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reciprocity agreement in harmony with the spirit of the
times as measures of retaliation or force are not.30
The Idea of being between two ages, between the
authoritarian state and the free association-of like
minded individuals is suggested in literature.
Modern culture is drawn on too*large a scale, 
is of too complex and multiform a character, 
requires the cooperation of too many and - 
various lines of inquiry, experience and 
insight to admit of its being confined within 
national frontiers, except in the case of 
insufferable coupling and retardation.3'5'
For clarity, if the two political positions were
isolated in the extreme, on the one hand would be that of
authoritarianism, and on the other, some sort of moral
concensus.- Simply 'stated, physical versus mental. The 
former is based on restraints, prohibitions and duty; the 
latter_on knowledge and atttendant .responsibi1ity. The 
aforementioned morality gap, suggests the tending 
divergence between governmental action and individual 
perceptions. ". . . distancing of the moral self from
the governments of modern states jaust not be confused 
with any anarchist critique of the state.,,z+o It is
the natural extension of the effects on the individual of
technological induced modernity vis a vis slow to change 
institutional governments.
It is fundamenta1ly a change in aesthethic
orientation akin to a new value revolution.
As the common denomination of reason diminishes, 
government must apply more authoritarian pressure to 
maintain its position. As it has been previously argued,
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the stove away from common Christendom has been causal to 
the loosening of common mental reasoning which was 
instrumenta 1 in keeping society unified through common 
morality orientation. This has moved toward more 
governmental authoritarianism witnessed by the extensive 
proliferations of the origins of government and their 
physical control on society.
Originally "both our general culture and our 
academic philosophy (were) in central part the offspring 
of a culture in which philosophy did consolidate our 
central fora of social activity".*41
The tendency latterly has been towards
authoritarianism. - . . _ .
. . . the relationship between ideology and
power is viewed-----not as causal but as
contingent, with ideology being essentially a 
-doctrine of political power-which 
simultaneously defines the ends, outlines the 
methods for their fulfillment, and mobilises 
support. . . .<e<2
Without a commonality of ideological orientations, 
authoritarianism expands. This shift may be demonstrated 
by looking at security.^3
Is the need for security that which previously 
caused feelings of solidarity, that which motivates the 
same today?***4 Fear, an emotion excited by danger or 
the apprehension of danger*455 has at different times 
and places in human existence been triggered or 
aggravated by different things, the idea of hell, the 
idea of hunger, the idea of hegemony. Eellgion, the 
great mediator of fear, in previous times is, often more
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than not, today pursued for its social rather than soul 
sparing value/"6 Religion is a cause for which few 
are willing to fight in Western Europe today.The 
salience of this is that religion sets moral tone. It 
contributes to hope, standards, orientation, and 
perspective. Its lack, is related to the opposite of 
these conditions,^3 a general pessimism. Fear of 
hell, fear of hunger, the fear of hegemony are all on the 
wane. It may be directly related to the lack of first 
hand exposure, making perception more difficult.^"*
The tendency is such that, the further removed from World 
War II and conflict and hunger, the less viable those 
concepts are as value orientations. “Security, like so 
much else, is taken for granted when things go 
right.“5SO There appears to be a greater “fear” of 
nuclear' weapons than of war itself, perhaps because of 
the theoretical possibility of error and the like of 
Chernobyl.5551 Concern for environment, acid rain, 
unemployment as well as nuclear contamination are new 
“fears," which may be replacing the old fears of the post 
war era. In 1984, Harris polling determined that 
Europeans feel the major responsibility for worldwide 
tension may be attributed to the United States.--531 In 
1985, a sample of German youths between the ages of 16 
and 29 found that 49% believed USSR General Secretary 
Gorbachov honestly wanted peace, opposed to 46% for 
American President Reagan. In the same year, another 
sample found that 55% wanted equally strong cooperation
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with both the Soviet Union and the United States,
emphasising the message of change.153 This nay be
characterised as an equidistance syndrome, where
polarised political, Ideological and systemic conflict no 
longer holds salience to perceived Individual freedoms 
and liberties It may be that a general lack of
commitment amongst European young no longer holds the 
values and concepts of freedom, common heritage, - 
civilisation, the rule of law and stability In the same 
light as did those of the immediate post war era who 
formulated them in the NATO preamble. Traditional values
resulted from traditional value orientations. The
religious structure of Western European society offered
the fundus for traditional value orientations. If
concepts of frugality, diligence, discipline, piety, 
sexual restraints are changing, it may be a sign of the 
lack of those traditional value orientations being 
considered operational, evidenced in a changing moral
tone . =i!5
plicuss Ion
The divergencies of governmental Interests and the 
Interests of nations say be evident in the consideration 
of things nuclear. Although Euratom was one of the first 
collective organi sat ions'54’ founded In post war Europe, 
it has exhibited general impotence in dealing with modern 
day nuclear considerations. The fact that not only 
acceptable radiation levels have not been agreed amongst 
Euratom signators but also that post Chernobyl action
273
amongst governments has not been coordinated,®7
demonstrates the fact that governments do tend to act 
according to their own political consideration.'56*
Perhaps, more than demonstrating a divergence of interest 
between governments and nations, this single incident 
demonstrates the limits to state sovereignty.®9
The problem which creates the gap between 
ideological orientations between society and government 
is that of perception. The problem demonstrated by 
Chernobyl is that of the perception of things nuclear by 
governments and the perception of individua1s.The 
overall key to the perception problem is sovereignty.
Who - is in control, the collectivity or the individual?
The contradict ions in society are the result of 
changes in perception, and those perception changes 
affect political considerations.61
Political states exist by exerting their right to 
sovereignty, providing security for their respective 
nations, but what about the concept of providing an 
optimal environment for individuals to fulfill need
requirements? On one side, there are needs; on the 
other, wants. Needs are primary, necessary for 
existence. Wants are artificial constructions gleaned 
through societal interaction. A state politically 
providing for current or future needs allows for the free 
unfolding of the individual. A state providing wants is 
a "thing-orlentated” system. Is technology a phenomenon
by which an end is accomplished or is it a se1f-dynamic?
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Is the economy that the political state controls one in
which the individual seeks fulfillment or is it a
totality in itself? Does the individual unfold as he 
desires or is he a victim of economic expansionism? The 
answers are perceptIonal.
Is the Individual motivated by accountability or 
duty? Accountability relates to an ideological 
consideration or moral code, duty is given or extracted 
by authority. Accountability is associated with the 
ability to make decisions on the personal level, with 
freedom. It is a concrete perceptua1isation, rational
and emotional. It is motivated from within.
Accountabi111y is freedom- leading'toward individual 
independence. Duty*5*3 is dictated by others, not free 
but regulated, not concrete but abstract, not rational 
and emotional but solely rational. It is not motivated 
from internalised conviction, but motivated by outward 
pressure.6"' Perception is the outcome individually 
gleaned through socialIsation.Attempts to 
Cybernetica1ly guide perception development are 
essentially social engineering, and when so
conceptualised may carry with it the negative
connotationa1 image as one of propaganda.
But the political structure of European societies, 
having a great effect on socialisation, does exactly 
that.'"& The shift from societal control through 
ideological consideration toward one of authoritarianism 
appears to be evident throughout western Europe.
&S7
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The key to perception, and indeed the key to the 
overall conslderation of politics as well as the question 
of integration in Europe is within the area of learning, 
or as suggested by political theory and educat ion, a 
function of state.If there is a discrepancy
between what is individually and what ought, collectively,
it may be because the state has a degree of autonomy..
An organism is essentially an -aggre-gate which 
“ acts in accordance with an internal purpose.
And this purpose is something distinct from the 
physical and chemical properties of the 
component parts. If the .state is an organism, 
the state possesses such an internal purpose 
distinct from the natural tendencies of 
individual citizens.6,0
It is within the mandate of the state to correct any 
merging discrepancies, however, rather than attacking the 
society as source, and trying to change it, it may be 
more prudent Tor-the state to attack itself and change. 
But in a political system where party political
considerations effectively govern, introspection is 
seldom seen.6’9 Governmental homiletics may be more 
one sided than truly an accurate reflection of society. 
The western political state, ostensibly created to allow 
individual voice, may be in the light of rapid societal 
change, muting that voice. This rapid social change may 
not be ideally compatible to large slow-moving 
institutional political governments. The institution of 
the state may be polarising interests. Polarisation of 
Interests is, in effect, social closure, a phenomenon by
which social collectives seek to maximise specific
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rewards by restricting access to rewards and opportunity 
by group identification or specifically to a limited 
circle of eligibles"zo and more operationally vocalise 
polarised views. It is a tendency toward disintegration 
or societal breakdown by the building of preference 
groups.71 Social closure is a search for a new 
identification of polls in light of rejection of the 
existing, motivated by lack, of a general inclusive 
perception. This may be exacerbated by the tendency 
toward governmental authoritarianism.
In democracies, the primacy of politics is becoming 
more evident. Political and military state policies 
increasingly control the development of technical 
research and industrial production, international aid, 
etc.72 But is it the state, or a powerful political 
group within the state? Or is the characterisation of 
modern political life more aptly one of a melange of 
different motives, different actors, different
causations? A constant fluid interplay of imputational
effects and results.
I n Sum
There are interlinkages of political and economic 
considerations,73 but also the inter1inkages of 
domestic and foreign considerations.7Z' Where does the 
homo politicus stand within the picture?
A functioning democracy requires a knowledgeable 
population. A knowledgeable population tends toward a 
concensus of opinion. The alternative to such a
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concensus is authoritarian force. Is the primacy of 
problems today answered subjectively through 
propagandisations by states through governments by 
accumulated projected images or objectively through 
knowledge by a knowledgeable society at large? ‘‘Nothing 
is necessary but to show u-s that a thing is truly good 
and worthy to be desired in order to excite in us a 
passion for its attainment .,i7-,:5 Long ago, it has been 
observed that governments may be no more than a necessary 
evil and may be necessary only because the system is 
underpinned by ignorance and sel f-interest.17Homo 
erectus needs knowledge to be able to assume the 
responsibilities extended through democratic governments. 
Conflict between ethical and political considerations, 
between concepts of freedom and duty are resolved best 
through the ability of critical thinking, itself a 
product of education.
CHAPTER SIX SECTION C
Homo Socius
In society, man requires interactional relationships to 
expand his individual self.1 In modern society, he 
expands most pronouncedly through the advancement of 
technology. "Technological progress comes about through 
invention and innovation. The benefits are_-spread through 
the economy in the form of new processes and products.
These new processes and products may,improve productivity 
and the standard of living.'12 Individual selves expand 
through concorporatIona 1 relations with others. Such 
concorporational relations make possible the individual 
participation in advancement, in both material goods or 
economic terms and in intellectual .development or cultural 
attainments. The failure of Europe to significantly 
integrate may be because of a perceived conceptualisation of 
the notion.of loss of autonomy. The desire to integrate is 
no doubt motivated by the individual gains perceived as a 
positive result of so doing, as in standard of living on the 
economic level. Basically, the Individual Is para meter 1a 1ly 
confined to his state. The State maybe "regarded as a 
coercive authority legally supreme over an individual or 
group."3 A control over its society as a unit exercising 
such control through absolute power providing "a well 
defined environment."^ Such a defined environment may be 
responsible for the loss of autonomy.
The environment negates ambiguity by covering Ci) human 
development Ci 1) political, economic, and psychological 
development, and Cm) social, religious, and ultimately
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cultural development. The perspicacity of the environment 
defines Its society. Objectively, Its effects on societal 
anthropometry are achieved through historical, political, 
scientific, and sociological reasoning. Subject i vely, It 
creates an abstract condition of mind (psychological), a 
spiritual possession, a way of thinking, feeling, and doing.
In the west, the state is causal to the creation of the
nation. “For a long time now,.the single nation has played 
the part which constitutes the supreme mission of society 
towards the individual human be ing, namely, maintaining 
through the present, links with the past and the future."
It has taken over the traditional role of the family.s 
This nation,'singular and separate, is the State."It 
brings within its power all forms and substance of the 
myriad human, lives whose destinies it is in charge."7 
The enclosure offered by state contributes toward the 
solidarity of the enclosed, and the state is greatly related
to the formation and maintenance of the nation in this
regard, evidenced by the Western European State linkage. At 
the cost of further horizontal integration, concentration 
was focused on vertical linkages.®
The first section of this chapter characterised the 
individual as homo economicus, and demonstrated that his
attempts to maximise his returns through socialisation, and 
increase those returns through integration, are to a great 
degree dictated by the imposed limitations of his
environment, limitations introduced by the State. The 
preceding section on homo politlcus demonstrated the
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Individual's requirements for knowledge, a requirement often
In conflict with the dominant authoritarian structure of
state. Both sections witnessed the Inextricable linkage 
between the economic and political worlds, character 1s1 ng 
two distinct operational motifs of man In society. This 
section looks more specifically at the overall cons Idera11 on
of man in society. Homo faber, or socl_us, although creat ing
his society collectively, is restricted to its dictates. 
Integration can only be mu111dI mens 1ona1ly viewed and may 
not be confined to specific disciplines because it Is 
fundamentally a mult1-d1 mens Iona 1 phenomenon. Man Is human 
and to understand human society, man must be understood, if
possible.
Social and political organisation has to accoma»cLat« 
Itself to human nature, and not vice versa. A necessary 
condition for an issue to be political is that It is the 
subject of dispute or debate.10 As society Is composed 
of individuals, each being separate and distinct, all
societal considerations exhibit a political potentiality.
Politics intersect with homo_soc i us to the extent that
different points of view, or orientations, exist. At least 
three fundamental polarities exist which require political 
amelioration within society. Cl) The idea of man as indeed,
a self-orlented individual, or the idea of man as a
commun1tarian being. C2) The idea of society being
political or apolitical and Cd) the idea of man as a free
and rational self thinker or a determined irrational
be 1 ng. 11 Literature defends all of these issues, i.e.,
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Man Is CI) Ca) 
CII) Ca) 
CIII) Ca)
Individual Cb) communative
political Cb) apolitical
free and rational Cb) determined
and irrational
I.a. John Locke42 put forward the notion of
individual freedom, the ability to order his own life, 
the notion of equality, in that no one had any more power 
or authority over another than did that Individual.
I. b. The Communative idea was put forward by Marx:
The essence of man is the true community of 
man, men .by activating their own essence, 
produce, create this human community, this 
social being which is not abstract, universal 
power standing over against the solitary 
individual but is the essence of every 
individual, his own activity, his own life, his 
own spirit, his own wealth.1-*
He viewed individuals as self-confident, but falling 
within the universality of humans.1'"* "The human being 
is an animal which can individuate Itself only in the 
midst of society."451
II. A. The political concept of man has been defined 
early on by Aristotle through citizenship. He saw man by 
nature as "an animal intended to live in the polls."16 
The end goal Ctelos) is achieved through the political 
community Cpolls). The being both dependent and
interdependent. He very much maintains that this
dependency and interdependency makes "man ... a
political being. ”L"Z
II.B. The apolitical nature of the Individual was 
put forward by J. Mill, who postulated that "acts of man
will be conformable to their interests."1'3 "Every
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human being is determined by his pains and pleasures and 
that his happiness corresponds with the degree in which 
his pleasures are great and his pains are small."*'*
Man desires wealth and power and desire .is
limitless.^0 Thus, ’‘every man who has not all the
objects of his desire has inducement to take them from 
any other man who is weaker than himself."' 1^- Because' 
of this, there is an according need for some sort of 
order or government whereby a great number of men combine 
and delegate to a small number the power necessary for 
protecting them all.^^
III.A. The. idea of man as free.and rational
self-agent was put forcefully forward by Hegel who found
that the ’’fundamental character of human nature, is man's
ability to think," the unbridgeable gap between humanity 
and animality. •^ He found that the ability to think
and reason induces self-imposed restraints, characterised
by the term, "duty. Duty being a liberation of
self from the demands of mere impulse or what he called
substantive freedom.
III.B. The concept of determined and Irrational man
stems from Hobbes who conceived life as a "motion of
limbs,”'as5 where motion is either vital, as in the
circulation of blood in the body, or voluntary, as in the 
animal acts such as running. Voluntary motion is 
preceded by an internal motion, that of endeavour which
itself is either Cl) toward movement as in an appetite or
C2) away from movement as in aversion. As man is alive,
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the major attribute of life is that of constant movement, 
deliberation among the endeavours. The idea of will is 
’’the last appe’tite in deliberating”2’''1'' and a_fact of 
nature as deliberations govern all life.31"'
These various theoretical approaches to human 
behaviour represent positions or views and orientations 
based on either pure theory constituting a knowledge 
Cep i steme) or based on observations of practice
constituting a prudent orientation Cphronesis). °
They are approaches to human nature. It is essential to 
have an overall conceptualisat ion of human nature as “an
account of human nature is intrinsic to moral and "
political argument."29 “The ideas of every
philosopher concerned with human affairs in the end, 
rests on his conception of what man is and can be” . . .
the “central notion or image” of which is what
“determines their picture of the world” and may be more
important than the argument employed to defend the views 
and confute objections to those views.30 These 
conceptualisations, or plethora of same, develop the 
identity of communities and characterise that community's 
mass traits.31 The holding of values are part and 
parcel of human nature.32 However, the fact that
different communities hold different values does not mean
human nature is different. There are “no optional
extras," but all held traits are part of the concept of
universal human nature.33 Traits define the
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conventions Cnomos) of society. .
The universality of human nature does not mean what
is good for one is good for the other. The fair
mediation'of values is essent ia-lly. the assignment of 
justice, and .the arbitrationa1 responsibility of 
domestic, or international political organisations. The 
concept of ’justice' has an inherent social bias; it has 
been said, "Justice consists in not transgress1 ng any of
the ordinances of the state of which one is a
citizen."''7'' But for Justice to be administered, the
ordinances of the state, which is composed of
individuals, should be loosely enough textured to allow a
position on all considerations.
If society is to organically expand, if nations are
to integrate to a degree of some sort of
supra-nationa1Ity, different fundamental views and
orientations must be organically mediated. This requires 
some sort of general concensus regarding human nature.
The state, as a social and political organisat 1 on, must
accomodate itself to human nature, not vice versa. The
central decisions facing western Europe Cindividual
Western civilisation) Is that which is composed of the
tension which results between two tendencies both found
within the individual. His tendency toward self-strength 
or independence and between his aloneness and 
interdependence.3"5 Powerlessness, anxiety, isolation, 
may be producing a sado-masochistic love for the powerful
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with a corresponding hatred for the powerless within 
society evidenced by pettiness, hostility, and even 
asceticism (thrlftiness with feeling as well as with 
money).36 Tensions can only be justly mediated in a 
loosely textured societal system if dissonances are to 
converge to develop consonances. In effect, a society 
composing a political system has "the task, of a political 
system to settle authoritatively the conflicting claims 
of Individuals and groups" if these cannot be resolved 
through non-political procedures.37 The authoritative 
political system is a last resort, but political 
Integrative actions in Europe’s post war era are of these 
ilk., and not through overt organic natural mediation per
se .
There are patterns of individual involvement into a 
social system. These patterns may be represented as 
being either sentimental or i nstrumenta1 attachment 
(Loyalty) to the system.
Sentimental Attachment to the system is based on:
Ci) Ideological orientation where commitment is to
cultural values reflective of some sort of national
identity.
Cii) Role part 1cipat 1 on is achieved through commitment to
the role of the nation and its associated symbols, it is
based
(ill) On a normat1ve system of acceptance of demands
based on commitment to the sacredness of the State.
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Instrumental Attachment to the system is based on an 
Ci) Ideoloqlca1 commitment to institutions promotive of 
the needs and interests of the population.
Cii) Role part 1c i pa11on is schemed through a commitment
to social roles mediated by the system and based
Ciii) On a normat 1ve system of acceptance of demands
based on commitment to law and order.36*
- This illustrates an approach to the determinants in
terms of interaction between individuals and government, 
interactions in a social setting requiring the mediation 
of values or justice in a functional system.
The foregoing illustrates six patterns of individual 
involvement in organised society and relate to sources of 
attachment or the motivations leading to an individual 
cathexis of the organised system. An individual is
sentimenta 1ly attached to the system when he sees it as 
representing him as some sort of reflection in a central 
way and extension of self. For the sentimenta 1ly 
attached, internalised ideals make it legitimate and 
deserving of his personal loyalty. When the individual
sees the system as an adequate or effective system in
which he can achieve his own Individual ends, he is
instrumentally attached to the system. Loyalty is
demonstrated when instrumentally attached because i t 
provides the means for an optimally functioning society.
The sentimenta1ly attached individual who is
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ideologically integrated is bound to the system by virtue 
of sharing cultural and social values and supports it 
because of the internalisation and personal 1ncorpora11 on
of these values. Integration is more or less abstract 
and contrasts wlth-the instrumenta 1ly bound individual, 
who ideologically views integration and support of the 
system in rational terms. - An ideologically bound system 
member, an ideologically integrated individual who is 
1nstrumenta 1ly bound, reviews system performance in an 
ongoing evaluation process. .
Certainly, there are overlapp1ngs, and at time 
different “feelings'’ would motivate connectedness with 
the system. But basically, the ideologically connected 
person expects the system, in exchange for his extended 
loyalty, to conform to a set of basic values. The 
nineteeth century capitalist Western European may, no 
doubt, have felt that the la 1 ssez-f a ire concept of 
government was consonant with society's values, in light 
of change in economic conditions, social needs, and 
governmental resources. The modern concept may be very 
much different. To assure support of the ideologically 
identified individual, justifications of the system’s 
operations must be consistently put forward, which it 
does in public awareness or other campaigns Coften 
through the issues consensus found in the democratic 
electorial process). Ideological integration can be seen 
as the most stable basis of support for_a_soc £al.
system. If this is so, if stability, continuity,
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and cooperative strength is to be achieved, then the 
expansion of a social system, the integration of others 
into a single entity, must be. based on Ideology. In his 
discussion of international organisat ion, Ernest
Haasz,° dis-claimed ’’psychological Interaction," but
likewise claimed that organisat ions promoting integration 
internationa1ly develop essentially an ideology of their 
ownzu through a commitment to an overall ail.42
When the aim becomes institutionalised, formalised and
rlgld, it become s h ighly polItical and ,__thus .,
subscription to such is often instrumental. The EEC, as
an example, solicits instrumental ideological attachments 
from Europeans, and because of a lack, of sentimental 
attachment, finds itself needing justification to solicit 
loyalty from individuals, especially when competing for 
such loyalties with domestic governments. For an 
institutionalised ideological acceptance, that ideology
must be based on a minimum common denominator of shared
goals."*3 This is essentially at variance with the
idea of institutions exercising a "power-compliance" 
profile"'"* and introduces the ra 1 son d? et re of such
endeavours. Is the qui bono Cl} mutual-benefit (members
and participants), C2} economic (owners, managers,
business concerns), Cd} clients (recipients, service, or
CA} general Cthe enlarged commonwealth)?"*"-1 Is the
concept of "Europe.” for Individual Europeans and for 
domestic states, to optimalise domestic aims, or to 
optimalise common endeavours or is it a combination of
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both? Is the approach to Europe and Europeanness du ut 
desi? Is It a value expansion of the domestic or Is It a 
value expansion toward the concept of a commonality? 
Gunnar Myrdal held that- the main purpose of governmental 
participation in international organisations is
recognition, governmental bureaucracy acquires Importance 
through such participation and only residually derives 
feedback, from such organ I sa t i ons to allow it to see
itself as others do. In other words, it engages in
such activities for specific role enhancing objectives 
and only secondarily for altruistic motivations.
Increased governmental participation, both externally and
domestically, is motivated primarily by economic
considerations: breakdown of competitive markets
resulting from technological and organisationa1
developments and the sophistication of "peoples' atitudes 
in regard to the economic processes in which they" 
participate.'-*7’' This requires governments to act both 
domestically and 1 nternationa1ly as they see fit to 
redress the problems they perceive. Such action may or 
may not be compatible to individual ideologies, notions
of fairness, on an internatIona1 level of collectve
justice/'9 or, the fair mediation of values.
The Aim of I nterna11ona1 Organisations
What is the real reason behind organisation? Is it 
to facilitate the socialisation process to allow
individuals to advance their own need endeavours, or is
it for some specific state aim? International
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organ!sat ions such as the EEC with its own overlay of 
synthesised domestic interests may not be accomplishing 
integrated society if it is operating for other than very 
special social aims. Individual endeavours, given the 
expansion benefits of increased contact, produce
Identification orientations consonant with integration. 
Perhaps a more loosely textured international 
organisation would be more successful in allowing that 
degree of socialisation to increase so as to allow the 
development of integrationa1 ties in a functionalist '
manner.
Endeavours, primarily economic in this context, are 
provided for by the EFTA. EFTA is a group of small 
European countries dedicated to the removal of Import 
duties, quotas, and other obstacles to trade in Western 
Europe/'-5, Highly affiliated with the EEC,®0 it 
maintains ostensibly only economic interests®1 and 
does not consciously promote integration.®^
An example similar to the EFTA but with much wider 
ranging scope is the Nordic Council®® built upon the 
desire of furthering closer connections beteen Nordic 
nations in culture and judicial and social spheres, by 
developing closer ties to create uniform rules in as many 
ways as possible. ®z' A more progressive approach to 
struetura1ised compatibilty likely to yield higher 
degrees of ideological commonality leading toward 
integration. The Nordic Council Is less rigid and more
ideologically oriented than both the EEC and EFTA.
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All three cases, EEC, EFTA, and the Nordic Union, 
although forwarded for collective alms, may In and of 
themselves produce an Important residual 1 ntegra11ona1 
effect, quiteapart from their declared a-lms. Allocation 
by authoritative decision of goals may quite often share 
as a mechanism for the unlversallstic application of an 
achievement-oriented system of allocation of ideals, the 
development of a collectivity of ideals which would
influence integrational tendencies/5™'
The action may be contributory to the creation and 
cathexation of a commonality of values, and motives and 
act as a directional guidance mechanism in the creation 
of a general system of actions leading toward a common 
social system, i.e., integration. Similarly involved 
with degrees of economic integration, formal
organisational activities, are essentially political, but 
could have salient social-cultural ramifications by
creating an identity in a core belief system.
An identity is essentially the answer to the 
question, "Who am I?" The answer to such a question is 
on the first level, social, placing the individual with 
or against the contextual consideration of country, 
(inhabitant of a territorial unity), ethnicity (person of 
observable ethnic traits), occupational (doer of specific
economic functions) or family (related sanguinely to 
specific other individua1s). The social answer is a 
reliance on a specific group reference.66 Individual
reference is self-interest oriented which also includes
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an element of group-orlentatlon but relates most strongly 
with personally held concepts of self as In role v13 a 
yi_s group.®7 The latter reference relates heavily
with Individual, the former with the overall
collectivity. References are or1entations and
collectivity, if society expands, individual orientations
will evolve after collective. "Who am I?" collective
orientations may with some degree of success be implanted 
through political manuevering into the social system but 
to be successfully and enduringly Implanted must be 
sentimentally linked with the ideology.
I n Sum
Homo socius is both the product of, and the 
originator of his social system. His social system 
functioning is socialisation in action. Expansion of 
contacts achieving greater stimulus, is principally
Integration. To be considered at any point in time as 
successfully integrated, the ideological concepts of the 
group must be sympathetically internalised. Such 
internalisation is personal. To answer the question of
"Who am I?," an attachment and bond must exist between
the individual and group. This bonding occurs through
free socialisation, not structural exchange.
Chapter Conclusion
The advantage inherent in Western European states, 
as opposed to the Eastern block states, is found in an 
environment where Individuals can essentially, at least
theoretically, achieve some sort of optimum satisfaction
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in providing for own needs through a combination of
Individual emotions and endeavours. To continue the
development of such a social system, new challenges 
needing response Cas past challenges give way to 
1nstitutiona1 responses) require greater demands from the 
Individual. The days of life of domestic free floating
currencies are numbered, as the economic systems become
more interdependent, a fact recognized by what has been
termed 'educated' individuals.""^4 Where the
educational balance tips to the point where a significant 
proportion of European populations are so ’ educated’, 
this block, in the way of European integration will be
removed.
In the politicised climate of today, especially in a 
democratic setting, knowledge is needed to adequately 
allow for the responsible decision-making Implied in 
democracies. Knowledge is highly compatible with
education in both the formal and Informal sense.59
Knowledge provides the backup for decisions based on an 
array of selected options, as opposed to decisions based
on unextensive prejudice. The future arrangement of 
society in the best possible situation would be decided 
on knowledge and understanding variables, be it
assumptions of man’s nature, or duties of collective 
governments. The world of the homo economicus and 
politicus is rapidly changing. Interdependencies are 
making domestic units more permeable to outside
stimulants and retardants. Ultimately, the best possible
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way of dealing with new International arrangements is on 
a basis of individual knowledge. There may be a lack of 
sufficient political will, at this point in time, to 
increase meaningful Independent knowledge, because of its 
potential affects on exist!ng domestic political
syst eras . '&o
The demands of modern society are most adequately 
met in the democratic setting by knowledge intenslvity, 
for in many respects, knowledge is power. Modern man, in 
his economic, political, and social societal
complexities, requires both information and the ability 
to critically choose, if problems are to be adequately
addressed. If further integration is the optimal future 
state of continental International systems, then the 
information and ability to discern must be nurtured and 
not controlled by states. After a discussion of the 
German integration experience, one based on education, in 
chapter seven, will follow a discussion on the value of 
knowledge in chapter eight and educational practices in
Europe in chapter nine.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
A Model of Modern Integration
The recent historical event, the Integration of 
Germany, is relatively well documented In literature. What 
were the causes of perceptual change which led the
autonomous states1 and principalities of central Europe 
to successfully integrate Into the modern State of Germany 
at the end of the nineteenth century? It is beneficial to 
look at the historical reasons for this integration and to 
determine if there are any compatibilities suggesting a 
focus on the consideration of modern European integration. 
Europe, a collectivity geographically contiguous In the 
latter portion of the twentieth century, is very much 
comparable with the contiguous units of Germany a century
earlier.
The essence of integration is, on the basic level, why
one interacts- with another, the notion of interaction. The
fact that the individual interacts, is not enough.
Transaction alone is not an indication of integration. It 
may be; however it is not fundamental, for other motives 
could result in a high degree of integration. Why we 
interact with another is the product of perception.
Retrospective history attributes the economic 
development of Germany in the middle of the nineteenth 
century2 to the Zol1vere1n. This is so primarily because
the Zo11vere1n was the most significant visible novum of the 
period, and partly because of the immense political 
importance attached to the Zollvere1n. How much of that
economic development was due to the ZoI1vere1n and how much
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of it was due to the better road conditions, the result of
the introduction of mass transport, the laying of a railway 
chaussee, the spread of knowledge which no tariff could stop 
and the general rise in inte1lectua1ism, cannot be _ 
determined.3 Ascribing it to the Zo1Ivere in may be a
-post hoc,_ergo proper hoc consideration.'" The 16 years
between the first Prussian Tariff C1818) and the Zo11vere i n 
C1834) were years that saw 75% of the states of Germany5 
being laid with track. In 1834 three quarters of Germany 
was virtually waiting to cross state frontiers. The time was 
right for a customs union, not vice versa. In 1818,
Germany, before the Rail Age, was highly rural,6 hence 
the customs union was of little importance. It was a 
pre-industria 1 period. Commerce was not developed. The 
states were agriculturally se1f-sufficent. They had little, 
if anything to trade.7
The unification of Germany was first and foremost 
1nte1lectua1ly stimulated. It was an intellectual 
stimulation which affected everyone singularly, because of 
its deep-seated individualism, and, collectively, because of 
its humanitarian appeal. In Great Britain and in France, 
the culture-oriented historiography of the 18th century 
exemplified by Voltaire and Gibbons gave way to a nation 
centred, politically orientated approach to the past. 
However, in Germany, historians looked back to political 
traditions which were very different from those of Britain 
and France.® The concept of Staat, as in the
Hohenzollern monarchy of the Prussian Reform Era,
317
Ob rig keltstaat, centred on an aristocratic and bureaucratic 
bias. The understanding of history and its application was, 
from the standpoint of the historlographer's approach, not 
so much a descriptive recipe for a modern location as In the 
case of Western Europe, but more a calling up of past motifs 
as Justification of the current'position.9 In the -German 
understanding and contemplation C Anachauung) t the
Humanltatsldeal of Herder, Goethe and Kant took
prominence.10 The conceptualisation of the German past 
by Herder ’’merged with the broader stream of Romantic 
philosophy,”11 and took academic license, extrapolating 
emotive appeals to future generations of readers. Herder
wrote: _
The purpose of our existence. . . is to develop
this Incipient element of humanity fully within 
us. . • . Our ability to reason is to be
developed to reason: our finer senses are to. be 
cultivated for art: our instincts are to —
achieve genuine freedom and beauty: our
energies are to be turned to the love of 
man.12
Typifying German historiography, Herder invoked 
illusionary motifs in the construction of a 
Humanjtatsideal which was typical of the German approach 
to historiography. Indeed, this idea of historiography 
is in and of Itself a part of overall Geraan history. It
is not so much history for itself but rather it is 
history that touches general and social intei—
relationships at every point.13 Germany set out to 
write its own history, and did so in humanitarian terms, 
setting a romantic ideal which influenced profoundly the
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developments of the 19th and 20th centuries in Europe. 
"Man possessed thought, but ideas possessed men."lx<
Goethe developed the ideal which eventually possessed the 
German mind,1® and the acceptance was made way for by 
Kant.1'5’ German historians regarded the final 
establishment of German unity in 1871 essentially -as 
'their work'. The victory of Prussia over the remainder 
of Germany which had been preached from the’ 1850-'s 
onwards was seen as having been effectively prepared by 
means of "influential teaching."1’7 The possession of 
the mind was through a debate to enable the nation to 
discover its supreme values.10 Further ideological 
concepts were . introduced .into the - intellectua1 system of 
the developing German mind by Ranke,1’5' who formalised 
the character of the nation. Ke held that the. State was 
the political expression of the people, and as such, part
of the divine plan. The State is thus ipso_facto
expansionist. It must grow if not to be eclipsed by a 
neighbouring state, and hence, the State's most important 
function is its foreign policy.'20
Ranke held, that war was the father of all
things.21 It was the motor of history.22
Nations may proceed in friendship alongside 
each other for centuries if their paths do not 
cross: however, at some stage . . . they must,
if they continue to strive ahead, finally 
confront each other in hostility. This is 
because they are all striving towards the same 
goal: Therefore the attainment of that goal by
one, means the decline (Untergang) of the 
other. So any friendships between nations are 
only a postponement of host i 1 ity. 2:3
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German foreign policy developed inextricably with 
the notion of a single Germany. Weltpolit Ik became 
central to its thinking. This development prompted Lord 
Acton 0882} to remark, "They brought history into touch 
with the nation's life, and gave it an influence it had 
never possessed, . . . and they were for themselves’ the
making of opinions mightier than laws."2*
The reason why the writings_of German intellectuals 
had such a resounding effect on the developing German 
mind may be because it began in a period of Isolation. 
This is perhaps best typified by Ranke's own beginnings. 
He came from Thuringia, at that time, ’’dead to modern 
life.”^-' Thuringia, its schools, the first in 
Germany, were nurseries for grammarians and philologists. 
What was taught there had not changed since the time of 
the Reformation. At a time when, in France and England, 
the reign of the applied sciences had begun, “when the 
intellectual horizons receded until it almost reached the 
end of the earth,” in Thuringia, people still had their 
orientation turned towards the past.51'6’ More
importantly, unlike the western countries of Europe, for 
the Germans there was no political life. Schools were
the center of intellectual life and it was there that 
patriotic feelings, awakened through literature, 
developed.517" This development took place alongside 
the new development of German democracy2'3 and class 
mobility. New equality, fired by passionate 
idealism51’’11' turned the idea of Germany into a labour of
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love.30 The atiosphere of idealism in universities 
was promoted by brotherhoods, and was heavily Influenced 
by Romanticism,31 and provided the seat for patriotic 
enthusiasm.32 It was against this backdrop that the 
first revolutionary Prussian Tariff law (1818} was
introduced and the Customs Union of 1834. There was a
movement afoot, a struggle against conservatives,__a
desire to try the new,__which produced a social
transformation.33
The social transformation fired a further
transformation in all spheres of commerce and banking, 
the non-political areas open to public access. The 
interesting question introduced by the Zo 1 lvere l~n was 
"What way?" A complete subordination to Prussia or a 
free association? Association or harmony was accession 
or Zollanschlus s; a union was Zo11vere1n. The rapid 
congealing of German interests and its eventual unity was 
because of an individual stand taken by the German states 
vis a vis Prussia as the dominant party. It was not a d a 
ut de3 association but an all encompassing union. Such a 
union produced total interdependence. "The consciousness 
of mutual dependence, the recognition that there could no 
longer be any separation from the great fatherland, were 
impressed upon all the habits of the nation by the petty 
experiences of every day life."3* It was this 
indirect political influence, this funct1ona1ly~developed 
interdependence, which developed through the Zollvere i n, 
that is of historical importance, and directly relates to
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the unification of 1871.
In the Gernan model of integration, there is a 
remarkable "kinship between the history of the economic 
unification of Germany and the history of the political 
unification."30 Neither tendency toward unification, 
the economic or the political, proved effective until- 
that point when after futile and repeated attempts, any 
other alternative other than succumbing to Prussian- 
hegemony proved i rnprac4§ble . 3e'
The customs union developed into an amorphous league 
allowing Prussia to encircle the totality known today as 
Germany.37 It was essentially a "patriotic struggle
. incited by the intellectuals" that centred around 
the focus of Prussia, 3S' that developed the nationalism 
that unified the people.3’5' It was animated by almost 
a fervent and se-1 f-r 1 ght eous rejection of the West, 
triggered by Napoleon, a rejection of the Enl1ghtenment. 
It identified the nascent German nationalism with a
hatred of the French and the alien.2*0 The Aufbruch of
the people was led by the youth CBurschenschaftj. With 
their irrational and semi-rellglous adoration of the 
German people and their mission against the West which,
early on, dominated the minds of Germans,2*1 an
Aufbruch, which took place In an atmosphere or
environment of political neutrality for "the German state 
of the nineteenth century, could rely neither on a 
politically alive nobility, nor on a bourgeois serving as 
a positive basis for the state."2*2-
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The German mind was produced in isolation and 
cerebrally, especially in the period from 1760 to 1830 
when there was no unified powerful Germany. Without 
restriction, the mind grew. "There are certain qualities 
which, when controlled, enhance the productivity of the 
m ijnd. When they are given free rein, however, they can 
grow to dimensions destroying human measure."^3
The position of the German mind contrasted greatly 
with that of the French or the English. The Germans 
emphasized becoming, infinite, measureless; the French, 
be ing, finite and mea sured; and the English, reasonable 
and useful.z<z’ The German attributes of becoming
infinite, and measureless, amounted to Romanticism which
coupled with historicism, and fused with Prussian
concepts of authoritarianism, produced the integratlonal
movement. ~ -
1848 was a pivotal year for the Germans. The 
national assembly in Frankfurt of that year245 marked 
not only a national discussion on unification,
Kielndeut sch (with Prussia), or Grossdeutsch (with
Austria), but marked also a crisis in the evolution of
German unity. Before 1848, the movement was Idealistic. 
After 1848 it was realistic and practical, concerned for 
the first time with political problems.2'6 For the 
middle classes it meant change. Before 1848, unification 
was the province of the educated elites with general 
spiritual, artistic, dramatic, and cultura1 aims. After 
1849, it became the province of a culture of enterprise,
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of capitalism, of power as the educated youth took, hold 
of the developing economy. Spiritual, general aims gave 
way to positive, concrete and tangible interests'*7 
which developed into German part i cular i st tendencies''*® 
and matured into integrated unity.
Di scus sio n ~
German integration commenced in isolation, first 
with a general notion that slowly evolved into an ideal. 
It captured the minds of the young with intellectual 
appeal and, via their enthusiasm, engulfed the totality 
of the population. It was initially apolitical and, only 
latterly, took on the important political dimension, at 
which time it focussed on Prussia. German integration 
was achieved through a perceptional change, away from 
i solat ioni st ic. particularisms to general knowledge of 
self as a collectivity. Using the model of Germany and’ 
contrasting it with the overall atmosphere of Europe 
today, its success can be ascribed to its
conceptualisation and internalisation in the minds of, 
and lives of, every German individual. Today, there is no 
such concept capturing the imagination of Europeans.30 
There does not seem to be any universal ideals, either in 
literature or music, permeating the European culture with 
a European idealism today. This is all the more
remarkable, given the apparent ease of public awareness 
through the media.
If Europeanism as a movement was alive in 1945 as a
direct result of the futility of total European War,
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although spin off particularistic movements toward that 
goal evolved; it is questionable if it Is still alive in 
1988. It is questionable whether the idealism which 
captured Germany's imagination could ever appeal to the 
particularistic interests of European states.’1 This 
is evidenced by the lack, of meaningful state interaction, 
where meaningful negotiation would take on the
characteristic of addressing a common task, communa1ly
and not protect 1ve of particularistic interests.’2 The
lack of any warranted Europeanism is evidenced by the 
almost non-existence of its idealistic promulgation.
Where the idea of Germany took hold on still political 
ground, the idea, today, of Europeanism has been seeded 
on not only political ground, but in the current of 
political winds. Germanism was an intellectual movement 
born of the mind. Europeanism is more an emotional 
movement born of fear and disgust; a reaction to war.
Germanism was a Humanitatsideal, an ideal based on the
collectivity of mankind, the post war Europeanism ideal 
degenerated to a domestic centred one. Although there 
may be room for discussion about the real role of the
German Customs Union, it did produce a near total
interdependence which, in turn, produced the idea of 
German existence through German dependency. E Plurlbus 
Unum within the current European Customs Union; total 
dependency, is not evident as demonstrated below by the 
1983 export figures of the community members:
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Table 7.1.1.
The EEC as Export Main Customers of the Follow 1 ng
Countries
Belgium Denmark Germany. Greece
70* 48*
(Federal Republic!) 
48.1* 53*
Spa 1 n France Ireland Italy
50.5* 49* 69* 46*
Luxembourg Netherlands Portuaal United
70* 72* 57.6*
Klngdom 
44* '
Because of the great reliance of the EC member
countries on foreign markets other than the EEC, i.e.,
Table 7.1.2 
Belgium Denmark Germany Greece
30* 52*
(Federal Republi
51.9*
c}
47* - ‘
- Spain France I reland Italy
49.5* 41* 31* 54*
Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal United
30* 28* 42.4*
Ki ngdom 
56*=3
Source: The data above has been extrapolated from
the appropriate countries' statistics found in The 
Import/Export Microtables, annual statistics of 
foreign trade by countries, OECD statistical files, 
OECD, Paris, 1984.
Domestic interests are required to substantially look 
beyond the EC for markets of domestically produced goods.
The EC does not have the E_Plurlbus Unum focus on self or
total interdependence with Europe. Modern European
domestic units are much more self-reliant than were
German units in the middle of the previous century. 
Domestic self-reliance inhibits the growth of collective 
notions of unity. Part of the problem is that the 
economy, through technological development, expanded and
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grew, within collective Germany and, in post war Europe, 
already existed and expanded beyond Europe. Transactions 
in the German model were more concentrated upon Germany 
than European transactions are concentrated on Europe in 
the modern period.!3Z+
The development of the Zo11vere i n offered a Prussian 
based model and forced the taking of a position vis a vis 
that model by all the.German states. Prussia was then 
the core. The Community today does not have a core model 
and any attempts to synthesise one, to focus the
attention of Europeans on Brussels, as attention was 
focussed by Germans on Potsdam/Berlin, is short-circuited 
by other happenings, such as -the location of the
Parliament in Strassburg or the floating meetings of the 
Ministers of States and Heads o-f Government Councils. A 
cathexis of thought is often aided by a physical object
or locus.
In the German model, the idea evolved first and, 
only latterly, was implemented Into,5’ an evolving 
political system. With the idea of Europeanism evidenced 
by its long and painful gestation lasting through a 
decade of debate, there was born a political idea, 
complete with attendant protective interests and ulterior 
motives of keeping France and Germany apart, but more so 
in supplying expanded markets for some economies of scale 
product ion, in a protect ive customs union. The idea of 
Europeanism for the sake of Europeanism was, to a great 
degree, a second thought—if that. What forced the
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general congealing cathexis of Germanness, a xenophobia
vis a vis France and the West was its hatred of the
French, a common enemy. This may be similar to the NATO 
projections of a common enemy, but the pressure that 
permeated the German society intellectually may not be of 
the magnitude of fear perceived by the notion of the 
East, by the Iron Curtain.56 Forty years of peace may 
have dimmed that focus if it was popularly felt55-7 at
the close of the war50
Where German nationalism was born of an idea
developed in isolation, Europeanism was as much North 
American as European.3'5' Where German transactions 
increased internally het-h with the concept of Germanism 
and the rise in, and application of, technology, post-War 
Europeanism developed amidst a high degree of foreign 
economic penetration and a sianificant- foreign control of 
technology. ,£’c>
Germany was led by Prussia. Europe does not have 
such a single and specific lead. Germany had a polls. 
Europe does not have such a clear centre. Germany was 
brought together by hatred. Europe does not exhibit that 
degree of emotional commitment. Europe attempts a 
rapport, a detente. Germany had, and Europe is lacking, 
a significant commitment to an ideal. Idealism became 
internalised and as such became a force for action, 
functioning as a force for an actor's cognitive
orientation.61
Although many of the conditions and circumstances
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are different between last century Germany and current 
century Europe, one thing, by examining the German model, 
is apparent. Economic transactions are just that, a sign 
of the frequency of interaction, not per se a sign of 
integration. Political integration followed social and 
economic interest in the German model. In modern Europe, 
it appears to lead. The German model demonstrates 
clearly that the requirement of integration depends on 
Individual conceptualisation and interna 1isation, 
synonymous with knowledge. Integration depends on 
individual perception and understanding. The Zollvere in, 
relatively apolitical, developed an amorphous cast which 
became the vehicle for German integration. The highly 
politically sensitive EEC is rigid and may not attain 
that which did the Zollvere i n. Markets and dependencies 
were regional in the nineteenth century. In the
twentieth, they are global.^'2 Focus is not 
introspective, perhaps because of the failure to fixate
on the idea.
Idea
The ideas of economist and political 
philosophers, both when they are right and when 
they are wrong, are more powerful than is 
commonly understood. Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from any 
intellectual influences, are usually the slaves 
of some defunct economist. Madmen in
authority, who hear voices in the air, and 
distilling their frenzy from some academic 
scribbler of a few years back . . . the power
of vested interests is vastly exaggerated 
compared with the general encroachment of 
ideas.
What is today's idea in Europe? Modern society has
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removed men from their age old struggle of authority, 
either authority subjecting man to natural elements or 
the authority subjecting man to the unquestioned 
authority of a ruler or binding tradition. Authority, 
positively or negatively, was involved with security; 
freedom from authority Increases Insecurity. The process 
of modern Isation and urbanisation costs the security of 
community and the breakdown of tradition. The advances 
of technology have brought European man to the threshhold 
of satiating human needs. No longer completely directed 
and challenged by the struggle against society and 
oppression, individuals may be projecting their attention 
toward humanity at large. Human rights.have taken on 
meaning, both within Europe, and vis a vis Europe and the 
rest of the world, influencing relations and attitudes to 
third parties. Values, thoughts of oppression and _
assumptions of world scarcity, have introduced the 
concepts of democracy, science, and technology into the
lives of individuals.
"And many may feel, . . . that they are dwelling
between two worlds, one dead and the other powerless to
be born."45^ The ambivalence of the two worlds*5 is
exacerbated by the individual's secondary need for
acceptance.Anomie, motivated by the "mass, 
impersonal organisat1ons and institutions which overwhelm 
the individual and create widespread feelings of
inadequacy,"&7 leave the individual in a general state 
of confusion. The values and assumptions of a commercial
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society may be leading the individual to see himself in
terms of disposable (raeaningless) consumption, as
commodities in the marketplace.4*® Once the level of
basic needs is reached, a new challenge must be set.
To have failed to solve the problems of 
producing goods would have been to continue man 
in his oldest grievous misfortune. But to fail 
to see that we have solved it and to fail to 
proceed thence to the next task, would be fully 
as tragic.'1-'’5’
Human rights, and general humanity at large, may be
the next task. But the formulation of the idea of the
next task does not yet appear to be clear, nor to have 
fully crysta 11ised. On the other hand, if it is even 
more consumption, with even more wealth accumulation, at 
the expense of even more numbers of humanity; that idea 
must crystallise. It appears, amongst these two
alternative ideas, the latter is more custom thant’he
former. Whatever the idea, it is a perception
functioning as a modus operandl.70 It is also “a
framework or a scheme of values against which is cast and 
evaluated the needed knowledge”'71 for its 
accomplishment. The needed knowledge is, in many 
respects, advanced or inhibited by domestic states.
The Germany of the last century had an idea, and 
from that idea followed action. Today, action precedes 
ideas to such a degree, that technologica1 development 
has thrown man into a state of disequilibrium because not 
only are ideas not precipitating action, ideas have
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fallen well behind action. The Ideas of Germans evolved
around Germany. It may be that the new ideas of western 
man are developing around a new conceptualisation of man. 
The conceptualisation of the German Ideas was around the 
geographic limitations of Germany. The new
conceptualisations of man, as in the i'dea of basic human 
rights, know no geographical or political bounds other 
than the earth itself. It is global". The framework or 
scheme of the values that are being developed, the ideas 
of man, may be more global than regional, extending 
beyond the continental limitation of Europe. Following 
the German model where ideas came before political 
expression, the new political expression of Europe may be 
extra-regional, i.e., planetary.
A wider general dissemination of knowledge is 
necessary, and the ability to make critical choices is
needed.
Information would be desirable. . . . By these
means, not only might the welfare of mankind be 
enhanced, but also the individual's ability to 
detect and to resist manipulative efforts, 
however these might be directed at him.*’7’^
Before the backdrop of Europe and its secularisation
into domestic political units, the individual held as 
internalised the notion of oneness, promulgated by the 
concepts of Christendom. Secularisation in thought led 
to the ultimate notion of democracy and society as a 
collectivity of Individuals. The resultant individuation 
of collectivities produced the patterned state system 
known today, but further inroads into self and freedom
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would suggest the development of a new reality. "Reality
[exists] not in nature or the external world, but in the
mind of nan."73 If society, satiated of primary 
needs, is-in disequilibrium, because of the loss of old 
ideas, then a new reality, awakened by man’s capacity to 
reason, could supply the void in self, with regard to
self's relation to the universe, with new ideas. There
may be a modern tendency towards the single free
unfettered individual, idealised in liberal democratic
capitalistic Western Europe, to start to refocus on the 
general body of mankind Ca rebirth of the Christendom 
idea, without necessarily the idea of Christi. Such an 
idea requires a new political expression. If this^ideal 
is extending beyond observable geopolitical frontiers, 
that political expression would likewise extend beyond
.such frontiers.
The individual may prefer freedom, but he, likewise,
because of his collective status, requires government.
Yet the enjoyment of it [freedom] is very 
uncertain and constantly exposed to the 
invasion of others; for all being Kings as much 
as he, every man his equal, and the greater 
part no strict observers of equity and justice, 
the enjoyment of the property he has in this 
state is very unsafe, very insecure. This 
makes him willing to quit this condition which, 
however free, is full of fears and continual 
dangers; and it is not without reason that he 
seeks out and is willing to join in society 
with others who are already united, or have a 
mind to unite for the mutual preservation of 
their lives, liberties and estates, which I 
call by the general name — property.7^
The form of the new government, the new political
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expression of expanded society will be a product of the 
new values and goals adopted by public consciousness. 
They will be the product of the ideas held by the 
collectivity at that point in time.
In economic terms, the breakup of Christendom's 
world was a form of individualistic specialisation, a 
focus on the immediate, tangible, and present. With the 
technology and demands of the pre-modern world of 
scarcity, a narrow specialisation and division of labour 
may have been efficient and necessary. At that point in 
man's evolutionary development, fixation on the domestic 
entity may have been the most manageable means of 
development. The Gesta 11 of the post modern world 
requires more; it requires a degree of cybernetics, a 
knowledge of the interrelationa1 parts and
interfunctionings akin to integration. - ~
Survival of the individual depends upon 
the development of a nervous system in which 
differentiations Cthat is, specialisation of 
function) is balanced by integration Cthat is, 
the control of partial activities by the 
organism as a whole). The evolution of the 
human race is now threatened by the failure of 
integration. That Integration is a social 
function, necessary both within individual 
national societies, and, in the interests of 
our common humanity, between those
societ ies .
Survival may, to a great extent, depend upon 
Integration, especially in the face of advanced 
technology. Traditional values, concepts, and Illusions 
regarding societal organisation are changing. The 
powei—authoritarian sovereign state of yesterday is
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becoming more and more open as It is succumbing to more 
and more permeations from without. Western European 
states have developed nations with cultural relationships 
which, if integration is to result, must change.
These relationships are patterns of orientation 
toward objects among the members of their nations.76 
Patterns of orientation are the internalised aspect of 
objects and relationships which include (1) a cogn i t. i ve
orientation, based on knowledge and belief; <2} an
affective orientation, a feeling; and an C3j evaluat iona1 
orientation based on judgment and opinion.77
Cognitive orientations as well as evaluational
orientations have a high cor-allary with ideas, and less . 
directly affect feelings. Orientations are triggered by 
ideas, perceptions, and impressions. Perceptions and 
impressions are highly individually subjective. 'Ideas 
are both objective and/or subjective, and are both 
individual and collective. They are motivators of 
action,70 catalysts to the systems In which the
collective action takes place. The social, economic, and 
political systems are specific systems In which specific 
actions take place. Cultural systems are in contrast to 
specific systems, systems of symbolic patterns which are 
created or manifested by individual actors and are 
transmitted among social systems by diffusion. Act ion 
within a system or multiple of systems is either
cognitive, affective, or evaluational motifs for action 
and interaction stimulated by ideas.7"5*
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ideas are powerful motivators. In the German model, 
the ideas of unity, the idea of the impossibility of 
anything else but collective identity, subsumed 
alternatives until as a stimulator, the object was 
achieved through compatible, common values. Common
lvalues are C~i } when an individual wants the group in 
which he and the others belong to achieve a certain group 
goal which the other also wants, or C2} the individual 
intrinsically values conformity with the requirements 
laid down by the other.00
In the period immediately after the war, the 'idea' 
of a European collectivity was expounded, perhaps most 
vociferously by the 'father of Europe', dean Monn^t.®1 
Monnet, himself, felt "man's finest profession is that of 
uniting Ban."02 Following in the tradition of the 
German Foreign Affairs Minister, Gustave Stresemann and
the French Prime Minister Aristride Briand Cthe two of 
whom received a joint Nobel Peace Price in 1926}, Monnet 
attempted to fire enthusiasm for the high ideal of 
Europeanism. This was not an easy task®"-5 in post-war 
Europe, where after 1945 the free countries had the main 
tasks of Cl) economic and political reconstruction and 
C2} safeguarding peace.0^
If Monnet was successful in generating an idea and 
not an ideal, that ideal rapidly gave way to the 
practical and pragmatic political cons1derations of 
operationalIty. In 1947, the economy of the European 
countries, as well as social conslderations, were visibly
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deteriorating. Economically, the Marshall Plan was 
proposed.®"5 At the Conference of Foreign Ministers in 
Paris <12.7.1947?, Foreign Minister M. Molotov refused 
Soviet participation in an all-European programme of 
recons t ruct i on . e<& The political division of Europe
into Eastern and Western zones of Influence and the
Western zone's participation,®7 in an economic
organisation heavily financed by the U.S.. represented a
major practical defeat to the ideal of a Europe
developing out of Europe by itself. The idealism
fostered by private initiative developed into a public
political movement. It is central to this argument that
the high ideals needed for inspiration have slowly
devolved into banal practicalities, which may have
directly contributed to the politically encumbered
progress- oT European integration today. 'The first actual
large-scale post-war European congress was convoked in
the Hague <8 to 11 May 1948? and carried the ideal
to support with all our powers those men and 
governments who work for a great purpose, both 
at home and abroad, in our political and 
religious life, in our professional and trade 
union circles. For this is our last chance for 
peace; this is the only pledge of a great 
future for this generation, and for those to 
follow.®®
Throughout the following decade, the idea of a 
universa1 and united Europe gave way to fragmented 
praqmatic institutions involving but a portion of the 
total whole. Schumann’s plan for a European Coal and 
Steel Community CParis, 25 duly 1952?®’* originally had
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only six members. But, in time, other organisations of 
states in Western Europe fo1lowed in the form of the EEC, 
EFTA, and the non-aligned.
What are the operational ideas of European society 
today? What, if any, are their common values? As 
systems change, is Europe integrating? Does it want to, 
or is it disintegrating?
The idea of “Europe" is highly political. If one 
looks at the political system of Europe, it is noticed 
that there are patterns or types of political
cultures.90 <1} Parochial, where patterns are highly 
particularistic without specialised political roles Cas 
in primitive societies-); (2} Subjective political culture
where the individual is aware and has orientations around
the structures of government, but with a high degree of 
orientation around the out-puts Cratherr passively 
involved); and (3) Participative political culture where 
the individual is actively oriented around both inputs 
and outputs (active involvement). With a cognitive 
orientation, there is a high frequency of awareness, or 
positive feelings toward allegiance, apathy, and
alienation. With an affective orientation alone, there
is a high degree of feelings toward allegiance, no 
feelings toward apathy, and negative feelings toward
alienation; the same with evaluative orientation.91
In their seminal study on political culture,'3*2 
Almond and Verba found that the estimated degree of 
impact of national government on daily life by the
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nation was as follows for three selected nations:
Table 7.2 IMPACT OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ON DAILY 
LIFE
Percentage of Respondents_Who Said Government
Ha s:
' U.K. Germany Italy
Great Impact 33 38 23
Some impact 40 32 31
No impact 23 17 19
Other - - 3
Don't know 4 12 24
Source: Adapted from Table 1, p. 80 in G. Almond 
and S. Verba, The Civic Culture. CPrinceton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1972).
They found a large portion of Britons and Germans 
seeing their government as having some effect on 
individual lives. The Italians were less perceptive of 
governmental impact. - .
The same was illustrated by a similar research into 
the impact of local governments.
Table 7.3 IMPACT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT ON DAILY LIFE 
Percentage of Respondents Who Said Local Government
Ha s:
U.K. Germany Italy
Great impact 23 33 19
Some impact 51 41 39
No impact 23 18 22
Other 2
Don't know 3 8 18
Source: Almond and Verba, The_Civic Culture. Table
2, p. 81.
The results here suggested a rather large majority 
of Britons and Germans are cognitively orientated to 
governmental action. Further research showed that 
amongst those cognitively oriented, the impact of 
national or local government was seen as bene f i c i a 1 .
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The obvious question that arises is this: what
individuals exhibit cognitive orientations? Here their 
research made a significant finding. Their results as to 
the educational differences on the estimation of impact 
of government revealed the following:
Table 7.4
Estimation of Impact_of National Goverment
Percentage who say the national government_ha s :
(Abbreviations used: A=primary or less schooling,
B=some secondary schooling, OSome uni vers i ty
educat ion , D» no schoo1i ng)
U .K. Germany Italy
A B C A B C A B C D
Some 70 76 92 69 83 92 48 72 85 24
e f feet
No effect 25 21 8 -18 14 8 20 19 13 17
Other 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 2 2 6
Don’ t 4 2 0 14 2 0 29 7 - 53
know
Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic- Culture. Table
4, p. 87.- -
From this study can be extrapolated a direct linkage 
between education and participative involvement with 
government. Perception of participation in societal 
arrangements is related to knowledge, if education and 
individual expansion of knowledge can be equated. In 
other words, the more one knows, the more inclined one is 
to be involved in governmental processes, either actively 
or passively. The less one knows, the less active he Is, 
the more passively he participates. This was
substantiated by testing individuals who follow
governmental affairs as below:
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Table_7r5
Percentage who report they follow government 
account s : '5’"z
U.K. Germa ny Italy
Regularly 23 34 11
From time to time _ 45 38 26
Never 32 25 62
Other 1 3 1
Source: -Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table 6,
p. 89.
And individuals paying attention to political 
campaigns, as below:
TabLe__7j_6
Percentage who say they pay attenton to political 
campa igns :
Pay much attention 
Pay little attention 
'Pay no attention 
Other and don't know
U.K. Germany Italy
25 34 ’ 17
47 34 25'
29 27 54
0 5 4
Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, Table 7,
p. 89.
This demonstrates cognitive orientation to government. 
Cognitive orientation is linked to awareness and awareness 
to 'knowledge of’ or education. The following, as reported 
by Almond and Verba, are percentages of those in their study 
that follow politics regularly or at least from time to 
time, by nation and education.
Table 7.7
Awareness of_Government _I_mjoa_ct_and Exposure to Politics
by Education Level:
U.K.
Primary or 
less
educat ion
60
Some
seconda ry 
educat ion
77
Some
un i vers ity 
educat ion
92
Germany 69 89 100
Italy 24 58 87
Source: Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. Table
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10, p. 4 .
The higher the educational level, the more awareness of 
political structures and happenings in society, the more 
cognitive the political orientation. "Thus, on the higher 
levels of education one finds in all nations a uniformly 
higher proportion who folloj* politics.1*1-00
The connection made between cognitive orientation and
positive_'feelings ’_-toward governments allgn themselves with
Cl) the positive 'feelings’ toward a single European
currency (discussed in homo economicus section) (2) the
cognitive orientations needed for the ameliorations of 
divergent value within society (justice, as discussed in
homo politicus) and (3) the emotional commitment to
structural organisations (discussed in. homo soclusj for 
societal (ethical) control. The pattern indicates
orientations, the product of knowledge and critical choice 
po s i 11ons, sympathetic toward an eventual European 
integration, and suggests positive correlations with
educat ion.
This is significant when regarding European integration, as 
the very nature of European society is highly political, the 
demands of which require high literacy levels. Capitalistic 
democracies are essentially knowledge-demand 1 ng societal 
structures. The more competitive the economics system, the 
more economic knowledge is required; the more complex the 
societal system, the more knowledge of political structures
is required if cognitive orientation, commitment,
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dedication, in short, loyalty, is to be extended to the 
system.
The need for adequate basic knowledge, synonymous with 
education rests on the need for comprehension of basic 
concepts, the need for conceptua1isat ion. 101
Conceptualisation need not be right or wrong, true or false. 
It can be direct or indirect, dependent or independent of 
influencing factors. All that conceptualisation requires is
clarity.
Elites Focus on Ideas
Clarity frequently but not specifically relates to 
elites.102 Elites project ideas upon which the masses 
can focus: they promote the conceptualisation of 
thoughts—thoughts which either originate with the elites 
themselves, the product of the-ir own independent cerebral 
output, or the output of society’s widely held
thoughts.107”1 History is often written in terms of 
biographies of elites. This simple conception of history 
relates to the idea that "no time need have gone to ruin, 
could it have found a man great enough, a man wise and good 
enough."1
History is the essence of innumerable
Biographies. But if one Biography, nay, our own
Biography study and recapitulate it as we may, 
remains in so many points uninte11igible to us, 
how much more must these million, the very 
facts of which, to say nothing of the purport 
of them, we know not, and cannot know *"1055 
History notes key individuals, frequently several to
their time as being essentially "those with the most
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power in a group."10*- Elites provide political
formula s:
the truth is that they answer a real need in 
man's social nature: and this need, so 
universally felt, of governing and knowing that 
one is governed not on the basis of mere 
material or intellectual face, but on the basis 
of a moral principle.10'7
Individuals as elites, exercise a moral force
internalised within the masses.10^ The more diverse
and complicated a society is, the greater its demands 
upon political leadership, and the more complex the 
leadership structure, as it must be suffused throughout 
the body of politics as well as exerted by persons or
positions of highest authority.10-* These individuals, 
when exercising elite power, focus conceptualisation on 
ideas and accomplish tasks.
Germany had, in contrast to present Europe, strong 
and vociferous elites, intellectual and political,
representing different ideas and thought, but each into 
the same voice promulgating Germanness.
By themselves governments cannot exercise the degree 
of moral suasion possible by elites. Governments do
adjust polity to society Cor society to polity} in a 
rather inept process of diagnosis and marginal adjustment 
or "piecemeal social engineering,"110 although
occasionally social trends cumulate semi-autonomously to 
give a "movement in and of itself through a destructive 
urgency or thrust."111 But by far the most dynamic
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and fastest general cathexis building is accomplished by 
a single individual who, with clarity and appeal, focuses 
mass attention. Masses are the public; their attention 
is their opinion. Elites thus Influence public opinion. 
Public opinion or public attitudes are important to 
European democracies. A-"working" definition of public 
opinion is a conceptualisation of "those opinions held by 
private persons which governments find prudent to
h e e d . " :l 1 a Image projection frequently is
man 1 pula t i ve3 1:3 when applied by elites and it affects 
public opinion. As images or political ideas are 
employed as activators11^ of public consensus. In 
democracies it i.s_ helpful when individuals possess . 
knowledge to assist the internalisation of ideas11* to 
balance elites projections.
Conc-lus ion —
The Individuality of man, unavoidable by his 
nature, which is, now, through ignorance, a 
cause of so much dissension of the human race, 
will become the cause of more intimate union, 
and of the increase of pleasure and enjoyment. 
Contrasts of feelings, and opinions which have 
here been, hitherto, causes of anger, hatred 
and repulsion, will become sources of 
attraction as being the most easy and direct 
mode to acquire an extended knowledge of our 
nature and the laws which govern it.11<&
The idea of integration may have always been just
subnascent to historical developments. Why else could an 
idea such as European Integration repeatedly trigger 
moral conversional responses?
Unification is an ideal, a lack of any such 
ideological cohesion is not necessarily the equivalent of
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anarchy. People who developed the ability to live with a 
variety of conflicting ideologies are able, as it is 
often put, to agree to disagree.117
"Amongst committed Europeans, it is the vision of a 
united Europe, which brings them together, and European 
union is the goal to which they would -like to commit 
public interest and allegiance."110 The trouble is in 
the commitment area. Commitment is in many respects 
synonymous with the 'Idea' of Europe. Is the idea 
motivated by self-assertion, a fear of being subsumed by 
greater forces? Is it an idea of friendly arbitration 
between near neighbours for domestic advantage, or is it 
a genuine feeling of togetherness because of a .common 
cultural heritage, common civilisation, common
i deolog i e s?
Europeanism11-'5' Is an appeal to wider motivation, 
a European motivation, capable of incorporating as 
constituent portions, any differences In race, culture, 
or language that fall within its sphere. A social system 
transcends all that separates; it Is capable of unifying 
loyalties to a single union. Economic stability in the 
face of American economic problems, the retreat and
re-entrenchment in America of American multinationals, a
meaningful independent European nuclear deterrent for 
defence, in the face of a potential reduction of American 
military presence in Europe, may be motivations forcing 
Europe into an idea of itself. However the focus is not 
specific and may be spread over too many points, that is,
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NATO, the EEC, the EFTA, the Nordic League, in the Hague, 
etc., to make a meaningful, exact, and clear cathexis of 
Europe in the minds of Europeans. There is an
alternative to largeness, anathema to super-power Europe 
being somehow squeezed into homogeneity between bipolar 
giants may be vented by the concept of smallness. Not a" _
re-creation of past power Images, but acceptance of
present realities. Largeness is akin.to a degree of 
homogeneity, functional smallness to heterogeneity. How 
does Europe envision its future?
Testing respondents’ moods, the EuroBarometer found 
the following results toward the ’idea’ of a single 
European area. A survey question in 1986 was worded as
follows1.
Lots of things still have to be done to make it 
easier for people and goods to move about more 
freely .among the countries of the European 
Commun ity. Some countr ie s want to speed this 
up; others hesitate or are against. What do 
you think about the idea that in five or six 
years' time, people, goods, services, and 
capital can freely move about or around the 
countries of the Community as they do inside 
one country at the moment?
Table 7.8
In the tables which follow, these abbreviations are 
used: B=Belgium, DK=Denmark, D=Germany, F=France,
IR-Ireland, I=Italy, L=Luxembourg, N^Netherlands, 
U=United Kingdom, G=Germany, E=Spain, P=Portugal, 
EC=Economic Community Weighted Averages.
In this specific table, these abbreviations are used: 
AC=Agree completely, AS-Agree to some extent, 
DS=Disagree to some extent, DC=Disagree completely.
347
For or Against a_Single Europe Area: 1 'ao
B DK D F IR I L N U G E P EC
AC 52 32 42 50 48 51 58 53 28 61 69 72 47
AS 38 35 44 31 40 37 25 34 41 26 26 24 36
DS 7 17 11 13 9 7 12 7 18 7 4 3 11
DC 3 16 3 6 3 5 2 6 13 6 1 1 6
Source: EuroBaroroeter 25CJune 1986'): 22. tattle 10.
Respondents did not indicate a resounding image or 
vision of a European collectivity. It is interesting to 
note, the highest response comes from persons in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece, new member states who no doubt see 
benefit in a collectivity due to d> ut des motivated
economic interests. Economic interests as evidenced in
trade are also high amongst Luxembourg. Belgium and the 
Netherlands. The disappointing low 'vision' of Europe 
amongst some of the older members may likewise be 
exclusively reflecting popular disillusionment with the 
EC’s performance. The low British response may be
connected with the fact that those in Britain most
opposed to the channel tunnel, a fixed link between their
island and the continent tend to be older women with
fixed political views - basically, those who grew up In 
an imperial period, with global-wide empirical views, 
indicating involvement with national and symbolic
factors.121 Individuals with a fixed d1f f e re nt view.
The concept of seeing collective future projections Is 
allied with trust. For the March/April 1986 period,
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trust amongst the European community members was found to
be as follows:122
Table 7.9
Perceptions of Trustworthiness amongst Community 
Members toward other Community Members:
B BK B F IR I L FJ U G E P EC
B — 13 9 16 - 5 3 12 25- 8 11 15 6 10
BK 16 — 21 13 7 5 12 22 15 15 15 8 14
B 12 21 — 15 9 15 20 12 15 21 20 10 15
F 13 11 18 — 7 8 18 10 4 20 14 16 12
IR 7 13 9 •9 — 3 9 9 9 9 14 5 9
I 7 7 7 5 4 — 13 ' 5 6 12 21 6 8
L 27 12 13 15 5 3 — 23 7 9 13 6 11
N 16 21 20 11 8 7 16 — 19 14 17 9 15
U 13 23 14 8 15 7 12 16 — 17 12 10 11
G 4 10 9 6 3 5 6 7 7 — 15 5 8
E 6 8 11 8 5 8 7 6 4 13 — 8 7
P 4 7 13 7 3 2 9 7 7 7 13 — 8
Source: ' Euro Barometer. 25(<June 1986}:d5-38« table 
19.
The percentage that found other Europeans very
trustworthy is depicted above and contrasts sharply with 
the trust levels those surveyed had for themselves as 
below. CPer March/April 1986}
Table 7.10
Percent of Respondents Who Found Their Own People to 
Be Very Trustworthy123
BDKDFIRILNUGEP
27 26 43 22 21 16 47 19 19 41 39 25
Source: EuroBarometer. 25(June 1986}:47, table 25.
This indicates that if the states in the community 
were considered as a homogeneous society, with an 
Intrinsic trust, the coefficients, as depicted 
immediately above, fall significantly short of the levels
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required for cooperative interaction.324*
What are the factors involved in trust? What are
the conditions for common vision perception? Knowledge,
specifically, public knowledge.
The basic problem in this context can best be 
illustrated by considering briefly the ways in 
which national and sub-na t i ona 1_- po 1 i t i ca 1 ' _ 
systems make their pressure felt among
citizens. Essentially they do this by offering 
services to and making demands on, the ’ 
individual citizen in a .way that establishes a 
direct and controlling link between them.- This 
link is forged virtually at the moment of birth 
and continues to the grave—and even 
beyond.
A felt contact through Interaction which increases with 
the expansion of governmental authority envelops in a 
dense nexus the individual,, inhibiting movement by 
restraints and obligations, making its presence ’felt'. 
The feeling and envelopment is underwritten by peripheral 
and. ancilliary symbols126 fortifying the political 
reality of nation-statism. Contact correlates highly 
with knowledge, and knowledge is related to the
dissemination of information.
The European supplement of The English 'Times,' the 
German 'Die Zeit eft', the French 'Le Monde * , and the
Italian 'La Stampa'would not sell on its own and is 
unlikely to interest more than juat a small proportion of 
the readers of the newspapers distributing it. The 
International Herald Tribune “which is widely read 
throughout Europe"12'' is fundamentally an extension of 
New York papers, that is, non-European in origin. This
has an affect on the dissemination of information and may
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be biased by other than European considerations.
The Information needed for a promotion of an idea.
the vision of Europe, must be clear and Incorporate a 
degree of involvement and partIcI pa11 on. The key to Idea 
internalisation,1'20 is through transactions12"5, as
in the Zol lvere i n which promoted knowledge. This _
knowledge was not significantly biased from outside. 
Knowledge is fundamentally related to ’feelings'’ of trust 
and acceptance of others. If the fact of the matter is 
that the world is now one characterised by a high degree 
of active politicalisation of issues, subsuming that 
obstacle appears to be only possible in a democratic 
environment where configurations with greater degrees of 
knowledge are more greatly diffused amongst the polity. 
For European society to focus on the idea of Europeanism, 
any attempt to expand society would require the injection 
of significantly higher levels of knowledge. Knowledge 
injection need not be considered a malevolent attempt at 
propagandisat ion. However, it would be if attempts were 
channeled toward a preconsidered end such as only within 
the context of the EEC. A substantive injection of 
knowledge would focus on the idea first of Europeanism. 
Once crystalised, the ’how' of the scheme would be 
through the 'meltdown' process of socialisation. If 
integration Is a social process, It requires, ultimately, 
individual accomodation to the idea. Individual
accomodation is not achieved through political or
economic means. It is achieved through social means,
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through knowledge and awareness, through the long and 
continued process of meaningful interchange analogous 
with the development of community.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Knowledge
The process of socialisation, as discussed In chapter 
two of this paper, demonstrated the linkage between 
Integration and learning. As society expands, contact, 
confrontatIon. communication, exchange, and ultimately 
dependence, both physical and psychological, result. 
Individuals are drawn through the process Into 
quantitatively expanded Integrated collectivities.
The expanding society process is virtually identical 
with the individual process. A child becomes aware of, 
communicates, and exchanges with, others, developing 
interdependencies, and Integrating with ever increasing 
sectors of society as he grows and matures. Le a rn i ng
precedes__integration. The learning process itself is a
process of knowledge accumulation.
Applying this basically functional process to the 
notion of expanded, integrated Europe would suggest that the 
more knowledge of otherness, the greater the potential for 
integrated society. But is this so? Is knowledge alone
sufficient?
This sectitn commences with a review of current teaching 
practices in Europe, specifically language learning in 
schools, to determine the degree of otherness being taught 
to school age children. Langiaje learning lncoporates a 
process of other-awareness and may be used as an indicator 
of European learning. The greater the learning intensity, 
the greater the acquired knowledge of the subject
societies. Increased knowledge of others enhances the
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possibilities for the creation of ties. The amount of 
language Cforeign) learning going on in Europe, may, under 
this assumption, be instrumental and overall, beneficial in 
the creation of pan-European ties.
In order to isolate the language learning taking place 
it is necessary to make a few locative remarks.
Table 8.1
Age at which compulsory education begins and 
ends2 Cas of 1977)""
Begins Terminates Average 
Durat i on
Austr i a 6 15 9
Belgi urn 6 14 8
Denmark 7 16 9
Finland 7 16 8-9
France 6 16 10
Germany 6 15* 9
Greece 5 1/2 15-16 9
Iceland 7 16 9
Ireland 6 15 9
Italy 6 14 8
Luxembourg 6 15 9
Netherlands 6 16 10
Norway 7 16 10
Port uga 1'- 6 14 8
Spa 1 n 6 16 10
Sweden 7 16 9
Switzerland 6-7 14-16 8-9
United
Kingdom 5 16 11
“In countries where beainnina and
ending dates are not uniform, the range is 
given.
^In Germany, part-time compulsory until 
age 18
°In practice, termination is on 
reaching 12-13.
Source: Composed of a summarisation of 
materials presented in the appendix of this 
paper gleaned from a myriad of domestic 
ministries therein referenced.
Table 8.1 indicates the extent of the compulsory
schooling undergone by the young in Europe. Outside of
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the home, the school is the primary source of learning. 
Hence, the position 'learned' in the school setting is 
fundamentally instrumental in the building of the overall 
opinion held by the young.
Table 8.2
The average age ranges for the level of 
education is:3
CAbbreviations: P=primary, S=secondary, 
H=higher (post secondary, or tertiary}, 
C=compulsory, N=non-coropu1sory}
P S H C N
Au st r i a 6-9 10-18 19-23 6-14 19-23
BeIgi urn 6-11 12-18 19-23 6-13 14-23
Denmark 7-11 12-19 20-24 7-15 16-24
F inland 7-13 14-18 19-23 7-15 16-23
France 6-10 11-17 18-22 6-15 16-22
Germany 6-9 10-18 19-23 6-14 15-23
Greece 6-11 12-17 18-22 6-11 12-22
I reland 6-11 12-16 17-21 6-14 15-21
Italy 6-10 11-18 19-23 6-13 14-23
Netherla nds 6-11 12-17 18-22 6-15 16-22
Norway 7-13 14-19 20-24 7-15 16-24
Portuga1 7-10 11-18 19-24 7-12 13-24
Spa i n 6-9 10-17 18-22 6-15 16-22
Sweden 7-12 13-18 19-23 7-15 16-23
United
Ki nadom 5-10 11-18 19-23 5-16 17-23
(The omissions of Iceland, Switzerland, and 
Luxembourg related to OECD presentational 
omissions. }
Source: Composed from a summarisation of 
materials presented in the appendix of this 
paper.
Language learning, a basic source of 'otherness' 
learning, increases as the child progresses through the 
school system. Table 8.2 illustrates the compulsory 
component of the average extent of educational
possibilities within European systems.
What is important is the focus on compulsory
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education. Although language education is distributed 
throughout the educational curricula, the compulsory 
exposure, as an indication of a minimal exposure, is of 
1mportance.
The appendix hereto attached presents a profile of 
compulsory education in Western Europe, highlighting the 
extreme diversity of formal education being offerrea.
The diversity reflects operational assumptions of those 
particular collectivities.
Given the diversity of eduction streamings and 
programmes, the following may be gleaned as a sound 
assumption of the average school leaver's exposure to a 
second foreign language.
Table 8.3
(Abbreviations: A = Not possible to conclude 
compulsory educational system without having 
had a high exposure to at least one second 
language. B=difficult to leave school without 
a second language. C=The norm is to have had a 
significant exposure. D=Very much possible to 
have not had significant exposure. E=Exposure
marginal to nil ■ )
Austria B Belgi urn B
Denmark A Finland B
France C Germany B-C
Ireland E Italy C-D
Luxembourg A Netherlands B-C
Norwa y A Port uga1 E
Sweden A Swi tzerland A
United Kinadom C-D
Source: Composed from a summarisation of 
materials presented in the appendix.
If Switzerland were used as a multi-1inguist1c
example of a successful political and economic
homogeneous entity, it is correct to infer that, on the
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individual level, a basic knowledge of at least one other 
language contributes toward the effective solidarity of 
that mult 1-1ingua1 collectivity. Although it possesses 
four 'national languages’, a significant knowledge of 
’other languages' appears to be operational, this affords 
a basis for a communlcations-community. A
communicat 1ons-commun1ty is capaele of making significant 
and meaningful cross-group ties on and at the 
biographical level. Here, linguistic ability gives the 
impression of aiding the building of a collectivity.
From this Impression may be gleaned an approach to 
Europeanisation. This somewhat typical approach appears 
to be a pattern. Small continental countries tend to 
place a higher formal significance on language learning. 
These countries also tend to place a degree of importance 
on 'otherness* or social learn lr.c by supporting such in
other than language classes.
Belgium, Luxembourg, and Thm Netherlands, as ceuntries 
stressing language learning, sees also to place an 
average emphasis on Structural European 1sm,the idea 
of a single European area; Denmark. however, does not.
This may be economically linked, as both the Danish 
satisfaction with life,”' and general happiness^ are 
higher than the Benelux countries, and so is their 
disposable per-capita income.7
If the notion of Europeanisation is correlated with 
trust Ctable 7.9, p. 548ff.j. the smaller countries which 
appear to emphasize language learning appear also to
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trust their European neighbours more than do large
countries that do not.® Amongst Community countries, 
core countries seem to register higher degrees of 
Europeanism than do periphery countries, multi-language 
countries more than monolingual, poorer countries more
than richer countries.”'
This seems to suggest a relationship between 
economic and political motifs with social integration 
motifs. This is the du ut des syndrome. Because of this
linkage, the Community polling material cannot be made 
sufficiently unbiased to yield adequate image material.
Language learning itself does not ensure 
integratlonal feelings. It only better equips the 
individual with first hand knowledge of others which may 
or may not lead toward a greater understanding and 
eventual feeling of commonality. Such learning is 
generally a component of education which itself is an 
‘’organized and sustained communication designed to bring 
about learning."10 Formal learning is influenced by 
the state, either positively as in the case of Austria, 
where "otherness" is examined neutrally and the idea of 
Europe is forwarded, essentially as an ideology, or 
negatively, such as in Britain where the idea of Europe 
is pragmatic, very political, and inextricably 
intertwined with the organisation of the European 
Community, and as such not encouraged.11 The state's 
position, as socialisation leader of its nationals, has a 
key influence on public consciousness.
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To the question, why is Europe not integrating, one
must look to the state, and the answer appears to
indicate that there is no significantly manifest desire 
for such integration to take place, other than that which 
is economically or politically necessary du ut des. Sir 
Geoffrey Howe's speech to the London Chamber of Commerce 
C3 April 1987} fairly typically forwarded the position of 
Britain toward Europe - one of personal gain,12 a
position more or less typical of European fellow EC 
domestic governments. Despite the erosion to sovereignty 
in the political, social, and economic spheres,
governments appear reluctant to foster the idea of Europe 
as an i deology. Fostering such an idea could be termed 
social engineering, and the critique may be leveled: why
should such a European idea be planted in the minds of
the individuals? The obverse is also a legitimate
consideration, the fact that self-identity is fostered, 
why should that be crystallised and implanted?
The fact that a national identity appears to take
precedence over that of a European identity suggests that 
governments are socialising their populations against 
Europeanisation. National currencies, flags, and war 
memorials in churches, postage stamps, sport
competitions, and a myriad of other phenomena all carry
distinct national bias. All of these influences
underwrite the individual's learning process, his
awareness, and perception of others. This awareness is 
nation-oriented. The general learning process produces a
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general "knowledge" cathexized In the Individual on the 
uniqueness of particularism.
Knowledge: A Precondition for Awareness
An individual's attitudes not only embody a
provisional appraisal of what for him is significant
reality; they also serve to mediate the kinds of
re lationships he maintains with others and the kind of
conception of self that he wants to maintain.13
For any society, an existential base creating
certain common_experiences interpreted through
certain cultural premises by men with certain 
personal qualities in the light of certain 
social conflicts produces certain political 
Ideologies . 1X<
Attitudes and ideologies highly correlate. An 
existential base - "subject and term explicated by the 
sociology of knowledge" - is the social vehicle of any 
questioned ideology.1-'
Because of an inherent compulsion to believe certain 
core elements of a given belief system,ie there is a 
general goal reference or te1os common to a given society 
toward which, either consciously or partly unconscious1y, 
ideologies and beliefs group. States of Europe appear to 
be supporting domestic national ideology.
Common experience indicates common thought, and is a 
subscribed common function by which society develops 
cohesiveness.17 The cultural premises are commonly 
found values, epistemologies, and particular specific 
beliefs.1* The individual input is the effect of the
sum total of personal qualities applied during social
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conflict, the elevation of tensions in the system, and
the prime inducement for change,15' The individual J
input, his personal qualities, bear influential weight on
3
the formation of his political ideologies or attitudes.
Hence, individual endowments Influence attitudes. j
Individual endowments, given a degree of normality, are
1
the product of socialisation.20 “If what is learned a
early in life is indeed influential in later years, the
••implications of early idealisation may be of singular i
importance,"21 when understandina why people think as 1
“ 1 
they do. Early idealisation is the product of early J
I
socialisation, which may be summarised as early learning J
1
equals early education. In Europe, this period of first
learning is hi ghly biased toward the partic- '
, . J
ularistic.^-^ ;
Early learning and environmental learning, have both ■;
a positive and a negative bearing toward perceptions of
■j
others.23 Positive learning in an environment
positively disposed to outsiders, tends to greater
degrees of acceptance and possible trust. Conversely,
negative learning in a negatively disposed environment,
tends toward perceptions of hostility. .
All the general problems of perception and
communication inherent in any 1 nterpersona 1, -j
intergroup, or interstate relationship are •}
invariably exacerbated innearlydirect 1
proportion to the intensity of the threat 1
perceived by the units in a conflict j
situation. 1
Groups’ perceptions are always changing, representing
j
j
'S
I
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ideological change brought about by circumstances such as 
modernisation and other events in the normal passage of
time. Ideology is a prime effective instrument of
power^*' when direc11 ona 11 y and goal orientedly
manipulated. In the hands of institutions, it becomes an
effective force akin to power. In terms of national
identity, ideology, when intertwined with the nation
"could be one of the major instruments for . . .
developing"2*’ commonalities. Once identification is 
made, the individual, reinforced by symbols, is often 
willing to sacrifice a great deal for the sake of that 
commona 1 i ty . Si'7
Education is a major factor in the creation of
knowledge . Knowledge of identity, ideology, and
Cbroadlyj group, is a major force in the creation and 
cohesion of the nation, either consciously or 
semi-consciously, employed by a system for the solidarity 
of a nation-state commonality.2^ Education enhances
perspective, It is responsible for a positive
disposition toward others and otherness. When inwardly 
focussed, it frequently develops xenophobia. Narrowly 
focussed, it crystallises the notion of collectivity, 
constricting the Individuals to the nation. If the 
parameters were relaxed and redrawn, it would promote 
crystallisation of the individual in a multi-nation
perspec t i ve . '5C)
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An Example
A recent report by the Youth Offices of the Federal 
German armed forces drew attention to the problem of 
perception and perspective currently held by the young 
with regard to their national security. "The 
understanding of the basic principles of our security 
policy is made difficult by the fact that many young 
people lack a historical knowledge . . . [they are] . . . 
suffering also from a blurring of concepts."31 
Lamenting the lack of commitment by the young to 
traditional European security questions and views of
remedial problem solving action, it indirectly but
forcefully underlined the fact that history or historical 
knowledge is paramount toward cognitive perceptions. Is 
a militarily secure peace, 'non-peace,’ or is the concept 
of law and order in society, a 'structural violence'?
The answer is based on perceptional orientation gleaned 
through the early learning process. These perceptional
views demonstrate the mighty tool of knowledge when
controlled by established authority, which can greatly 
affect the cultura1isat ion of the young through 
structured imagery projection, through education, media,
etc .
If for Europe, the media portrays the tripolarity or 
multipolarity of the world system in terms of 
superpowers, is it any wonder that sociologically 
Europeans view issues in abstract terms?32
This abstractness may lead toward a creation of a
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11stlessness, or disengagement. The mental and sometimes
physical conflict Induced into the system by change is 
the result of cultural lag. Cultural lag is when 
traditional solutions and arrangements are no longer 
compatible with the demands of newer needs. To provide
all that is needed, to give purpose and significance to 
new solutions, is "an enormous educational task involving 
politicians, political scientists, historians,
sociologists, trade unionists, media experts and the 
clergy."33 It is the product of knowledge, and highly
susceptible to the bias placed on the received knowledge 
of the system.
Collective knowledge, channeled through social 
collectivity, had a great bearing on the development and
construction of the national consciousness evidenced
during the nation building period of European history. 
Collective learning is. in effect, dependent upon the 
knowledge available to the collectivity as a whole. Its
importance was illustrated by Richard Rose in a sample
highlighting the case of Britain, as below:
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Table 8.4
Justification for Supporting Systems of Government
Agree Di sagree Don't know
It's the best form
% % %
of government we 
know
It's the kind of
77 19 4
government the 
people want
We've got to
66 25 9
accept it, what­
ever we think
It usually provides
65 32 3
the right things 
for people
It's good because
49 40 10
it's tradit ional 44 49 7
Source: Politics in England Today. CLondon: Faber
and Faber, 1974), p. 127, table IV,1.
Governments reinforce national society through the
fact that it is all that is fundamentally known; in other 
words, not much else is known. This may be expanded to
Include the notion that as not much is known about
otherness, our-ness is the best.
It is not surprising that the idea of nationality 
and eventually nationhood went side by side with the 
general advances of popular literacy and numeracy 
associated with broadening general education.3^ The 
spread of education in Western Europe produced greater 
popular knowledge of self and of otherness in the already
existing nations of Europe, and significantly added the 
development and conceptualisation of self amongst the
newer states.35
Once the process of group consciousness started,
there appear also the deliberate pioneers and 
leaders of national awakening. There appear 
grammarians who reduce the popular speech to
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writing; purifiers of language: collectors of 
folk epics, tales and songs: first the poets 
and writers in the revised vernacular: and the 
antiquarians and historians who discover 
ancient documents and literary treasures - some 
genuine, some forged, but all of them tokens of 
national greatness.
National pride and symbols arise, such as Rule Br i tann1 a, 
Marseillaise in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
Deutschland uber_a 1les in the twentieth, which support
particularisms and highlight exclusion of others.
Symbols, maps, anthems, flags are taught and impressed 
upon the young by educational processes, national 
Indoctrination by informal group pressure and the media 
of mass communications as well as "by all the coercive 
powers of the state and its system of compulsory public
educat ion .
This notion of collective consciousness_is built on
the idea_of_communications and is why nationalism and
nation state building is highly correlated with language. 
Accepting this reasoning supports the idea that a nation 
is formed and evolves when reinforced through
communications, when a . . .
relatively large community of human beings has 
been brought into existence who can communicate 
effectively with each other, and who have 
command over sufficient economic resources to 
maintain themselves and to transmit this 
ability for mutual communications to their 
children as well.3®
A human network of communications exists when such a
system is capable of self-maintenance and reproduction, 
and has a potential for further developing self. This 
definition ties collective knowledge to communications
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and the notion of an autonomous environment. This was
the pattern of development historically in Western
Europe. But is the degree of knowledge, communication, 
and autonomy necessary for sustaining particularistic 
units still present in the European international system? 
Autonomy, as indicated by modern life, may be pa s se in
Europe.3'5" The precocity of associations with limited 
collectivities may be challenged by advancements in 
learning, widening the barriers to traditional European
entities. The communications - economic sustainment -
reproductive chain, is weakening. The indication is that 
the advanced world is becoming rapidly non-autonomous, 
more generally knowledgeable, and mono-linguistic/'1-' 
Unbiased knowledge is becoming a functional necessity to
modern life/'1
In the past, the nation state environment accounted 
for the stable condition necessary for expanded 
development and the growth necessary for the diffusion of 
best practices in technology and commerce. This 
environment was also responsible for the founding of 
manufacturing, for a self-propulsion of market
forces/'2 and for an inward focus of learning. The
EEC, as a customs union provided for the freedom of 
movement of goods and of factors of production, basically 
an enlargement of an area constructed for efficiency in
resource allocation in an environment where
discrimination was absent/-' It was in this respect
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only an economic extension of the national collectivity. 
These spatial arrangements are, in the light of 
technologica1 advance, becoming challenged, restrictive
and, in some respects, non-advantageous. Knowledge is
thrusting exchange beyond such frontiers.
Western democracies, functioning via a received 
popular mandate, require an intellectual level equivalent 
to the challenges of modern society if that democracy is 
to find its optimal position in a multinational order. 
Current internationa1 socialisation is primarily
characterised by Interact ions, mostly transact ions of an
economic nature, with little effective individual impact 
regarding fundamental, generally held, knowledge of
’otherness'.
Cycles of Development
In history, there have been cycles of activity 
characterised by periods in which domestic entities both 
developed internally and related to others externally in 
an ever-changing international system. The period, from 
1845 to 1875,was a hegemonic period, centring
around the role of Britain.
From 1875 to 1945 was a period in which all features 
were reversed. It was a non-hegemonic order, which was 
followed by another period (1945-70), which was a new
hegemonic order similar to the first but with the United
States as the fulcrum.'4"1 Since 1970, the
international system has changed again toward a
non-hegemonic or polar hegemony, with the breakdown of
378
Bretton Woods, the energy crises, and latterly the
financial crisis of the modern period.
A hegemony is like a centaur, half man, half beast,
a combination of consent and coercion, Z|fclead 1 ng,
gu1d1 ng, d1rect ing political, economic, and to some
extent, social activities. Its present absence means.
for Europe, a loss of leadership as an identification
role mode 1. The choice of what is to come next in
Western European democracies, is ultimately a decision 
depending on the democratic polity. It will be a product 
of that polity's general knowledge.
In a Rousseauean sense, "Man is born free; and
everywhere he is in chains."4'7 The chains are of his 
own making, through structura1isation of society and 
arrangements of convention. Decisions made are taken
within the context of reference. The structura1isation
of society, in an economically advanced capitalistic 
society constitutes both points of reference and chains. 
Capital, the spirit of individual advantage
(entrepreneurship, the urge to make a profit), markets 
implying means of transportation, wage workers 
(separation between ownership and wage earner), the 
acquisition of raw materials, and capital intensive 
industry*"3 require, because of the great abstraction,
separation of the individual from economic transactions.
The result is a high degree of struct uralisation,
organisation, for assurances of fluidity of the system.
The arrangements of conventions, needed in a
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harmoniously functioning complex society may likewise be
considered as chains. Forces, institutional or
sociologically moral, function as cohesive binding 
agents, as substance moulding individuals into set 
patterns of behaviour. The "economic history of modern 
Europe is the record of the impact of industrialism upon 
an older and more stable organisation."'''-’’ The impact
of econcomic development, that is, increasingly
sophisticated transactions, relates to the requirement 
for higher degrees of structura1isation within the 
system, necessitated for the transmission of knowledge
and know how. The impact is in Increased organisation of
society.
This increase of organisation produces tensions.
Two positions are evident and suggestive of these 
tensions. On one hand, "one man is made to carry human 
knowledge to its furthest point," and on the other, "many 
find the ability to read a dangerous thing. "”-c>
Tension brings about a quest for freedom from tension, 
through a need for control by subjective dictates and 
critical thinking. This action provides the force for
social cohesion or ethical ties. The tools needed for
society to make a choice are controlled by the authority
in those societies.
Authority
Tension raises an interesting phenomenon, the 
question of authority. The sociological movement over 
time, aided by philosophical reasoning, has focused
380
attention in Western culture, on the individual.""’1
The concept of democratically free societies are the 
result. The political authoritar1 an1sm of the past has
been the focus of that movement. The result has been the
diffusion of authority from a central sovereign above 
society to an authoritarian web of government encircling 
society. Previously, authority if one so desired, was 
far removed from the individual. He could get on with 
this need fulfillment as a nominalist, only marginally 
associated with the sovereign. Today, governmental 
penetration into the individual's private life is such 
that authority structures are constantly evident,
frequently causing tension amongst individuals, between 
individuals and society, or government in general.
As the individuals’ interests are centred within
their own world, the interests of others are, for them,
'less urgent’,1252 and in order for governmental
authority to be recognised, it must penetrate the private
world, underwriting authority through communication.f5 3
Individuals in sociological settings have perceptions and 
thoughts shaped througn language .25As a good deal of 
interpersona1 communications is an attempt to locate with 
words and signals, “the quantitative coordinates of a 
given relationship along a finely textured matrix of
interactions.*'
Concepts are perceptual lenses for shaping 
thought.=Sfc' For authority to be recognised, and to be
brought into the near-zones of Individual life,
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communication must be structured to so yield that result. 
It is not by accident that the term Parliament stems from 
the verb parler, to speak.Governments paint
pictures through speech, "strong talk." "election talk," 
"official comment," and "negotiation." These are
pictures that image their authority. Words (verba} are
suggestive of deeds (facta). Higher degrees of literacy, 
associated with greater developed cognitive evalutional 
abilities, make it increasingly more possible for the 
individual to personally evaluate actions of governments. 
Governments_are forced through language (or the lack of
disciosure)>_to fortify their positions to prevent inroads
i nto a uthor1ty. Authority and the individual, as
d i vergenc ies arise, are placed into the resulting tension 
situations. For author ity as sovereignty, must
ultimately be recognised. A modern state cannot "achieve
a comfortable monopoly over the use of social
communication. Consequently, the authority of the state 
is uncertain and unabsolute, constantly threatened."s&
The control that governments have, although not
exclusive, relates to the formation of ideas. Power is
exercised through the educational system.
Communication is conducted within the functional
parameters of a culture. The parameters of culture also 
include a codified system of beliefs,-'3' for 
communication implies both deliverance and acceptance of
concepts. Both, in order to be effective, have to be
within the same contextual restraints. Hence, belief
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systems*1,0 support communications and likewise support 
authority. This was first theorised by Weber who related
the nature of a belief to its source.
Charismatic Nature of Belief
Belief that an individual (group) is enclosed with 
superhuman abilities to make good decisions for a 
collectivity
Charismatic Source of Belief
Religions: Scripture, prophecy, signs, etc.
Secular: Demonstrated abilities, personal
attractiveness
Traditional_Nature of Belief
Belief based on length of acceptance, opposed to
'new' untried concepts (ancient))
Traditional Source of Belief
Custom, habit, superstition, conviction, etc.
Rat ional-Legal_Nature of Belief
The System embodies highest levels of normative 
efficiency, effectiveness, etc. Protected by 
constitutional guarantees
Rational-Legal Source of Belief
Sophisticated indoctrination, presupposing 
widespread literacy and growth of bureaucracy as 
cause and effect of system.
Authority structures in Western Europe spread 
throughout the above schema, however, governmental 
authority is at this point in historical development 
centralised around a Rational-Legal posture.The 
strengths of rational-legal authority rest on a degree_of
programmed acculturation in a conditional collectivity of 
high literacy,6'3 This is the biased knowledge 
presented in school, available and compulsory for all new 
society members.
The individual's freeing of self from traditional 
conceptualisations of authority in Western historical
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evolution has been produced by the general acceleration 
of advances in knowledge and in its accumulation. It has 
been related to the increased emphases on the Individual
in Occidental Cultural evolution. Where once political
authority may have rested upon common belief systems,
i deolog1e s, or ethics (based on Christianity), it is now 
anchored in duty,__power,__and physical restraints (as
found in capitalism). As literacy advances,
indoctrination becomes more intense. It has been
suggested in literature that*'-1* the post-industrial
societal trend is toward an anti-institutionalism, a
trend which supports a new hedonism, a hedonism based on 
affluence and on a commercially fostered ethic of 
consumption. In many respects, this
anti-insitutionalism, the break-up of a social order, is
highly individualistic, based on immediate, impulsive
grat i f icat ion of needs.6”'
Hedonism may be a trend toward a new standard based 
on action, related not to conceptua1ised authority but on 
responsibilities of acting, and upon personal
insights.This Is a counter-cult ure movement, borne
out by new styles of management, new structural ethics, 
secularisation of religion, human potential movements, 
se1f-rea1isation, self-improvement, etc., which suggests
that new hedonism is a stress on s1mpli c11y and
commun ity, shaped by personal freedom. The expressions 
of personal freedom are shaped by learning, or the
absence of same.
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The extension of authoritarian considerations,
intertwined with the learning process, illustrates the 
cause-effect relationship of society interaction, 
specifically, the great effect institutionalised learning 
has on the belief structure of society.
In a study of British children, Dowse and Hughes 
found that the higher the educational level of parents of
children, as well as the child's own education, the
higher the political awareness and general knowledge.
Table 8.5
Children's political knowledge as a function of their
educat Ion.__parents' education and class
(Abbreviations:: H=high, L=low)
Rank Parents' Parent s' Child's Child's % High
Educat ion Soc i a 1 Educat ion Rank on Political
Class Political Knowledge
Knowledge
A H H H 1 87
B L H H 2 69
C H L H 3 63
D L L H 4 59
E L H L 5 18
F H L L 6 13
G H H L 7 12
H L L L 8 7
Source: Robert E. Dowse and John Hughes, "The
Family, the School, and the Political Socialisation 
Process," in Richard Rose, ed., Studies in British 
Politics: ft Reader in Political Sociology. CLondon:
Macmillan Press, 1976), p. 188, table 88. The 
conclusion, as well as the methodology, is contained 
there in.
As the demonstrated political knowledge of the new 
inductees to a political culture is heavily biased by his 
own and his parents' education, the tendency is that the
more authoritarian the system, the more authoritarian the
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child. There is a direct linkage. Conversely, it is to 
be noted, if the system were liberal, or indeed had any 
other orientation or ideological persuasion, it could 
also be theoretically socialised in the young.
The obvious question is, do the institutions of 
society consciously attempt to control socia 1isationa1 
development or is it by chance? The answer may be 
“both.” The fact that the system is there, does indeed
mean that is exercises an influential force. However,
the conformity to any set patterns of behaviour is
enforced. Further, if one were to take England as an 
example, historical evidence does show occasional bias 
toward social engineering. In the language of the Old 
Poor Law, the chief aim of education was "to set the poor 
on work."4,7 Education had a specific aim. The aim or
purpose of education is not here of Issue. What is
important here, is that there is a bias which is
exercising control over the educational process, either 
directly or indirectly, and, through that process, the 
system in general.
In a study on the 1974 British election coverage, 
those that watched the government broadcasting system 
registered the following satisfaction:
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Table 8.6
Views on the Impartiality of the BBC Coverage of the 
1974 Election Campaign
Completely satisfied 38%
Less than completely satisfied 62%
Source: “The February 1974 General Election on
Television," A BBC Audience Research Department 
Report, in Richard Rose, ed., Studies In British 
Politics. CMacmlllan, 1976), adapted from table 10, 
p. 304.
Although different respondees perceived the coverage 
differently, 62% found it somehow biased.
The Increased concentrat1 on of ownership of the
media, as illustrated below, would present also the 
potentiality for the transmission of knowledge with a
d1st i net bias.
Table 8.7
Concentra t ion_of Ownership of Daily ana Sunday
Newspa pers
The three leading corporation!' percent a ge share of
Total Total Total Nat 1ona1 Na t1ona
Dally Daily Sunday Daily Sunday
and Ci rcuiat ion
Sunda y
Cl rcuiat 1<an
1948 46 45 61 62 60
1961 65 67 84 89 84
1976 64 49 80 72 86
The Proportion of the Total Market Accounted for by
the Leading Five Companies in Selected Main Media
Sectors In Percentages
Commercial Televi
National Dailies 
National Sundays
sion Programmes 
(transmitted)
Ceircuiat ion) 
Cc1rcuiat i on)
% Controlled by 
the leading five
50
91
96
Source: David Coates, The Context of British
Politics. CLondon: Hutchinson. 1984), adapted from
table 33 , p. 209.
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The basic growth of the individual from 
authoritarian acceptance to critical thinking and 
ultimate responsibility are actions which may eventually 
challenge existent establishmentarianism. This is done 
by seeking new future alternatives to social arrangements 
quite distinct from current authoritarian structures.
This action is a dichotomy as the individuals’ growth 
Cknowledge accessibility) is controlled, to a great 
extent, by those social institutions which may ultimately 
be challenged by those very same individuals.
Discussion
Collective behavioural control may be through either
conditioned or moralistic alternatives,__or through
socially Imposed__image-precepts called rights or
wrongs.156 These psychological restraints on action, 
along with physical restraints are both controlled and 
developed by states through governments. "All the ties 
that hold men together in any society, all the needs and 
all the hopes that depend on their society for
realisation, prompt them to law-abidingness."156
Compatible Interaction based on law-abidingness produces 
a 'mystic' civil obedience, and is based on "Custom . . .
affective ties ... a purely material complex of
interests, or . . . ideal motives,"70 and develops a
type of legitimacy. This interactiona1 accomodation and 
subscription to basic behavioural patterns is the result 
of socialisation and because of the prominence in the 
process of the educational learning process, amounts to
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learning effectively controlled by governments.
One learns the acceptance of traditional authority 
or the acceptance of a given position or view by the 
"handing down" process.71 The political framework of 
socialisation is institutiona1, family, peer group, the 
school system, social groupings and eventually secondary 
institutions such as political parties or
associations.72 The stages in socialisation are
generally first C1D submissive, C2) accountable, and C3) 
participatory.73 The difficulty of deciding 
ultimately what "motive" is operational for having 
individuals obey authority is appreciated when realising 
that authorities almost always possess at least potential 
power and influence. The difficulty is in ascertaining 
whether subscription is through de sire or obed i ence, or 
simply a Kind of "anticipated reaction" in response to 
the power or influence that underlies authority. In 
other words, when does authority really work as 
authority?7’*
Oppenheisa suggests, "Those in power normally succeed 
in securing compliance with their decisions simply 
because they possess authority."7’”' That is because 
individuals "nave formed the habit of considering
official enactments to have binding force, regardless of 
whether tney approve of them" or not. In his
consideration of Herrshaft, Weber found that a command
with a specific content will be obeyed by Individuals out 
of the "probability that by virtue of habituation, a
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command will receive prompt and automatic
obedience."76 In other words, "when the [desired]
behaviours do not occur there is no authority, whatever 
may be the" proper "theory of organisation."77
Authority, in order to be such, must be recognised.
States claim national authority. By both physical and 
institutional means, they enforce that position. When 
not done successfuly, tensions develop and eventually the 
questioning of authority leads to a crisis of authority. 
Such a crisis is a result of knowledge introduced into 
the socialisation process free from the prevailing bias. 
It is based on a perceptual change taking place in the 
minds of the collective individuals, divergent from that 
held by the power authority. Resistance or opposition to 
traditional forces, is frequently induced by
modernisation and the fact that things today are not as 
they were before. So the answers of today's problems 
would not necessarily be those that answered yesterday's 
problems.
In as much as organised behavior results "when each
of the coordinated individuals sets for himself a
criterion of choice that makes his own behaviour
dependent on the behaviour of others" in complex society, 
the individual "sets himself a general rule which permits
the communicated decision of another to guide his own
choices."70 Patterns of normality are important.
These are, generally, the sum total of projected or 
received patterns, emitting from the institution. Higher
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literacy challenges acceptance and comforrolty to the
patterns after a degree of Independence is reached.
"An individual on becoming associated with an 
organisation, will be more likely to adopt its goals in 
place of his own if he has hope of changing those he 
finds unsat 1 sfactory or repugnant."7"’ This is a
fundamental idea embodied in democracies and in
integration. An internal functioning of the individual 
in systems through perceptions of participation in one or 
all institutional benefits is necessary. A failure to so 
perceive participation tends toward dis-integration.
This institutionalisation of authority aims ar the sKOotn
continuation of collective action, failure leads to
disfunctions.630
As life i s ’’experienced everyday . . . in terms of
differentiating degrees of closeness and
remoteness6*1 , ” otherness knowledge, its application
and appreciation is tne key to successful integration. 
However, as knowledge expands the requirements of the 
individual for greater amounts of learning, all forms of 
authority come into question. The heterodoxy is that, on 
the one side, the system is trying to influence 
socialisation to assure its legitimacy, and, on the 
other, that legitimacy is being challenged by the 
increasing levels of literacy.®2
This paper has argued that most of this knowledge 
has been filtered tnrough a state-led social system and
biased toward the maintenance of that system. This view
substantiates the fact that states' insistence on
sovereignty, the prima facie Inhibitor to further
European integration, is a claim based and perpetuated by
the domestic states’ own action. Can these be overcome?
This paper has put forward the role of Elites in 
society as one which enables the population to focus on 
ideas and thus cause action to be accomplished by 
society’s collective efforts. Here, is appreciated both
the functionalist and the neo-functiona1ist views. The
functionalists see society integrating, through the 
process of socia 1isa11 on and the Neo-Functionalist sees 
it happening by way of elite-led activity.®^ Chapter 
7 quoted Thomas Carlyle, wno noted that history appears 
to be a compilation of biographies of individuals. By 
virtue of the fact that certain individuals" names appear 
to be transmitted to further generations, there appears 
to be an implication of importance attached to the 
accomplishments of those individuals. In many respects, 
a good portion of these may be considered the elites of 
their period.
In illustrating the ideological beginnings of German 
unity in chapter seven, this paper presented the effect 
of a concerted action amongst elites. In the German 
model, elites fixed onto and projected one common idea, 
the collective totality of man. Out of this idea, the 
idealism of a German-ness evolved. Lessing's Nathan der
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We i se, specifically the "ring parable," and Beethoven's
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Ninth Symphony (fourth movement ode: "Alle Menshen 
werden Bruder") are but two examples. If for nothing 
else, both of these Individuals are in the history books 
for their appeal to a higher ideal.
Who are those amongst the elites of today that will 
go down in the biographies of history as integration
el i t e s ?
If Monnet is considered as one. it is the suggestion 
here that, in the post-Monnet era. there has been an
Inexorable decline of idealism, a lack of a concerted
voice focussing the attention of the masses on
Europeanlsm. Un f ort una t e 1 y most elites’3" are not
completely self disinterested servants of the
public.®^ Their "circulation" is an important
mechanism of social equilibriun,6- and as orientations
tend to be less ideological and more pragmatic,they 
frequently take on the characteristic of a ruling elite, 
a minority whose performance regularly prevails in cases 
of potentialities of conflict over what become political 
issues.87 These elites tend to be power elites.88 
Power elites are highly pragmatic, vis a vis ideological
and tend tc be biased.8^
Eventual integration depends on the total 
integration of soc1et y. not necessarily elite portions of 
that society. If the elite portions integrate and 
stimulate further domestic support for Integration a la
bonne he ure. Such action would be an isogoalc step
requiring 1 nterna1isation amongst the masses over time.
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In British history, the events of 1066 may be considered 
of this sort. The events of 1215, however, suggest that
it was not successful. In Politics in England Today,
Richard Rose suggests that the common and Identifiable 
American identity out of a polyglot base, stems from an 
overt commitment to that end by the school system. He 
furthers: "English school children Cand their teachers)
take their Englishness for granted. in the words of one 
elderly life-history respondent, schools taught
patriotism 'in the form of prayers and history.'"'”'0
If patriotism, or nationalism, is taught by society's 
school systems through prayer and history, would not 
Europeanness be the end result amongst the masses if 
school systems, by the same means, taught it as such?
Universa1ism, not particularism, as an ideal, appears to 
be the missing ingredient necessary for European
integration. The efforts of elites to support that end
continuously, and in a clear voice, is m i s s i ng. The
present system supports particularism in terms of
national superiority. Monnet, for this reason, disliked 
nationalism. He said, "Equality is absolutely essential
in relations between nations, as it is between men.",?1
Open Education: The Key to Europeanisation
Acculturation, the parallel process to 
socialisation, is a process whereby the old and current 
value systems, belief patterns, and societal structures, 
are handed down and projected into the future. An 
historical study of society assumes that, through
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education, present day problems become clearer when 
attention Is given to major directing forces and how 
those forces affect today's problems.^2 The education 
process is based on underlying a s sumpt ions. Conflict 
over assumptions has been a major component of societal
growth as traditional assumptions handed down from the 
past vie with new assumptions forwarded by those who 
advocate change.15,3 Traditionalists look to the past 
for solutions. Progressives, in the light of changing 
social and intellectual conditions, sponsor new 
solutions.'’'^ Hence, the educational process,
specifically the formal component thereof, is integrally 
related with the collectivity of each period through 
tlBe.9"" Patterns for historical periods, which 
influence the posture of education, may be suggested by 
the following questions:
The Individual_Institutions
Political 
I nst i t ut i ons
Econom i c 
Institutions
Soc ial
I nst i t ut i ons
Re 1i gious 
Inst i tut i ons
What happens to education when 
the state is predominantly 
monarchic, aristocratic, democratic, 
nationalistic, liberal, fascist, 
communi st?
What happens to education when 
a society is predominantly 
agricultural, feudal, commercial, 
capitalistic, individualistic, 
industrial, collective?
What happens to education when 
a society is marked strongly 
by family, or clan and tribe groups, 
class distinctions, urban life, the 
middle class, organised labour, 
heterogamous racial or ethnic groups
What happens to education when 
a society is dominated by one
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church, or is divided by many?’5**’
Not only is the method of education distinct to
collectivities, but also the conception of what
constitutes knowledge and the social role assigned to
knowledge. The status of organised knowledge has a
direct bearing upon the the kinds of education that are
instituted.*5*"” In a collectivity, the role of
education supports that collectivity's underlying values.
When religious, aristocratic, and humanistic
traditions confront secularism, democracy, and science,
the collect Ivity, in the modern epoch under heavy
influence of the state, must make choices among
conflicting traditions and values.
Politically, the historical trend has been a balance
of societal control between externa 1 authoritarian
structures and interna1 moral codes leading toward an
ever increasing reliance upon the former at the expense
of the latter.*5'® Education, as a means of
author i tarian control providing’5'9 the formalised
central element of the learning process, is currently
purposely focussed on the nation, when Incorporating a
wider view. It would allow individualised internalised
'feelings’ of expanded collect Ivity. 1OC>
The early champion of the European movement, Monnet,
disliking the notion of nationalism, equated it with the 
spirit of dom1nat ion. Nationalism is based on
inequality: he envisioned a spirit of equality. He said,
"National sovereignties can oppose one another;
396
nationalise in one country fatally provokes nationalism 
in the others."101 Further, he said, "For a long 
time, people spoke of European unity. But words, general 
ideas, good intentions were not enough. Concrete action 
was necessary to bring that idea to reality. That action 
was started by the Schuman Plan, ”10:2 and resulted in 
the European Community. This political movement was a 
movement toward European integration. This is an 
ideological attempt to dismantle national particularistic 
collectivities in an attempt at limiting domestic 
national authority.
Only very recently we have started to accept in 
the relations between our nations what we 
accept in the relations between men in one 
country: that force does not prevail, that
differences be resolved by common rules, by 
common institutions.10^'
Common allegiance to new institutions relies on slow 
incremental identifications with larger groups. The slow 
pace is a direct result of the fact that it, being highly 
political, is substantially influenced by the domestic 
actors. And, thus they have coloured the goals put 
forward by those actors,10*
"On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the
people decide. it was in fact ridiculous because the 
people cannot decide until somebody decides"10"' what 
the people are to think! Deutsch held that nationality
means an alignment of large numbers of 
individuals from the middle and lower classes 
linked to regional centres and leading social 
groups by cnanneis of communication and
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economic Intercourse both indirectly from link 
to link and directly with the centre,10''
His model was a vertical integration model, not a
horizontal model. It is a model based on total soc iety
and not elite society. If multi-nationa1ism were built 
ostensibly upon the same model, it is not possible to 
consider integration occurring without greater internal 
communicated knowledge. Where the external is merged to 
create an expanded, internal society, there is need for 
greater social knowledge. The current attempt to 
integrate by elites' activity appear to follow the 
Nakruma maxim: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and
all things shall be added unto you."107
The fact that Europeanism is not being universally 
advanced is evidenced by the fact that elite commitment 
is not apparently sufficiently extensive, and that the 
individual, in both the formal and informal setting, is
I
not sufficiently confronted witn idea of Europeanisation
to affect conversion.
Europeanisaton
Introducing Europe into domestic educational 
programmes1061 could occur, not by 'denying’ any past 
historical perspective, but by opening that perspective 
up to include wider collectivity. In A Cultural History
o f Educat i on. Harold Beniamin said,
One of the most characteristic features of 
human culture is the development of organised 
bodies of knowledge as tools of maintaining and 
improving life, and one of the most destructive 
ways in which cultures differ is in their 
conception of knowledge and tne social role 
they assign to it.10'5'
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One of the roles asianed education in a culture is to
cont ro1 domestic culture, it could also be instrumental
i n expand i ng i t.
In organising post-war Europe, emphasis was given 
the economic consideration because ’’History teaches that 
in such a quarrel [over economic disequa11ties3 the 
recourse has always been to force.”110 It was thought 
that some degree of economic integration would enhance 
the long term prospects for peace. If life develops from 
small to large,111 commonality was postulated as
growing functionally from small beginnings, achieving 
eventual integration. Economic dependencies or 
interdependencies are more Cif any) to do with peace 
maintenance. Economics may be the Casus Belli.
Education is. as a stimulant, integrat1ona1. Laws 
governing human life may be fundamentally determined by 
economic factors,312 but integration through 
socialisation Is a meeting of the minds through mind - 
cooperat ion . 1 13,
Whereas previously humanity was the common 
denominator, today, nationality has assumed that 
position, and limited socia 1isation to the domest ic
entity,11a condition in part related to the control 
of the nation by the states and partly due to the demands 
for exactness brought about by modernisation.
If static peace is the desire of interactional 
relations, it must be sought. "We who are living now
cannot ensure peace for ever, because we shall not live
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for ever."11" Consequently, if a dynamic integration 
were sought, peace would become less illusive, less of a 
political activity, more a reality. Such dynamics are a 
part of cerebral activity, an orientation, an image of 
collectivity. Some states in Europe, albeit, the smaller 
states, may be already embarked on this collective 
imagery through social channels. In this respect, 
largeness may be a handicap.
While society evolves, and becomes formalised, the 
structures of the formal evolution further strengthen the 
form of evolution. Change has induced the need for more 
learning. Knowledge acquisition, although essentially a 
matter of individual aptitudes, falls within the
influence of government.316 Interestingly, the
advancement of knowledge is causal to d1sequiIibration, 
and stabilisation is achieved through nothing more than a 
new way of solving problems.
Integrat ion vs ■__Domestic Authority
What does this have to do with European integration? 
Sovereignty is the supreme, unrestricted power of a 
state, but perhaps "the traditional concept of 
sovereignty ... is of little relevance today. In part, 
this is a consequence of changes in the world at large, 
and in part, it is the result of change in the nature of 
Government and the scope of its authority."117’
Integration requires the reduction or an alteration 
of traditional state authority. Given the politically 
sensitive elected nature of goverments, the current
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system requires a status position pre-disposed towards
self •
Britain’s rejection of the Shuman plan in 1950 and 
De Gaulle's withdrawal froa the military structures of 
NATO in 1965 show that a traditional concept of 
sovereignty held by states and elites fixed on the 
central idea of seif may nave been responsible for the 
notion that participation in large international wholes
can only reduce the Influence of individual
nations.11&
The preoccupation of self by Individual nations is 
primarily causal to international tension. The current 
attempt to politically integrate is designed at venting 
tension by the constitution cf internationa1 institutions
shifting the domestic focus from self to the expanded
collectivity. But rigid internationa1 organisations have 
a long history of disintegration11"1 because of the dt 
ut de s component of the organisationa1 arrangements, that 
is, arrangements of groups cf participators, and not 
accomodations within a single expanded group.
Factoring down groups achieves greater cohesion, 
more capable of understanding and addressing change. 
Openly, factoring down is pcssible only by C11> taking an 
expanded holistic view, as opposed to a particular view 
and C2D through knowledge cf alternative points and
positions. The basic common denominator found within 
Europe is its individuals. The creation of structures
with permanence requires tr.eir pa r t i c 1 pa t i on and the
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partIcular1stic knowledge of each other collectively as
self.120
In the Kidst of internat1ona1 change, to answer the 
question, 'Is Europe integrating, or disintegrating?’ is 
a question that directly addresses the creation of Europe 
in the form of individual knowledge of a collective 
self.121 Because primary knowledge is dispersed v1 a 
formal education, it is a question addressed the
Educational systems of domestic European states.
I n Sum
The classical historian Henri Plrenne Introduced a
new idea into the study of antiquity which may be
beneficial to the analysis of integration. The Pirenne 
thesis,122 simply stated, was that the decline of the
Poman Empire was not necessarily due to the constant 
Intrusions from the north by a tide of Germanic peoples.
but was more related to the rise of Mohammedanism.
Specifically the lossof the Mediterranean unity C»are
no st rum as the Orbi s Pomanus) meant the loss of
linguistic cohesiveness12" and resulted in domestic
fraamentat1 on character1sed by historians as the Dark 
Ages. 12X*
Linguistic communications allow for the interchange
cf conceptua1ised ideas. It allows for the
vertlcallsation of thought formalising ideologies which 
afford the development of a te1os as an end goal for 
action. As demonstrated by the German-Prussian
experience, communications, favourable experience, much
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interchange, and intercourse lead to new, expanded 
nationhood, by loosening the ties to traditionalism. 
Education was the vehicle which allowed Cboth formally 
and informally) the development of expanded society by 
challenging the old ideology of conservatism, the idea 
that things are better unchanged. Conservatism is an 
1deology based on the premise of Cl) aristocracy, or a 
traditional ruling elite C2) autonomous or
self-stimulated1'-"’' desire to hold onto the past, or 
C3) situational considerations126 which suggests it is 
easier to hold onto the past. Conservatism rests on the
acceptance of traditional authority. Unbiased education
challenges this position.
As previously illustrated in both the Almond and
Verba study and the EC analysis on the adoption of a 
common currency, the profile of individuals most lively 
to exert a degree of favourable disposition toward a 
collective perception are those individuals who are. to a 
great degree, 'educated'. Education, the internalisation 
and conceptualisation of knowledge, nas this ability 
because it produces_an open-mindedness, as opposed to a
c 1 osed-rn indedness . 3 2'' Knowledge tends to loosen the 
ties to traditional authority, as it produces more 
reliance upon individual liberty.Psychological 
sociological literature posits for conceptualisation 
fixation the two opposing poles of authority and
liberty. 1S1S'
Looking at authority alone, the movement toward
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authority Is that of authoritarianisra. Authority is 
essentially a fixed way of looking at situations, a 
traditional struetura1ism, a posture taken by 
individuals. Its rigidity is highly correlated with 
closed-mindedness and prejudice. It is based on what is
known Ctable 8.4). It is oriented in ethnocentric!sm,
and in nationalism.
Liberal thinking is concerned with open-mindedness, 
looking for new solutions, a position akin to choice made 
by the availability and recognition of possible
options.130 It is based on a selection from
vari ables.
The mixing of these two positions in a political
sense gives rise to societal tensions. Western European 
Nation-States are generally characterised as liberal
democracies. Democracy best embraces the liberal
open-mindedness. However, within Western democracies,
varying from time and circumstances, different degrees of
authoritarianism are evident.
The two positions, authoritarian and liberal, relate 
to society and to integration and ultimately to knowledge 
in the following manner. By definition, society, as a 
collectivity of individuals in development, has some sort 
of meaningful order. Order, as far as it relates to 
control, has two aspects. Society is controlled either
Cl) externa 1ly or C2 ) i nterna1ly.
Cl) External control was, at one point in time, in
the hands of one individual, a Sovereign. External
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controls are given the appelations of power, might, 
strength, or violence.131 Through the evolution of 
modern society, external control is best emphasized by 
the term, 'authority'. A characteristic of modern 
government is its high degree of authority, its control 
of daily individual life was brought about through Caj 
demands placed upon it by those under its jurisdiction;
(b) or its own self-perpetuating autonomy; (c) or its 
demands resulting from the modernity-induced complexities
of current life.13-2
(2} Internal control of society is exercised by what 
is best described as a common morality. Individual 
subscription to codes of morality are individual, highly
singular, and discrete. In the period best characterised 
by Christendom, external control and internal control 
highly correlated, both being balanced with the 
conceptualised notion of religious theology. Hence, 
religion is frequently an identifying attribute of a 
national collectivity, because those 'religious' tend to 
respond to stimuli in manners consonant with the dominant 
theological orientation.
Through the period of modernisation, the balance
between internal and external control shifted to where
external control assumed dominance evidenced by both the 
increases in laws, regulations, and other restrictive
controls by externally exercised authority, and the 
decrease in the prominence of internally sanctioned 
restraints through religion.
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The importance of this Is that the external controls 
take on the characteristics of rigidity and formality.
and are frequently more descriptively articulated than 
the prescriptive controls of a 'higher moral’. Internal 
controls are more related to ideological orientations
than external, are often less formally structured, less
reliant on logical articulations ana more personal.
Internal controls are self-reliant. 1'3?’ external.
system-reliant. Self-reliant orientation focusses on the 
broad aspects of human itv in counteraistinetion to the
system-reliant orientation focussed on the collectivity.
As demonstrated in the German model, the
open-mindedness during the nation building process rested 
on education, knowledge, and high idealism. The two
German-led World Wars rested on tnat states’ retreat to
system-reliance, and authoritarian acceptance. This 
demonstrates the fact that the knowlege produc ing 
ideological orientation which resulted in a humanitarian 
outlook and societal expansion which giving way to a
prejudicial lack of knowledge Churning of books) and an 
Introspection, an ethnic centred authoritarian ideology.
Authority demands obedience ! 1*z' The articulated 
necessity of external control mandates specific language. 
That explains the high correlation between formal
language groups and nation-states. "Humankind's primary
intellectual experience is linguistic.”1’1"'
We start all our reflections with the world 
already formulated in words. Aristotle puts 
it: We start witn ’what the world is said to
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be’. ’With previous knowledge', we set out} if 
not with what 'the world knows', at least with 
the world already sorted out into the
categories of our institutionalised language 
habits. 1
These habits are ’’intelligibilities”12^ representing 
orientations when fed into the system through knowledge 
acausition and relate to the high correlation between 
language identification and national character .
If life is characterised by a series of 
contemplation Ct heor 1 a and action Cpraxi s) , constraints 
In prax i s are introduced into the system by either 
self-imposed controls or externally imposed controls. A 
controlled system yielding to group structures is 
essentially authoritarian.
The t heor i a-prax i s tension propels the individual 
through socialisation to integrate Individually with ever 
increasing circles of exchange, as nations themselves 
quantitatively expand into Integrated society-set fixed 
institutional arrangements. Authoritatively dictating 
external restraints Cpraxls) are modified through
re-thinking Ctheor i a) in the long run. accomplished 
through learning, both experienced and formally.
The rigidity of political empirical a_pr i or 1
argumentation inherent in national governmental 
institutionalised structural regimes requires further 
knowledge for control, especially in the face of a 
deciining ideological commitment as a viable basis for 
societal collectivity cohesion.
Only through unbiased knowledge acauisiton can
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traditional control be abnegated. For European
integration, this means only through the introduction of 
more knowledge into the system can sufficiently enough 
open-mindedness acrue to promote an individual profile 
disposed toward societal expansion. This knowledge is 
necessary for the logical re-evaluation through 
linguistic interchange of traditional external control 
and the (fundamenta 1iv} non-logical Chignlv emotional) 
building of an ideological te1os exercising internal
control.1
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Elitism. CLondon: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1980); Alvin
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CHAPTER NIKE
Conclusion
It is a difficult thing to develop an exposition of the 
salient functionals inherent in the integration process, as 
a paradigm for the analysing and assessing of integration or 
dis-integration. The very question of integration, the 
ramifications of its demonstrative complexities, in light of 
International change, requires a unique approach akin to an 
analytical framework. A frameworr. mat is centred on man in 
society, as social, is vulnerable to individual
interpretation.
The major difficulty in approacning the question in 
this manner is that the consideration becomes exposed to 
external operationa1s, rendering conclusive and substantive 
empirical evidence problematic. Tris is not singular to 
this specific inquiry, but is evicer.cec by specialist 
literature in the field whicn. attempting to overcome same, 
draw a tight postliminary parameter around hi gh1i ant ed 
facets. It was the specific attempt of this analysis to 
avoid this loss of plasticity to encapsulate the process of 
integration in its entirety. By sacrificing measurability, 
it developed a general plexus of interacting relationsnips 
requisite for the understanding cf the overall whole of
i ntegrat i on.
Review
For Europe, in light of tecr.no log i ca 1 advanced 
modernity Cp. 2ff. above), the consideration of integration 
has developed a new urgency. Generally, social integration
is undergone for benefit. For wr.om ana what type of benefit
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is subject to theory Cpp. 6ff.) The concrescence of society 
thus Involved undergoes changes which are observable, as are 
the requisites for that concrescence. Basically, the 
coalescence undergone by the process produces an ethnos, 
making the concause of collectivity an individually
sententious reality Cp- 23). What evolves is a social
community or social unit functioning as a total system with
subsystems differentiated by activity, functioning within
the overall. The process of integration is one in which
total autonomous systems merge with a detrition of
particularistics into a singular nomic unit. Tne integrated 
unit exhibits centripetal tendencies creating solidity 
absorbing previous particular units inte the universal 
either hetero- or homogeneously. History references 
successful and unsuccessful attempts at integration. It is 
significant to note, that the degree of success is high when
integration is underwritten by the individual, motivated by
internalised personal and often altruistic motivations and 
affinities, and low when introduced by elites stimulated by 
a construct of political motivations Cpp . 27ff.).
The essential and fundamental process undergone by an 
individual in a social system is that of socia 1isation Cpp.
52ff). Socialisation affords the estaoiishment of contact
and development of patterned behaviour establishing roles,
which create expectations of performance of Doth self and
other. A sui generis entity evolves. Wnat evolves for the
society is a society with distinct characteristics, and for
the individual a person with a distinct personalitv The
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unique attrition of particu1aristics . merging into
commonality and universa 1istics. is the outcome of
socialisation. Initially, a quia pro quo activity develops 
eventually through the buffetings (pp. 62ff} of the overall 
process into a degree of altruism. Tne 'I' consideration
merges with the 'us’ position. Action and beliefs solidify, 
creating collectivity. For the individual, the produced 
self unites with the societal product of nat i o.
The process of socialisation is an aspect of the theory 
of Functionalism in action. Functional interaction (pp.
74ff.} affords identification as a state of ml nd.
Observable national stereotypes are the outcome of the 
process and evidential of the group uniqueness. The 
achieved uniqueness relating to political and economic
considerations observable in the overall social system 
becomes a psychologica1 position of tne participants in the 
process and simultaneously define the boundaries of
exclusion for those not so incorporated.
It is significant to highlight that the total process 
is very complex and freely structured, highly unique and 
tends toward what may be termed a per itus ootimus bias.
It is here, if social European integration is to 
evolve, tnat the attrition of uniqueness is to be 
introduced. As the individual merges with society during 
socialisation so, too, may social systems merge. Such 
action is integration (pp. 96ff.>. The dependencies and 
interdependencies which characterise integrated society are 
a process of free and unfettered exc.nange and interaction.
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As Identity is individually unique, it must be Independently 
achieved. Individually achieving such is not imposed only 
by outside stimulus. It is also by internal cognisant or 
non-cognisant action. Identity becomes an internalised 
value (pp. 105ff.) distinct and shared.
Here is made more full the Deutschian model of
community, offering theory to incorporate a fuller
understanding of the process (pp. 35ff.). Much confusion is 
expressed as to the whole concept of communication. To 
suggest that language, a substantial portion of
communication, is the criterion for the identification of
uniqueness, is to obfuscate the issue. It diverts attention 
to what lanc^a^e does. The function of language, as 
evidenced in the myriad instances of its utilisation, is to 
convey t nought■ Tne importance of a Deutschian language 
community is not the sharing of a the language per se. out
the sharing of the contents of the mind. Much of the
meta-needs accomodated for (pp- 97ff) during socialisation 
are done by mental posturing visa vis third parties. Mucn 
is by way of anoesis. a sapient positioning facilitated by 
language. This positioning is what gives individual and 
society definition, and i s the result of interaction.
Definition in terms of moral structure fills the Inane and
lends substance to tne meaning of community. Language is 
only a vehicle. The reason why European co 1lectivities 
exhibit uniqueness is not because of the variety of the 
languages spoken, but because of the variety of different
patterned mentally Induced responses to meta-need
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situations. Switzerland is an example with its many
languages but identical Swiss mentality Cpp. liOff.}.
At this point is appreciated the individual 
particularities of nations. . A nation as a social unit 
functions as an informally structured Gesellschaft Cpp. 
141ff), a homogeneous social totality providing a mental
environment for its nationals. A state is a Geme inschaft . a
political unit providing an essentially physical
environment. A successfully integrated society is a society 
in which the totality of its indiviouai constituents, or at 
least a significant portion thereof, nave achieved the 
highly unique and internalised attainment of think!ng and 
perceiving others within the system as oelonging to the 
system. National consciousness is socially conscious.
European Community endeavours ur.Qertas.en in tne name of 
promoting further integration are political. There is no 
substantive evidential proof that successful social 
integration may be achieved in this manner, not directly at 
least. If somehow the political lan^vering triggers
sufficient and sustained individual internalised catnexation
of community, it would be. But there is precious little 
historical evidence of this. The Western European tendency 
of politicising nationalism Cpp. lS^ff.) was instrumental, 
if not causal, to the current state system. Althougr, the 
frequently expostulated position is one suggestive of a
series of nation-states, an examination, evidenced by
devolutions! outcries, suggests not sc much homogeneous
national societies but heteroaeneous state societies.
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France, Spain, Britain, and Belgium are examples.
A truly integrated society, as nothing more than
expanded social community, is where Europeanism is writ 
larger than any domestic identification. It would be where 
the ethnos has been enlarged to incorporate divergencies in 
an essentially ineluctable, identifiable entity. This 
integration is not so much political, as it is individual
and highly mental Cp. 201). Given the common civilisations,
and basically a common if not identical utilisation of the
attainments of civilisation, as witnessed by culture, a 
further fluidity within the social world could and may very 
well produce a European Identity akin to a supra-nationa1itv 
of Europeanness. The fact that this does not appear to be 
the present case is because of the domestic political
content inherent in the modern reality of Europe. This was 
the failure of Functional theory addressed by Neo­
Functionalist theory. The Neo-Functional argument is
persuasive in overcoming the obstacle. "Integration is the
process whereby political actors in several distinct
national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties,
expect a tions and political activities toward a new
centre."1 The outcome of this shifting and realignment
is a new political community. This reasoning is in keeping 
with the politicisation of nationalism evidenced in the true
Western European tradition of historical events. The EC, as 
an example, if successful in creating a political European 
entity, in the long run. would be lust as successful as the
aforementioned European states. It would produce a
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heterogeneous political coounlty. tied together by
politically extracted loyalties, conventions and nominative 
patterns of unity. It is the argument herein contained that 
this sort of, community Is not a socially Integrated
community. Social Integration is not the process of
incremental kinesis of elites, but It is of the kineses of
individuals.
It is evident that the long term evolution as 
well as the current Functioning of the 
Community institutions is fundamentally a 
matter to be determined bv the national 
governments concerned. Supra-nationa1itv has 
contained no genuine escape from sovereign 
states. It may be a step toward federal unity, 
but it is a step taken by governments. which 
retain the capacity to decide whether to take 
further steps forward, to stand still, or to 
retrea t . 2
Monnet understood the true nature of intearation.
He understood it as a mental tasK. "At no time must the
study take on the character of a negotiation. It must be 
a common task."- A negotiation incorporates the 
maintenance of a pre-prejudiced position in a d< ut des
confrontation. A common task is a balance sheet
approach, assessing conditions and postulating goals
focussed on collective, not domestic advantage.
By taking a long term historical view of the social
process of integration, there appears to be an important
sequencing of events. First, tne idea of collectivity.
frequently stemming from a notion of un1versa1ity, which 
eventually evolves into pragmatic politicisation of the 
ideal Cpp. 32C-f f . J . This is a sequence from the mental
to the physical as ideas are translated into action.
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Ancillary to this sequence is the political consideration 
of societal control through either a conon adherence to 
an overriding, individually realised ideal or control by 
what may be tened force Cpp. 207-08'). It is noted here 
that in the absence of an overriding dedication to the 
ideal of a Europeanisr in the bonnet sense. EC endeavours 
are of the latter genre. Collectivity builds oy
politicised force tnrouah institutional and otner
restrictive maneuvering, often subsuming ideological 
orientations. The motivation is supplied by notions or 
perceptions of advantage and mandatory accom»i#cLati«n 
not by any particular normative etr.icai code
subscr i pt i on .
Table 6.1, supported by table 6.2 rpp. 251-5^". 
de mo ns t r a t e s tne ps yc.no 1 og i ca 1 implication in economic 
terms of collectivity perception wit.nir. a giver, 
community. Wnen strong cognitive perceptions of domestic 
strength abound, expanded economic interchange lessens in 
urgency and appeal. Tnis. in tne context of tne EC. 
demonstrates the c « ut des principle. Nothing seems to
be gained through expansion if the domestic unity is 
perceived stronger. Hence, it supports the assertion
that the EC endeavours, at least i r. tnis respect, show a 
marked lack of ideological appeal. Tr.is economic 
consideration may pe expanded to incorporate tne general 
notion of the worth of expanded community. Taole 7.8 
Cpp- 346-^71 snows tnat 53% of polled community nationals 
show anvtning out complete agreement with the idea of a
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single European area.
This suggests that, as far as can be extrapolated 
fro® what has been essentially couched in economic terms, 
more than half of the respondents show reservation to the
idea. The indication is that there is no apparent
resounding notion of advantage. This demonstrates that 
advantage, as opposed to i deoloqi ca1 commitment, is tne 
major consideration. In the absense of ideological 
commitment, it would imply the politically induced 
integration will only be as successful as the
Neo-Functionalist elites' success in converting segments
of domestic population to co 1lectivism.
This is indeed a dismal prospect, if that is all 
that there is to it. It implies a political positioning 
amongst twelve participants for a maximisation of 
particuiarist advantage or at least a minimising of 
particularist disadvantage.
The Future
The theoretical discussion within this analysis,
coupled with empirically testifiable facts where possible 
appear to illustrate an alternative. Firstly, the 
findings summarised in table 7.4 illustrate that the 
higher the level of education, the greater the political 
awareness Cpp. 339ff.}. This may be expanded reasonably 
to substantiate the fact that the greater the amount of 
education, the higher the general environmental 
awareness. Literacy, as a form of education ( p. 3^15.
allows for greater individual exposure to stimuli. i ne
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ultimate value derived is dependent upon both the stimuli 
inputs and the individual Cor collective) utilisation in 
terms of outputs. Higher educated individuals were found 
to be more favourably disposed toward the notion of an 
integrated Europe. There is no substance to suggest the 
type of support these individuals ascribe to
collectivity, i.e.. materialistic or ideological. It may 
indeed by combinations of both. But by noticing the 
linkage between education or Knowledge and favourable 
d1spos i t i ons as empirically Justifiable, psychology 
demonstrates the effects education may introduce, i.e.. a 
shift from prejudice to preference based on choice.
During socialisation, the child changes from an 
individual, se1f-oriented status and merges by way of
education and interchanoe into a contributor. The
child's original 'give me’ orientation evolves to a ’give 
you' or sharing orientation. It is an incremental 
movement from the self-centred particularistic to an 
orientation based in society. Much the same appears to 
be happening to the individuals that experience greater 
levels of education. Particularism tends to merge into
altrusim. lean Monnet indicated this to be his
particular case. He also suggested "cooperation between 
nations will grow from getting to know each other better, 
and from interpenetration between their constituent 
elements and those of their neighbour."3 This is a 
position substantiated by tne findings of Gabriel Almond 
and Sidney Verba in The Civic Culture.^ and suggests a
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valid assumption for general human behaviour Cpp* 
341ff.).
Here. It Is necessary to recall types of attachment 
to a social system. Generally these types are either 
sent 1 aent a 1 or Instrumenta 1 Cp- 28 5?). Sentimental 
attachments are essentially those received and accepted. 
Instrumental attachments are essentially those made by
self coan 11 1 on . Sentimental a 11 a c .-.me nt s freauentlv ailor,
themselves with oreluaice. because tnat Is what Is
'known’ Ctable 8.4?). and may be tne major source of 
public support for social systems. Tnese imply the need 
for governments to re-emphasise ry symbols and
verbiage.the collective Identity Cpp. 315ff.?) throughout 
the entire acculturation undergone within the 
socialisation process within the parameters of the 
collectivity. Instrumental attacr.mer.ts are those aligned 
with higher levels of knowledge. suggestive of a choice 
being made by some sort of evaluation amongst variable*
At this point, it may be assumed that, if this is 
so. integration wouid be the natural result of plain 
knowledge expansion. The evidence dees not suggest this 
to be directly dependent. It is r.ct so much knowledge or 
the form of knowledge, out tne app1ication: what is done 
with the knowledge. The fact tnat Europe exists today as 
a plurality of different social systems, each educating 
their young, in the distinct confines of their own 
linguistic parameters and achieved cultural trait 
traditions, demonstrates that tne Knowledge that is
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received Is domestically biased toward the nation Cor
state).
Essentially, the same Information is being learned 
by German children In German, and French children In 
France, each biased toward those states, producing 
nationals stereotyped as such. Tnis is substantiated by 
table 8.5 that shows that Doiltlcal awareness amongst 
educated children of educated parents exhibit a linkage, 
and the fact as highlighted by Ricnard Rose,-' that the 
persuasions of adults carry througn noticeably to 
children. If political positions of adults are reflected 
substantially onto the child's orientation, then it is 
fair to assume general biases anc prejudices likewise
reflect.
This exposes the paradox i r. sovereignty.
Sovereignty as ultimate autnority must be recognised and 
because of the personnel turnover cf society, authority 
must be constantly exhibited as suer.. Since the
post-Keynesian introduction of tne welfare commitment 
into the realm of government responsibility^ evidenced dv 
the ever Increasing taxation in general termsf required 
by governments to discharge tne welfare requirements <pp. 
265ff.) and exacerbated by the centra 1 i sa t ion of early-
collective socialisation tnrougr. education brought aoout 
by modernity) the state has beer, forcec. with ever 
increasing verve. to fortify its claims to ultimate 
authority. Because of the electoral sensitivity inmere nt
in modern Western European cemocrat.es. it has
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effectively forced the state to give consideration to 
the domestic, over and above any consideration to the 
expanded system as a whole, other than what it exactly 
does, substantiating and enhancing Its d> ut des 
position. It is evident that yes. the states' Insistence 
on domestic sovereignty is the major stumbling block 
toward more racla European1sat1 on and that. yes. it Is 
such because of the states' own doing, required thr«u<M 
its own necessity.
Present endeavours undertaken in western Eurooe
could conclude eventually a higher degree of European 
coalescence dependent on political considerations. This 
does not necessarily imply nor does it effectively 
suggest substantial change associated with the
understanding of tne concept of social integration. It 
suggests, rather, a more tightly political environment, 
in many respects more restrictive, more innibitino. more 
formal and more structured. It suggests something 
analogous to a multi-national political state. Tnis 
suggests that the crux of Europeanisation is found within 
that educational process. The form that integration 
today is taking is based on the assumption of allegiance 
being ascribed to tnrougn cognition. Allegiance of a 
much more enduring nature is that that is based on one's 
own intellection. Individual intellection produces 
allegiance through choice. Subscription to allegiance 
through choice is of seIf-vo1ition. Subscription through
cognition only is an appeal to duty and ax.in to force or
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v1olence.
Consider again the process of education. Language 
learning dismantle* the barrier of bias inherent within 
iiono-11 ngua 1 acculturation. It for»s a linguistic bridge 
to the Binds and thoughts of others. Monnet's linguistic 
knowledge aided hire as “in later years. ... I have 
never naa to fight against reflexes." programmed into nil 
by the bias of an unending stream of aono-llnguistlc 
inputs. The paucity of quantitative evidence makes this
a theoretical assertion. However, there may be a slignt 
indication of this in considering the fact that the EFTA 
country of Austria has been cited in the British national 
press tne first week of April 1986. as contemplating EC 
membersnip. Table 8.3 illustrates the fact that it is
difficult to leave Austrian scnools witnout at least a
substantial knowledge of a second language. The appendix 
review of Austrian educational practices, from which tnis 
information is gleaned, holds Austrian education as an 
example, because it notably exposes tne student formally 
through civic instruction, and informally tnrough
mandatory language learning, to ’otherness’. and it also 
encourages critical choice . This is tne functioning c-f 
attachment through Knowledge and cnoice leading towarc
the acnievement of desire. Througr. tne democratic
political process, knowledge in the hancs of the
electorate has the potential of inhibiting institutional
bias.
me Outcome
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Change is, in actuality, revolution.7 Classical
political theorists were interested in the problems of
cyclical change,'-' attributing revolutionary feelings
to a discrepancy between the individual's wants and their
perceived situation, a discrepancy giving rise to
profound political disagreement. Contemporary theorists
distinguish between genuine political revolution and
other phenomena such as student or urban movements.
Revolution nay be . . .
an acute, prolonged crisis in one or more of 
the traditional systems of stratification . . .
of a political community, which Involves a 
purposive elite-directed attempt to abolish or 
to reconstruct one or more of said systems by 
means of an intensification of political power
This conceptualisation is one that places 
revolutionary cnange in the category of emotion-laden 
utopian ideals and emphasizes the role of elites.10 
Emotion-laden ideals are an "expectation that the society 
is marching toward a profound transformation of values 
and structures, as well as personal behaviour."13 
This degree of intensity, if ever existent, no longer 
appears to be the modus operanoi of European activity. 
Integration, because of its logical appeal to either 
economic or political considerat ions, either domestic or 
collective, appears to have lost its immediate post-war 
urgency, its emotion-iadenness. its cognisant social 
level appeal1*-. Integration appears to be focussed on 
the desire to "get ahead."1- If Europeanisation is no 
longer an emotion-laded idea, what, if anything, is? If
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the ’’pathos of novelty" which has traditionally
accompanied the emotion-laden idea. Involving "the notion 
that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an 
entirely new story, a story never known or told before, 
is about to unfold"1*' is no longer, what is? Is it 
possible to determine the direction of current and future
movement?
There may be a new area of emotion-laden ideas, a 
new question of interest emerging within the minds of 
individuals. A revolutionary idea incorporates a vastly 
improved pattern of human relationships in a future 
realisation. Such a revolution describes a more perfect
social situation - more freedom for the individual,
greater individual equality, more awareness of
commonality and feeling of community, not necessarily 
political, not necessarily economic, but soc ial. Peace, 
human dignity, human rignts. even the environment, may be 
the transcendental ideas witn emerging popular appeal. 
Whereas revolutions of the past were attached to distinct
geographical identifiable areas.1”' the revolutions of
the future appear to be forming without such
parameterisation. The emotion-laden ideas of the future
may be inevitably humanistic, and not nationalistic ie
or if this is so, the new emotional ideals of a broader
humanistic nature are compatible with the humanistic 
ideals that characterised the first stages of German
Integration in the German model.
The forces that compact tne ideals may also be
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humanistically felt.1-7 A society which in one phase 
of its history may be highly Integrated and disposed 
toward intense external conflict might at another time 
undergo domestic disintegration and experience serious
internal di sorders, as did the states of Central
Europe that effectively dissolved and reunited into the 
1871 German entity after the seeds of humanism took hold. 
This may be related to the decentralisation tendencies 
within Europe today. The greater decentralisation in 
France under the socialists and provincial higher
autonomy in Holland or the British folk-led devolution
movements may result in a relaxation of central authority 
in the long term which would be preludial to broader
humanistic centra1isations.
The aisintegration necessary for re-co 11ectivisation 
on a larger scale may be the result of collective action 
or the calculated pursuit of individual interests. These 
individual interests create a gap or Anom i e between
individual orientation and collective structures.19
The gap widens as a result of modernisation between
institutionalisation of social control and the need for
structural change and is exacerbated by the pressure
toward collective action to restore shared beliefs.'*20
The critical guidelines are Cl} addressed to the degree 
to which various strata or groups within the old 
collectivity are participating or not participating in 
the political system and C2} the ability of the old
system to respond flexibly to various new demands and C3}
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the extent or effectivenes of old controls.23
The key to disintegration may lie in the
considerations of: Ci> The extent to which individuals
in collectivities feel themselves more loyal to, than 
critical of, a system: C21 The extent to which elections
are participated in. taxes are paid, military service is 
performed: (3) The extent to which intellectuals educated 
within the system are aosorbed in system: C4} The extent
of system "safety-valves” such as economic competition, 
channels of criticism. expression of new ideas: The
extent of relatively stable cohesive social groups, such
as churches, armies, trade unions, farmers'
organisations, professional associations, political 
parties: C6') The pattern in which symbolic social 
honours, political power, economic benefits are 
distributed among individual groups in system; and C 77 
the proportionate allocation by various groups of 
fear-hostitiiity attitudes inside and outside the 
collectivity.2-
D i s i ntegra t ional tendencies may be domestically 
evident by increased vocal criticism, poor electoral 
turnout, the brain drain, controls on competition or
governmental censoring, the current decline of church
attendance and trade unionism, poor perceptions of
perceived advantages to current collectivities and the
vocalisation of decentra 1isat ion or devolutional
a 11 erna t i ve s, tne econom i c societal divisions or the
lessening of the perception of 'the fear of Russia'
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throughout Europe.
If this is so, then perhaps the greater force which 
would motivate eventual Europeanisa11 on is not on the 
overt, political, economic level, but more to be found on
the underlying social trends in which individuals are 
involved,2-' These individual forces are products of 
conceptualisation, images, the net result of individual
understanding based on individuals’ own acquired
knowledge. Some states in Europe equip through formal 
education their young to deal with social questions: 
others do not. The smaller states, perhaps because of 
their smallness, exhibit a greater degree of
determination to increase individual cognition, others 
dismiss it.=x< Language study contributes toward 
individual cognition by decreasing linguistic barriers to
collectlvisation.
As with the word “Europe" itself,the ideas 
held by Europeans toward the notion of European 
integration are unclear.2"- In actuality. European 
integration is postulated as a 'process of political
. . . transformation,’ however, to achieve it, it must be
“also fa) far reaching social transforiaat ion."27 Such 
a process is not without difficulty.2** The approaches 
taken within literature: cultural, anthropo1ogica1, 
political science, soc i o logi ca 1 . economic, or legal2'* 
reflect, fundamentally, a mono-discipiinary view and, 
depending on the discipline’s approach, propose opposing 
paradigms . :r"0
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Integration necessitates a focus on the individual, 
as it is he who ultimately socialises into integration. 
The mono-dlsciplinarv views summarily overgo the 
individual's feelings, his emotion-laden subnascent 
feelings or conceptualised ideas. They focus on aspects 
which may or may not peripherally affect, but not 
specifically encapsulate, the individual's att1tudes.
The aspects on which they focus are Trans-nationa1 
institutions, governmental institutions, economic 
transactions, or conditional phenomena, political 
sovereignty, authority, power, or elites. They all have 
concepts which have to do with quantifiable, descriptive, 
or prescriptive conditions of cooperation, which may, to 
a greater or lesser degree, influence the individual's
constructed attitudes.
Attitudes are the basis for communities of
attachment . 33 as they are, In principle, ’’shared
opinions of large groups of people (sometimes called 
"publics"32) which, in theory, at least can “exercise 
influence over individual behavior, group behavior, and 
governmental po 11 cy . “ These may not have a direct 
1i nka ge.
“The institution or maintenance of a democratic
system is not contingent in any immediate sense upon 
public opinion. In the long run. though, it may well be 
that democracy thrives only where people actively support 
it.,,::::X4 Such collective attitudes may be either the
product of a leading Cbubble-up))::*•-, or a lagging
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Ctrlckle-down)36 process. That is an upward flow
todel. from public to elites or a downward flow model, 
from elites to public.3'7
Societal growth is best conceptualised in an organic 
model. The organic evolution model lays important 
emphasis on the individual's own commitment to expansion.
a commitment gleaned through either experience or
education. Although the leadership function exercised by 
elites appears to have a great effect on the 
collectivity, that function appears to be inversely 
proportional to the leadership ability of the 
collectivity itself as time shifts from the short run
into the intermediate and long run.
A political short or intermediate integrationa1 
attempt, led by elites, would be characterised by that 
of. for example, the Austrian-Hungarian or Sweden-Norway 
unions, or the occupations of various European areas by 
Hitler or Napolean. An example of the long run societal 
influence is demonstrated by the growth of most 
Nation-States, as France. Britain, or Italy.
Tne close-knit cultural community,3® once united, 
albeit loosely, under Christendom, is now fragmented, 
disintegrated, and polarised.3*
These states polarised, on these dates, into what
has been termed the liberal democracies of Western
Europe. They came into being and were recognised as
constitutional democracies, and as nation states in a
time when economic evolution could no longer be contained
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within distinct geographic boundaries. The curlosum of 
the post-constitution period, brought about by the 
general evolution and pro 11feration of knowledge, was in 
the introduction of state sponsored educational 
processes, a politically induced function directly 
affecting the social evolution process, and reinforcing 
individual identity.
Integration as change in the recent past appears to 
have been coupled with a humanistic idealism, exemplified 
by "God has given you your country as cradles, and 
humanity as mother; you cannot rightly love your brethren 
of the cradles if you love not the common mother."4*0 
This thought gave way to a particularistic-nationalistic 
bias. This bias is what the politicisation of
integration is attempting to redress.
As "in the modern world. Europe has to rely on 
itself,"*£41 the international regime of the EC. 
desperately realising the necessity for successful 
integration, seeks to unite through perhaps the greatest 
continuing international effort yet known to Europe 
exclusively. But, as history has repeatedly witnessed, 
political or elite endeavours have but marginal long term 
success. Lasting success appears as collective movements
lead not necessarily from the top down, by efforts of 
elites, but bottom up, by the action of the population ar 
large.42 Ideological commitment*4*3 is necessary for 
a successful population-led end-result. The pen may 
indeed be mightier than the sword. It may be in the
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realm of a utopia, but the conceptualisation of the idea 
precedes concentrated action.
This organic model of European growth is a
conceptualisation of society as . . .
a number of persons with a locus. . . . some
permanence and a history. . . . The broadest
grouping of people who share a common set of 
habits, ideas and attitudes, live (sic) in a 
definite territory and consider themselves a 
social u n i t . z<
Idealism is an essential, albeit often overlooked.
component of the overall integration process, . the
unique trait of human society - the thing which 
transforms the primitive grouping into a new emergent 
reality - is the system of symbolic communication,’^”' 
shared within the community^*' The fixation on the 
appropriate locus amongst individual Europeans will 
determine the eventual outcome of integratlonal
attempts.'4’7 It depends on (i) communication, but more
on (2) collective symbols. Europeans are at the end of a 
period in which their history, habits, attitudes, 
territory, and indeed their whole thought, has been 
focussed inwardly on themselves, their domestic nations, 
and the nation's political states. Through increased 
modernisation, their increased perviousness is
una vo i dable.
This perviousness will eventually lead to further 
integration. If primarily conducted by way of political 
moves, the situation will slowly change international 
systems via the constructs of crypto-integrational
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i nst i t ut i ona 1 i t y, and integration will be long in
coining. If. however, the lead was icpianted in social 
endeavours, it would be much more rapiclv achieved. 
Holistically viewed, what keeps Europeans from seeing 
themselves as Europeans, individuals sharing portions of 
like territory, with like attitudes arc like history and 
habits, is nothing more than the slant wnich their states 
put on these phenomena and stimuli. Tc integrate may be. 
in real terms, nothing more difficult tnan to change that 
slant, to allow it to happen as it has cualis ab incepto. 
The challenge is worth the try, for ’’until you have 
tried, you can never tell whether a task is impossible or
not .
It is the duty of a patriot tc prefer and 
promote the exclusive interest arc glory of his 
native country: but a ohilosoorer mav be -
permitted to enlarge his views, and 
Europe as one great republic, whcse 
establishments have attained almost 
level of politeness and cultivation, 
balance of power will
and the prosperity of 
neighbouring kingdoms 
exalted or depressed:
to cons ider 
varIous 
the same 
The
continue to fluctuate, 
our own or the 
may be alternately 
but these partial
events cannot essentially injure our general 
state of happiness, the system cf arts, and. 
laws and manners which so advantageously 
distinguish, above the rest of mankind. the 
Europeans. . . .&c>
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APPENDIX
Survey of Coapulsorv Educational Practices
in European States1
Austr i a
In many respects, the Austrian approach to Europeanism 
may be exemplary. Its ultimate object is a system 
characterised by humanity and freedom from fear.2 The 
attitude taken by the government was heavily influenced by 
the effects of World War II3 and its intent is to produce 
"conscientious and responsible members of society" 
encouraged to develop an independent Judgment and social 
understanding, to be open-minded to the philosophy and 
political thinking of others and to participate in and with 
both Austria and Europe.Modern languages are taught as 
a constituent compnent of that ideal- and its adherence 
is a s sured.e
Both the humanitarian approach to education with Its 
openness and Europe an approach, and its extensive forei gn 
language suggests a compulsory educational system geared 
toward the formation of minds potentially favorably disposed 
toward openness, based on knowledge, with the facility for 
independent cultural choice. The Austrians possess a 
disposition conducive toward integration.7
BeIgi urn
The structure of education in Belgium is highly marked 
by the country's own distinct problems, primarily the strife 
caused by the political unification of what appears to be 
two ethnic groups, the Flanders (French'1 and the Walioniar.s 
(Deutsch}. The problem is exacerbated by the religious 
divisions roughly associated witn tne linguistic. As of 
July 14, 1975. there has been a significant step toward tne
creation of a pluralistic system.e A pluralistic system 
is fundamentally a system given over to accomodation of tne 
underlying philosophical and linguistic divisions of the 
Belgian society. Two patterns emerge, the Old Humanistic 
which centres around Latin study and the new humanities 
which centre around modern langauges.s' Regardless of 
previous exposure, all students, based on the results of 
examinations, are placed in a Classical language stream or a 
modern language stream which frequently mirrors the
philosophical orientation of their origins.
The impression of the Belgian educational system is 
that a preoccupation with their own linguistically centred 
problems overshadows any general commitment toward the 
creation of a European consciousness. despite Brussels es 
the headquarters of the Community.
Denmark
The Denmark education Is compulsory. however, school 
attendance is not. Foreign languages are an eminent feature 
of their educational system and amongst those that attend 
school. English is compulsory for at least four years.10 
The Danish Folkeskole "prepares pupils for sharing in the 
activities and decisions of a democratic society and for 
sharing responsibilities for solving the problems that face 
society.*’11 Responsibility mandates Knowledge, and
knowledge is increased by full exposure of the individuals
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to outside structural stimuli. The model for education, the 
Folkskole. has been adopted throughout the Scandinavian 
countries12 and is coordinated by the Ministry of 
Education to ensure standard learning levels.1 * The 
impression of the Danish educational system, similar to 
Austria, is one of a small country, educating its young to 
be social contributors in an expanded (interactionai) 
env i ronment.
FInland
Education is compulsory, although it is not mandatory 
for students to attend. It is of a comprehensive school 
nature Cas in the Danish Foikeskole} and Finnish citizenship 
mandates compliance Ceither attendance or not) with its 
standards. The duty of citizenship is to acquire a 
bill ngua 1 country (Finnish and Swedish)) and every cn i id is 
taught two languages compulsory, other than the mother 
tongue. 86 percent of students undergoing compulsory 
education elect English as an A-level course, meaning for an 
extended period. Languages are taught openly, with cultural 
content and complements compulsory history which covers 
aspects of Finnish, regional, and European topicality.1^
The impression the Finnish education system makes, not 
discounting its historical ties and dominations, is one 
emphasising literacy in a multiple of European languages.
France
Education in France is a constitutionally enshrined 
function of tne Stare and is conducted eitner direct or by 
contract with <95%. Catholic? the state. Streaming ir.tc 
foreign language study is 'compulsory from class six tc class 
three. Students that continue to the completion of 
secondary education C70%?) enter the 1 vcee s. either
professional or general. Foreign language learning is a 
prominent feature of the 1vcees curriculum. The languages 
taught are dependent on the facilities of the scool witn 
English and secondly, German. Spanish, and Italian tai-ting 
prominence.1"' The general impression is that languages 
are taught as a constituent component of understanding 
others.
Germany
All day compulsory school for all children between the 
ages of six and fifteen, and the coordination of various 
types of school was adopted in 1946.1,::> This introduced a 
protracted debate on content and type of education in 
Germany, greatly intensified by the Bundesstaat governmenta 1 
structure where the Bundeslander1'7' are generally
responsible for education. Tne SPD holds the idea of
comprehensive schools for ail. The FDP believes in greater 
competition between different types of pupils.10 Tne 
result is seen by the emphases which vary in the 
Bundeslander according to political party dominance. Tne 
Lehrplane is accordingly different. However, coordination 
is achieved at the broad level with compulsory education 
which on the Grundschuie level includes Social Affairs
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CSoziaIkunde7. The system is replete with examinations in 
all schools at all levels to assure a basic learning.’""
An interesting aspect of the German higher educational 
system is that students are expected to avail themselves of 
a Wunaeriahr, a year’s study abroad, a modern revival of an 
old German custom suspended during the Nazi era. The loose 
structuring of the German educational system reflects its 
constituent foundations,20 but central coordination 
appears to ensure an extensive exposure to foreign language 
study.
I re la nd
Primary education in Ireland is managed by boards 
composed of parents, staff, and religious authorities. 
Although teachers are paid by the Department of Education, 
content is highly influenced by local will. As of 1971, an 
official curriculum laid down by the Department of Education 
has aimed at broadening local education to include social 
studies. Post primary education is under private 
management. To obtain government funding, some loose 
curriculum guidelines are suggested, which include a desire 
for language exposure, but. despite a system of state 
inspectors, does not appear to insure instruction.21
Italy
Article 34 of the Italian Constitution states that 
“Education is available to everyone. Elementary education, 
imparrec for at least eight years, is compulsory and 
free."-- Central coordination is not strong and hence a 
uniform picture of any compulsory language exposure is not 
possible. What is possible, however, is to glean the 
effects of positive coordination for a perceived goal. In 
the Directive for a Long-Term Educational Plan for the
Period Successive to dune 3D. 1965, the state began
allocating a figure in excess of five percent of the
national income toward education. The result is that, at 
the expense of Classical education, scientific instruction 
has registered an increase of five hundred percent in the 
first decade.23 The marked economic improvement of the 
Italian economy may be directly correlated with this 
governmental shift in education,-2^ borne out by the fact 
that Italy has had higher university enrollments since 1970 
than any other European nation.23 As university
admittance is based in part on foreign linguistic ability, 
this would suggest a substantial achievement of foreign 
language knowledge.-6'
Swi tzerland
Despite its complexity, school in Switzerland from the 
emergence of compulsory education at the beginning of the 
last century shows common characteristics. Because of its 
multi-national nature, education tends to be liberal, 
tolerant, and emphasises broad-mindedness. The Cantonal 
System, as in the Bundesiand System in Germany, is primarily 
responsible for compulsory education. Compulsory is at 
least one other national language (Eomanisch, German,
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French. Italian). All school leavers must sit examinations, 
so some degree of foreign language exposure is assured,27 
despite a recognised provincialism.20
Norway
More than ninety percent of Norway’s young people 
continue education beyond the compulsory period.22'5' The 
1969 act concerning basic school and the Supplementary Act 
of 1975 give all citizens the same statutory right to 
education.30 Norwegians have a great latitude in 
selection of educational courses, however, "major subjects" 
within the compulsory period include English. English is 
compulsory for all pupils from the fourth grade onwards, and 
a second foreign language may be chosen in the eighth 
year.31 Another example of direct state influence on the 
socialisation process is evident in Norway by the ANT 
compulsory topics, a series of compulsory instruction 
covering the use of alcohol, narcotics, and tobacco.
Sweden
Every county in Sweden has a county education board 
appointed by the State. It functions as the liason between 
the State and the community and is responsible for
curricular supervision. The compulsory component of the 
Swedish currlculua is conducted within the nine year 
comprehensive school. Within this school, ail students take 
the same subjects at the primary level. Englisn is 
compulsory from grade tnree Cor four). Options are 
introduced in the senior level and French anc German or 
another "home language" must be included among tne optional 
subjects. The first two are more popular than the 
third.73 22
Holland
The educational system in Holland is highly 
centralised. Here centralisation provides an extremely 
effective method of creating an effective educational 
system. Schools in Holland are divided amongst Fublic 
C26%), Catholic C41%), Protestant C26%), and private C7%). 
and are administered by the several times amended Compulsory 
Education Act of 190G. The syllabus of the schools, in 
accordance with the act, is worked out to achieve an 
amelioration of state and school goals. Higher schools 
(Gymnasiuni and Atheneum) require either Dutch, Greek, Latin, 
and one modern language CFrench, German, or English) or 
Dutch, Greek, Latin, and two modern languages. Frisian is 
an optional subject, as is also Russian, Spanisn. Esperanto, 
and Hebrew.33 English is contained in the overall school 
plan required by all scnools as taught subjects.3^
Although a very diverse system, centralisation maintains the 
achievement of broad curriculum content aims. Language 
proficiency is one of these aims.
Luxembourg
In many respects. Luxembourg is a linguistic puzzle.
In other countries, such as Switzerland, several languages
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are also spoken, but they are almost always limited to 
definable regions. In Luxembourg, this is not the case. 
Here, various languages are superimposed almost
hierarchically. In all levels of society, oral
communication is in the Luxembourg, a Mosel dialect of 
frank!sh-german1c origin. The German language, because of 
its relationship to Luxembourgese. is favoured by the 
popular classes, French by the intellectual elite. French 
is used as much as possible. German when it is
indispensible.French is the official language of the 
authorities. This sort of multi-layered linguistic system 
places a heavy burden on the educational Institutions. 
Primary school itself is taught in German. As compulsory 
education advances, French replaces German as the medium of 
instruction with the result that, ar the end of the 
schooling. German is treated as a foreign language.
Throughout most of the secondary scnool program, English is 
compulsory.
Port uga1
Primary education in Portugal does not carry any 
foreign language exposure. Preparatory education does 
include, in its syllabus of ordinary courses. French, 
English, and German. These courses are offered either in 
direct preparatory education or TV preparatory CTelescola}. 
In the seventh year of schooling, languages are mandatory. 
Those who continue past the compulsory schooling have 
greater exposure. Since EEC affiliation, Portugal has been 
undergoing a process of school reform to not only attack 
illiteracy, but also raise the general standards of living 
through greater popular education.37
The United Kingdom
British education tends to exhibit a high degree of 
f lex i bi 1 i ty . 3se* Currently, the whole educational system 
in the United Kingdom has undergone, and is contemplated to 
undergo, change, as results are politically reassessed, 
reviewed, and reshaped to, "in the light of difficult 
economic circumstances and a substantial drop in the birth 
rate,"39 develop a 'better school' system. In the 
current political climate, the government's basic attempt 
appears to be at forcibly educating for not so much personal 
rewards but more public rewards.*0 Using education 
directly, as a means for achieving distinct political aims, 
"to encourage institutions to improve their management and 
planning, and to become more flexible and responsive to the 
economic . . . needs of the country"*1 the government
has tended to control, and through the adoption of muted 
reforms, will enhance control via guidelines over the direct 
process.These are broadly to include English, 
mathematics, and science, some study of the humanities 
including history, religious, and physical education, and 
"most pupils should also study a foreign language."*3 As 
compulsory education falls within tne reach of local 
councils, little compulsion is placed on a set taught 
curriculum other than the aforementioned guidelines. The
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respective departments of education nave a significant tool 
at their disposal for guiding local education.''''4 It 
appears as if the new emphasis in Britain on the centralised 
curriculum will, if adopted, include a "balanced 
curriculum," including "foreign 1 anguageCsin order 
to standardise the British Educational System.
APPENDIX NOTES
because of difficulties in obtaining objective 
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append 1x.
^Government policy declaration of May 1983. See The
Austrian Educational System__ Austrian Documentation.
(Vienna: Federal Press Service. 1984), p. 5.
3Loc. clt. p. 8.
^Loc. cit. pp. 9-10.
55 Austria Organisation of Education 1976-80. (Wien: 
Bundesm1n1ster1um fur unterrlcht and kunst, 1981), p. 33.
^Loc. c1t. p. 37.
^For further Information, see "Aaaaogische 
Freiheit.” in Marian Heitger. Recht der Schule. fWlenne: 
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